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DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT 
1. Upon the death of the President, the Vice President shall 
become President. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; U.S. 
Const. amend. XXV, § 1. See Appendices 1 & 3. 
2. The Vice President should take the oath for the Office of 
President prescribed by the U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 1, 
cl. 7, as follows: 
"I [, Albert Gore, Jr.,] do solemnly swear (or affirm) 
that I will faithfully execute the Off ice of President of 
the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, 
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United 
States." 
Appendix 2. 
3. The oath may be administered by any "individual authorized 
by local law to administer oaths in the State, District, or 
territory or possession of the United States where the oath 
is administered." 5 u.s.c. § 2903(c). See Appendix 6. If 
the Vice President is away from the country, he simply can 
swear the oath in the presence of a witness. 
4. The Secretary of the Treasury immediately should direct the 
Secret Service to provide protection to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, and other appropriate individuals, 
pursuant to 18 u.s.c. § 3056(a). 
5. At any time after he takes the oath of Office, President 
Gore may select and nominate a Vice President who shall take 
off ice upon confirmation by a majority of both Houses of 
Congress. U.S. Const. amend. XXV, § 2 • 
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TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT 
Threshold Considerations 
At any time that the President is, or is about to become, 
temporarily unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
off ice, consideration must be given to whether or not it is 
prudent or necessary to transfer temporarily full Presidential 
authority to the Vice President, pursuant to the 25th Amendment. 
See Appendix 3. This may be accomplished in two ways: 
(1) Pursuant to Section 3 of the 25th Amendment, the 
President voluntarily may transfer authority. Procedures 
for such a transfer are outlined at Tab c of this document. 
(2) Pursuant to Section 4 of the 25th Amendment, the Vice 
President and a majority of the Cabinet may transfer 
authority without the President's consent or even over his 
objections. Procedures for such a transfer are outlined at 
Tab D of this document. 
The first questions that must be asked in any situation where use 
of the 25th Amendment is contemplated are as follows: 
(1) Is the President conscious and capable of understanding 
and giving his assent to the temporary transfer of authority 
to the Vice President; 
(2) Is there sufficient time before the President becomes 
unconscious or unable to understand -- ~' before he 
undergoes general anesthesia -- to obtain the President's 
signature or assent to a written declaration of inability as 
outlined at Tab C of this Document? 
If the answer to either of these questions is "no," Section 3 may 
not be used. Consideration should turn immediately to the use of 
Section 4. 
If the answer to both of the above questions is "yes" such that 
Section 3 may be used, a Section 3 transfer of authority is much 
preferable to a Section 4 transfer. A Section 3 transfer of 
executive power is a voluntary act by the President that can be 
countermanded immediately by the President; therefore, it is less 
legally ambiguous than the Section 4 procedure to restore power 
to the President. 
The decision whether or not to invoke the provisions of the 25th 
Amendment can, of course, only be made in the context of the 
circumstances that exist at the time that the President becomes, 
or is anticipated to become, temporarily disabled. However, 
certain generalizations can be made and, if time permits, the 
following paragraphs should be considered: 
A. Delegation of Authority. The question of whether or not the 
procedures of the 25th Amendment should be invoked may well be 
answered by examining the non-delegable powers and duties of the 
President. Constitutionally and by statute the President has 
broad authority to delegate functions vested in him by law. 
3 u.s.c. § 301. See Appendix 5. Use of the 25th Amendment 
procedures might be avoided by delegation of Presidential 
authority when it is anticipated -- ~., in the case of elective 
surgery -- that the President would be unable to discharge the 
duties of his office for a relatively short period of time. On 
the other hand, the Constitution and certain statutes impose 
limits on the President's power to confer his authority on 
subordinate officials. If, during a period of Presidential 
inability to discharge the duties of his off ice, an action must 
be taken that only can be taken by the President or the Acting 
President, then obviously one of the 25th Amendment procedures 
must be invoked. The non-delegable functions of the President 
are: 
1. The power to nominate and appoint the officers of the 
United States to the extent provided in Article II, § 2, 
cl. 2 of the Constitution. 
2. The power to approve or return legislation pursuant to 
Art. I, § 7, cl. 2 and 3 of the Constitution, and the power 
to call Congress into special session or to adjourn it 
according to Art. II, § 3. 
3. The power to make treaties by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. (It should be 
noted, however, that the power to negotiate treaties and the 
power to enter into Executive agreements may be delegated. 
7 Op. A.G. 443 (1853).) 
4. The power to grant pardons. 
5. The power to remove purely Executive Presidential 
appointees. 
6. The power to issue Executive orders and proclamations. 
(The President can, however, delegate the power to issue 
many orders which cover substantially the same subject 
matter as Executive orders and proclamations as long as they 
are not so labeled.) 
7. The powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of 
the armed forces as provided in Art. II, § 2, cl. 1 of the 
Constitution. Although the President cannot delegate his 
ultimate Constitutional responsibilities as Commander-in-
Chief, he may make arrangements with his civilian and 
military subordinates to ensure that the chain of command 
will function swiftly and effectively in time of crises. 
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B. Section 3 vs. Section 4. Of the two 25th Amendment 
procedures by which the Vice President temporarily can assume the 
powers and duties of the Off ice of President, the Section 3 
procedure is eminently preferable to the Section 4 procedure. 
Not only would the transfer of authority to the Vice President be 
justly perceived as a voluntary and conscious decision by the 
President, but the mechanism by which the President reassumes his 
authority under Section 3 is very simple. 
If the Section 4 procedure is invoked, the President reassumes 
his powers and duties upon transmittal of his written declaration 
that no inability continues to exist unless the Vice President 
and a majority of the Cabinet transmit, within four days, their 
written declaration to the contrary. The answer to the question 
of who governs during this four-day period is uncertain, though 
the more persuasive legal arguments would leave authority in the 
Vice President until the four-day period had elapsed. See 
discussion in Appendix 14 at p. 5 and Appendix 15 at p. 4. 
Accordingly, any time that it is anticipated that the President 
will undergo a period of general anesthesia, during which time a 
decision may have to be made which only can be made by the 
President, or the Vice President as Acting President, serious 
consideration should be given to the use of Section 3 of the 25th 
Amendment • 
c. Inability to Govern. Both Section 3 and Section 4 of the 
25th Amendment involve a determination that the President is 
"unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." The 
legislative history of the 25th Amendment clearly envisions that 
this inability to govern might stem from either physical or 
mental disabilities of the President. The question arises, 
however, as to whether the incapacity of the President must 
necessarily be physical or mental or can it result from outside 
events. For example, what if the President is kidnapped, known 
to be alive, but held incommunicado? Or what if the President is 
simply missing as a result of an Air Force One mishap? The 
legislative history gives no guidance in such situations. 
Even in situations less farfetched, once one gets beyond a 
comatose state, or perhaps massive paralysis, defining inability 
might prove to be extremely difficult and likely to depend, to a 
large extent, on the surrounding circumstances. A discussion of 
prior Presidential disabilities may be found at Appendix 13. 
Perhaps the best guidance, however, can be found in the House 
Report which accompanied the 25th Amendment: 
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to 
secure continuity in cases of inability must depend upon 
public opinion with a possession of a sense of 
"Constitutional morality." Without such a feeling of 
responsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against 
3 
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usurpation. No mechanical or procedural solution will 
provide a complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases 
in which most of the parties are rogues and in which no 
popular sense of Constitutional propriety exists. It seems 
necessary that an attitude be adopted that presumes we shall 
always be dealing with "reasonable men" at the highest 
governmental level. 
See Appendix 17 at p. 13. 
D. Transfer of Authority on July 13. 1985. On July 13, 1985, 
as former President Ronald w. Reagan was about to go under 
general anesthesia in connection with surgery to remove a portion 
of his large intestine, he signed the attached letters. The 
letters were drafted in such a fashion as to preserve to former 
President Reagan and future Presidents maximum flexibility in 
responding to possible brief periods of inability. As noted, the 
legislative history of the 25th Amendment does not provide a 
definitive answer to the question whether the drafters intended 
it to apply to brief periods of inability. Indeed, most of the 
legislative history discussed considerably more extended examples 
of Presidential inability, such as President Wilson's illness. 
The letters signed by then President Reagan indicate his belief 
that the 25th Amendment was not intended to cover brief periods 
of inability of the sort encountered on July 13, 1985, in the 
sense that a transfer of authority was not required or clearly 
contemplated by the drafters of the Amendment. 
The procedures of Section 3 are available at the complete 
discretion of the President. While a transfer of authority may 
not have been required or clearly contemplated by the drafters in 
instances such as former President Reagan's surgery, his Counsel 
determined that a transfer of authority was appropriate to 
eliminate any doubts concerning the continuation of the powers of 
the Presidency. There was some criticism of this procedure in 
the media, with some critics contending that Section 3 clearly 
was applicable and should have been clearly invoked. As noted, 
however, because it is unclear that Section 3 was intended to 
cover the July 13 situation (surgery), and a simple statement 
invoking the Amendment under such circumstances would have 
created a precedent that might have presented problems in the 
future when Presidents were confronted with similar inabilities 
but vastly different circumstances, Reagan's Administration 
elected to follow the above-described procedure. This procedure 
ensured that there was no lapse in the continuity of Presidential 
authority, with no doubt as to who was "in charge," while not 
binding future Presidents in any way. Some seven hours after 
former President Reagan transferred authority, he signed the 
attached letters reassuming the powers and duties of the Off ice. 
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THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
July 13, 1985 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I 
will be briefly and temporarily incapable of 
discharging the Constitutional powers and duties of 
the Office of the President of the United States. 
After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney 
General, I am mindful of the provisions of Section 3 
of the 25th Amendment to the Constitution and of the 
uncertainties of its application to such brief and • 
temporary periods of incapacity. I do not believe 
that the drafters of this Amendment intended its 
application to situations such as the instant one. 
Nevertheless, consistent with my long-standing 
arrangement with Vice President George Bush, and 
not -intending to set a precedent binding anyone 
privileged to hold this Office in the future, I have 
determined and it is my intention and direction that 
Vice President George Bush shall discharge those 
powers and duties in my stead commencing with the 
administration of anesthesia to me in this instance. 
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I 
determine that I am able to resume the discharge of 
the Constitutional powers and duties of this Office. 
May God bless this Nation and us all, 
s0rely, 
~~~ 
The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. 
Speaker 
United States House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
• 
• 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
July 13, 1985 
Dear Mr. President: 
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I 
will be briefly and temporarily incapable of 
discharging the Constitutional powers and duties of 
the Office of the President of the United States. 
After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney 
General, I am mindful of the provisions of Section 3 
of the 25th Amendment to the Constitution and of the 
uncertainties of its application to such brief and • 
temporary periods of incapacity. I do not believe 
that the drafters of this Amendment intended its 
application to situations such as the instant one. 
Nevertheless, consistent with my long-standing 
arrangement with Vice President George Bush, and 
not intending to set a precedent binding anyone 
privileged to hold this Office in the future, I have 
determined and it is my intention and direction that 
Vice President George Bush shall discharge those 
powers and duties in my stead commencing with the 
administration of anesthesia to me in this instance. 
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I 
determine that I am able to resume the discharge of 
the Constitutional powers and duties of this Office. 
May God bless this Nation and us all, 
The Honorable Strom Thurmond 
President Pro Tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
'WASHINGTON 
July 13 11 1985 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
Following up on my letter to you of this 
date 11 please be advised I am able to resume 
the discharge of the Constitutional powers 
and duties of the Office of the President of 
the United States. I have informed the Vice 
President of my determination and my 
resumption of those powers and duties. 
Since<rz~~ 
The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. 
Speaker 
United States House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
. ·• 
WASHINOTON 
July 13, 1985 
Dear Mr. President: 
Following up on my letter to you of this 
date, please be advised I am able to resume 
the discharge of the Constitutional powers 
and duties of the Office of the President of 
the United States. I have informed the Vice 
President of my determination and my 
resumpiion of those pow~rs and duties. 
The Honorable Strom Thurmond 
President Pro Tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
~ I ~ , . 
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TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT 
SECTION 3 PROCEDURE 
The Vice President Becomes Acting President Pursuant 
to the United States Constitution, Amendment XXV. § 3 
If the President is willing and able to do so, he may provide for 
the temporary assumption of the powers and duties of his off ice 
by the Vice President by "transmit[ting] to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office •••. " 
Appendix 3. 
The following procedure should be used: 
(1) Written Declaration. The President's declaration 
of disability must be written. If possible, the 
letters should be typed on Presidential stationery. If 
circumstances demand, however, the letters may be hand-
written on any type of paper. 
(2) Form. The written declaration should consist of 
two short letters framed in the Constitutional 
terminology and addressed, respectively, to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of 
the House. Appropriate letters are attached at 
Appendix 7. 
(3) Signature. The letters should be signed 
personally by the President if possible, but a reliable 
manifestation of his understanding and assent would 
suffice. In cases of any doubt regarding his capacity 
to understand and assent, the procedure under Section 4 
of the 25th Amendment should be used. 
(4) Transmittal. Transmittal of the letters to the 
President pro tempore and the Speaker is the operative 
event to effect the transfer of authority to the Vice 
President. Transfer of authority to the Vice President 
takes effect immediately when the letters are sent (or 
placed in the hands of a messenger); it is not delayed 
until the letters are received by the addressees. 
Accordingly, there is no need to have the President pro 
tempore and the Speaker stand ready, at the White House 
or elsewhere, to receive the letters. 
See Appendix 12 at p. 3, n. 4. 
Documentation of when, where and to whom the letters 
are sent and receipt of delivery would be prudent. 
Transmittal should be made not only to the offices of 
the addressees, but also to each personally. 
(5) Oath. 
a new oath. 
The Vice President is not required to take 
See Appendix 12 at p.l, n. 1. 
(6) Status of the Vice President. Pursuant to the 
above procedure, the Vice President assumes all the 
Constitutional and statutory powers and duties of the 
President. He does not, however, become President. 
Instead, he becomes "Acting President" and should use 
that designation for all official purposes. In 
addition, he would continue to exercise the duties of 
Vice President while he serves as Acting President, 
although he would apparently lose his title as 
President of the Senate. See Appendix 12 at p.l, n.1; 
and p.2 at n. 2. 
2 
r 
• 
• 
• 
' 
• 
TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT 
SECTION 4 PROCEDURE 
The Vice President Becomes Acting President Pursuant 
to the United States Constitution. Amendment XXV. § 4 
If the President is unable or unwilling to transmit a declaration 
of his inability to perform his duties, the Vice President and "a 
majority of the principal officers of the executive departments 
• . • [may] transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written 
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office ••. " Appendix 3. In such an event, 
the Vice President immediately shall assume the powers and duties 
of the off ice as Acting President. 
The following procedure should be used: 
(1) Consensus of the Cabinet. The Vice President and 
a "majority of the principal officers of the executive 
departments of such other body as Congress may by law 
provide" must agree that the President is unable to 
discharge his duties. Congress has not designated any 
"other body" to exercise this authority and the 
legislative history indicates that the term "principal 
officers of the executive departments" is intended to 
mean the Cabinet. Appendix 12 at p.2. 
"The Cabinet" traditionally consists of the heads of 
the fourteen executive departments; however, to avoid 
any doubt regarding the sufficiency of any given 
declaration, it would be best to obtain the assent of 
all executive branch officials with Cabinet rank. 
Unanimity would be desirable, but if time is of the 
essence, a simple majority is all that is required. 
There is ambiguity as to whether or not "acting" heads 
of Cabinet departments should participate in the 
decision. Most of the legislative history and a 
leading commentator, however, suggest that "acting" 
heads should participate. See Appendix 12 at p.2, n. 
3, and Appendix 16 at p.5. 
(2) Written Declaration. The declaration of the 
President's disability by the Vice President and 
Cabinet must be written. A single declaration would be 
preferable, but not necessary. If circumstances 
require, counterpart declarations would be an adequate 
alternative. See Appendix 12 at p.3, n. 4. 
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(3) Form. The written declaration should consist of 
two short letters framed in the Constitutional language 
and addressed to the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House. Appropriate 
letters are attached at Appendix 9. 
(4) Signatures. The letters need not be personally 
signed by the Vice President and a majority of the 
Cabinet. Clearly, however, their assent to the 
declaration must be established in a reliable fashion 
and they must direct that their names be added to the 
letters. See Appendix 12 at p.3, n. 4. Moreover, as 
discussed in paragraph 2 above, the Vice President and 
Cabinet heads may send separate letters if necessary. 
(5) Transmittal. Transmittal of the letters to the 
President pro tempore and the Speaker is the operative 
event to effect the transfer of authority to the Vice 
President. Transfer of authority to the Vice President 
takes effect immediately when the letters are sent (or 
placed in a messenger's hands); it is not delayed until 
the letters are received by the addressees. Accord-
ingly, there is no need to have the President pro 
tempore and Speaker to stand ready, at the White House 
or elsewhere, to receive the letters . 
Documentation of when, where and to whom the letters 
are sent and receipt of delivery would be prudent. 
This would be especially true if separate letters are 
sent by the Vice President and the Cabinet members. If 
separate letters are sent, transfer of authority to the 
Vice President would not take effect until the Vice 
President and a majority of the Cabinet had transmitted 
letters. See Appendix 12 at p.3, n. 4. 
In any event, letters should be sent not only to the 
offices of the addressees, but also to each personally. 
(6) Oath. 
a new oath. 
The Vice President is not required to take 
See Appendix 12 at p.l, n. 1. 
(7) Status of the Vice President. Pursuant to the 
above procedure, the Vice President assumes all the 
Constitutional and statutory powers and duties of the 
President. He does not, however, become President. 
Instead, he becomes "Acting President" and should use 
that designation for all official purposes. In 
addition, he would continue to exercise the duties of 
Vice President while he serves as Acting President, 
although he would lose his title as President of the 
Senate. Appendix 12 at p.l, n. 1; and p.2 at n. 2. 
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TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT 
Resumption of Authority by the President 
Section 3. If the President temporarily transfers his authority 
to the Vice President pursuant to Section 3 of the 25th 
Amendment, he resumes his authority by transmitting, to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, his written declaration that he again is able 
to discharge the powers and duties of his off ice. The procedure 
for transmitting this written declaration would be the same as 
for the initial transfer of authority to the Vice President as 
discussed at Tab C of this document. Appropriate letters are 
attached at Appendix 8. 
As with the initial transfer of authority, transmittal of the 
President's declaration is the operative event, and the President 
resumes his full powers and duties immediately upon transmittal. 
Section 4. In order to resume the full powers and duties of his 
off ice after the Vice President has become Acting President 
pursuant to Section 4 of the 25th Amendment, the President again 
must transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration 
that no inability continues to exist. Again, this written 
declaration must be in writing and personally signed by the 
President. Appropriate letters are attached at Appendix 10. 
Unlike the other written declarations, however, it is unclear 
under Section 4 whether or not transmittal alone is sufficient to 
restore the full authority of the Presidency in the President. 
See discussions in Appendix 14 at p.5 and Appendix 15 at p.4. 
Section 4 of the 25th Amendment states that the President shall 
resume the powers and duties of his off ice "unless" the Vice 
President and a majority of the Cabinet "transmit within four 
days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives their written declaration that 
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office." such an action by the Vice President and a majority of 
the Cabinet would trigger a 21-day (somewhat longer if Congress 
is not in session) period during which Congress can, by a two-
thirds vote, uphold the Vice President and Cabinet. Should such 
Congressional action not be forthcoming, the President then would 
resume his office. 
Putting aside the prospect of a disagreement between the 
President and the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet as 
to the President's ability to govern, a situation which also 
3 
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would raise difficult questions, 1 the question remains as to who 
governs during the four-day period following the President's 
declaration that he again is able to perform the duties of his 
office. One could read the constitutional language to provide 
either for an immediate but defeasible resumption of authority by 
the President or to provide for resumption of authority only 
after the four-day period has elapsed. The legislative history 
tends to support the latter interpretation. Even so, it would be 
very difficult to avoid projecting a sense of uncertainty to the 
American public and foreign governments not familiar with the 
nuances of the 25th Amendment should the Vice President continue 
to act as President after the President has declared himself able 
to govern. 
The uncertainty could be diffused by having the Vice President 
and, if possible, an unanimous Cabinet declare that they have no 
intention of challenging the President's declaration, but that 
the Vice President will continue as Acting President pursuant to 
the Constitution, although he will make no major decisions 
without first obtaining the approval of the President. Such a 
statement would have no force in law since clearly the Vice 
President and a majority of the Cabinet could challenge the 
President's declaration any time during the four-day period, and 
there is no requirement that the Acting President consult in any 
way with the President, though obviously in such a situation the 
perception of harmony would be invaluable. 
1 Discussion of procedural problems that would be 
encountered in such a situation may be found in the memoranda 
attached at Appendices 12, 14 and 16. 
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PEATH OF BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE PRESIDENT 
1. Upon the deaths of both the President and the Vice 
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall 
"act as President." U.S. Const. art. II § 1, cl. 5; 
3 u.s.c. § 19(a) (1). See Appendices 1 & 4. 
2. The Speaker should take the following oath: 
"I[, Thomas s. Foley,] do solemnly swear (or affirm) 
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the 
United States against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic; that I will bear true faith allegiance to the 
same; that I take this obligation freely, without any 
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I 
will well and faithfully discharge the duties or the 
office on which I am about to enter. So help my God." 
See Appendix 6. 
3. The oath may be administered by any "individual authorized 
by local law to administer oaths in the State, District, or 
territory or possession of the United states where the oath 
is administered." 5 u.s.c. § 2903(c). See Appendix 6. If 
the Speaker is away from the country, he simply can swear 
the oath in the presence of a witness. 
4. The taking of the above oath by the Speaker will be held to 
constitute his resignation as Speaker and as a member of 
Congress, which is a prerequisite to his assuming the powers 
and duties of the office of President. 3 u.s.c. § 19(a) (1) 
& (d)(3). 
5. The Speaker does not become President; instead, he becomes 
~Acting President" for the remainder of the current 
Presidential term. 3 u.s.c. § 19. 
6. The Speaker, as Acting President, will be compensated at the 
rate of pay provided by law for the President 3 u.s.c. 
§ 19(f). 
7. If, upon the deaths of both the President and the Vice 
President, there is no Speaker of the House, the Acting 
President would be the President pro tempore of the senate 
[Robert c. Byrd] or the appropriate Cabinet officer as 
provided by 3 u.s.c. § 19(b) & (c). 
• 
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VARIOUS OTHER SUCCESSION QUESTIONS 
Other possible situations in which Presidential succession 
questions would arise include the following: 
1. Temporary disability of both the President 
and the Vice President simultaneously; 
2. Temporary disability of the President and 
death of the Vice President; 
3. Death of the President and temporary 
disability of the Vice President; 
4. , Temporary disability of the President and 
subsequent disability of the Acting 
President; 
5. Temporary disability of the President and 
subsequent death of the Acting President. 
All five situations raise the same basic question: how to 
proceed if both the President and the Vice President are unable 
to function. - The answer to this question goes beyond the scope 
of the 25th Amendment. 
Article 2, § 1, cl. 5 of the Constitution states that "Congress 
may by Law, provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation 
or Inability, both of the President and the Vice President, 
declaring what Officer shall then act as President ..• " 
Pursuant to this section of the Constitution, Congress, in 1948, 
passed the Succession to the Presidency Act, codified at 3 u.s.c. 
§ 19, which provides that "[i]f, by reason of .•. inability 
. . . there is neither a President nor Vice President to 
discharge the powers and duties of the off ice of President, then 
the Speaker of the House shall • . • act as President . . • until 
the removal of the disability of one of such individuals." 
The answer to the question of who would govern in each of the 
situations listed above would appear to be, therefore, that the 
Speaker of the House would "act as President." There are serious 
difficulties, however, with this seemingly simple answer in that 
the Act articulates no procedures for the determination of 
"inability". 
In the first two situations enumerated above, a determination of 
Presidential inability to govern would clearly be necessary 
before the Speaker could act as President. Whatever procedure is 
used to make this determination, since the Vice President by 
reason of his own inability or death could not participate in the 
decision, the Act necessarily contemplates a determination of 
Presidential inability that is at odds with the 25th Amendment 
procedure. 
The situations listed at 3, 4 and 5 above are less problematic 
since the determination of Presidential inability would have been 
made pursuant to the 25th Amendment, or no such determination 
would be necessary because the President is dead. Nevertheless, 
a determination of Vice Presidential inability would be 
necessary, and again, the Succession to the Presidency Act gives 
absolutely no guidance as to what procedure should be used to 
determine Vice Presidential inability. 
In the third situation, another question arises pertaining to the 
status of the disabled Vice President after the death of the 
President. If the Vice President is unable to recite and 
understand the oath, does he nevertheless become President by 
operation of law? 
Article II, § 1, cl. 5 of the Constitution states that upon the 
death of the President, the powers and duties of his office 
"shall devolve" upon the Vice President. Section 1 of the 25th 
Amendment states that, upon the death of President, the Vice 
President "shall become President." On the other hand, Article 
II, § 1, cl. 7 of the Constitution states that the President must 
take the oath prescribed therein before "he enters on the 
Execution of his Office." 
An argument can be made, therefore, that the Vice President does 
become President, but until he takes the oath he cannot exercise 
Presidential authority. For succession purposes, however, this 
would mean that in the situation listed at 3 above, determination 
of Presidential disability would be necessary and would, 
therefore, raise the same possibilities of conflict with the 25th 
Amendment as would situations 1 and 2. 
Only in the last situation enumerated above -- death of the Vice 
President after he had become Acting President pursuant to the 
25th Amendment -- can the Act be implemented with any degree of 
certainty. In that situation, the Speaker of the House would 
become Acting President pursuant to the procedures outlined at 
Tab F of this document. 
As to the first four situations, however, no guidance can be 
given with any legal certainty. The goal in all four situations 
would be to have the Speaker act as President. One way in which 
this goal might be obtained would be to implement procedures 
which parallel the 25th Amendment. The determination of 
Presidential and Vice Presidential inability should be made by 
the Speaker of the House and the Cabinet. They should then 
transmit their written declaration of inability to the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the Majority Leader, and perhaps 
Minority Leader, of the House. That having been done, the 
Speaker would become Acting President pursuant to the procedures 
in 3 u.s.c. § 19. 
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Article II, section 1, clause 5: 
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his 
Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties 
of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and 
the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, 
Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, 
declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer 
shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President 
shall be elected . 
. i 
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• 
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Art. II, section 1, clause 7: 
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the 
following Oath or Affirmation:-"! do solemnly swear (or affirm) 
that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United 
States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution of the United States." 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Amendment XXV: 
Section I. In case of the removal of the President from office or 
of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become Presi. 
dent. 
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice 
President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall 
take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of 
Congress. 
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Repre. 
sentatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a 
written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be 
discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. 
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either 
the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other 
body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa· 
tives their written declaration that the President is unable to dis-
charge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall 
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting 
President. 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa· 
tives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume 
the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a 
majority of either the principal officers of the executive department 
or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit 
within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration 
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling 
within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the 
Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written 
declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days 
after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds 
vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to 
discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President 
shall resume the powers and duties of his office . 
-'· 
• 
• 
3 u.s.c. § 19: 
(a)(I) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or 
failure to qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice President to 
discharge the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and 
as Representative in Congress, act as President. 
(2) The same rule shall apply in the case of the death, resignation, 
removal from office, or inability of an individual acting as President under 
this subsection. 
(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section a Speaker is 
to begin the discharge of the powers and duties of the office of President, 
there is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails to qualify as Acting President, then 
the President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as 
President pro tempore and as Senator, act as President. 
(c) An individual acting as President under subsection (a) or subsection 
(b) of this section shall continue to act until the expiration of the then 
current Presidential term, except that-
(1) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded 
in whole or in part on the failure of both the President-elect and the 
Vice-President-elect to qualify, then he shall act only until a President 
or Vice-President qualifies; and 
(2) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded 
in whole or in part on the inability of the President or Vice President, 
then he shall act only until the removal of the disability of one of such 
individuals. 
(d) (1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, 
or failure to qualify, there is no President pro tempore to act as President 
under subsection (b) of this section, then the officer of the United States 
who is highest on the following list, and who is not under disability to 
discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall act as 
President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of 
Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agricul-
ture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary 
of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education. * 
(2) An individual acting as President under this subsection shall continue 
so to do until the expiration of the then current Presidential term, but not 
after a qualified and prior-entitled individual is able to act, except that the 
removal of the disability of an individual higher on the list contained in 
paragraph (1) of this subsection or the ability to qualify on the part of an 
individual higher on such list shall not terminate his service. 
(3) The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified in the list in 
paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be held to constitute his resignation 
from the office by virtue of the holding of which he qualifies to act as 
President. 
(e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to such 
officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution. 
Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death, 
resignation, removal from office, inability, or failur~ to qualify, of the 
President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the 
House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the office of 
President devolve upon them. 
(f) During the period that any individual acts as President under this 
section, his compensation shall be at the rate then provided by law in the 
case of the President. 
* Pursuant to Pub.L. 100-S27 (1988) Amendment, 
the Secretary of veteran Affairs is concluded 
as the last agency head in line authority 
for the Office of the President. 
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CHAPTER 4-DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS 
Sec. 
301. General authorization to delegate functions; publication of delega-
tions. 
302. Scope of delegation of functions. 
303. Definitions. 
Historical Note 
Chapter added by Act Oct. 31, 1951, c. 
655, § 10, 65 Stat. 712. 
Similar Provisions; Repeal; Saving 
Clause. Similar provisions were contained in 
former chapter 4, comprising former sections 
301 to 303 of this title, which was set out 
here but which was not a part of this title. 
Former sections 301 to 303 were derived from 
Act Aug. 8, 1950, c. 646, §§ l to 3, 64 Stat. 
419, and were repealed by section 56(j) of Act 
Oct. 31, 1951. Subsec. (l) of section 56 
provided that the repeal should not affect any 
rights or liabilities existing under such re-
pealed sections on the effective date of such 
repeal (Oct. 31, 1951). 
§ 301. General authorization to delegate functions; publication 
of delegations 
The President of the United States is authorized to designate and 
empower the head of any department or agency in the executive branch, or 
any official thereof who is required to be appointed by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, to perform without approval, ratification, or 
other action by the President (1) any function which is vested in the 
President by law, or (2) any function which such officer is required or 
authorized by law to perform only with or subject to the approval, 
ratification, or other action of the President: Provided, That nothing 
contained herein shall relieve the President of his responsibility in office for 
the acts of any such head or other official designated by him to perform 
such functions. Such designation and authorization shall be in writing, 
shall be published in the Federal Register, shall be subject to such terms, 
conditions, and limitations as the President may deem advisable, and shall 
be revocable at any time by the President in whole or in part. 
(Added Oct. 31, 1951, c. 655, § 10, 65 Stat. 712.) 
Historical Note 
Transrer or Functions. All functions vest-
ed by law (including reorganization plan) in 
the Bureau of the Budget or the Director of 
the Bureau of the Budget were transferred to 
the President of the United States by section 
101 of 1970 Reorg.Plan No. 2, ell July I, 
1970, 35 F.R. 7959, 84 Stat. 2085. Section 
102 of 1970 Reorg.Plan. No. 2, redesignated 
the Bureau of the Budget as the Office of 
Management and Budget and the Director of 
the Bureau of the Budget as Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget. See Re-
organization Plan No. 2 of 1970, set out in 
Appendix I to Title 5, Government Organiza-
tion and Employees. 
Similar Provisions; Repeal; Saving 
Clause. For similar provisions contained in 
prior law, and saving clause in connection 
therewith, see note preceding this section. 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Act Oct. 31, 1951, see 1951 
U.S.Code Cong. Service, p. 2578. 
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EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10250 
June 5, 1951, 16 F.R. 5385, as amended by Ex.Ord. No. 10732, Oct. 10, 
1957, 22 F.R. 8135; Ex.Ord. No. 10752, Feb. 12, 1958, 23 F.R. 973 
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 
1. The Secretary of the Interior is hereby 
designated and empowered to perform the 
following-described functions of the President 
without the approval, ratification, or other 
action of the President: 
(a) The authority vested in the President 
by section 1 of the act of July 10, 1935, ch. 
375, 49 Stat. 477 [see sections 19e to 19n of 
Title 16), to appoint members of the National 
Park Trust Fund Board. 
(b) The authority vested in the President 
by section 2059 of the Revised Statutes [sec-
tion 62 of Title 25) to discontinue any Indian 
agency, or transfer the same, from the place 
or tribe designated by law to such other place 
or tribe as the public service may require. 
(c) The authority vested in the President 
by section 6 of the act of May 17, 1882, ch. 
163, 22 Stat. 88, as amended [section 63 of 
Title 25), to consolidate two or more Indian 
agencies into one, to consolidate one or more 
Indian tribes, and to abolish such agencies as 
are thereby rendered unnecessary. 
(cf) The authority vested in the President 
by the act of March I, 1907, ch. 2285, 34 
Stat. 1016 [section 140 of Title 25), to divert 
appropriations made for certain purposes to 
other uses for the benefit of the several Indian 
tribes: Provided, that the Secretary of the 
Interior shall make to the Congress reports 
required in connection with action taken by 
him under this provision. 
(e) The authority vested in the President 
by section S of the act of February 8, 1887, 
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 389, as amended [section 348 
of Title 25), by the act of December 24, 1942, 
ch. 814, 56 Stat. 1081, [section 348a of Title 
25), by the act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 
Stat. 326 [section 391 of Title 25), and by 
section 3 of the act of January 12, 1891, 26 
Stat. 712, as amended by section 3 of the act 
of March 2, 1917, ch. 146, 39 Stat. 976, to 
extend trust periods on land patents issued to 
Indians and to continue restrictions on aliena-
tion. 
<0 The authority vested in the President by 
section 4705(b) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954 [former section 4705(b) of Title 26) to 
authorize certain persons in the Virgin Is-
lands to obtain certain drugs for legitimate 
medical purposes without regard to order 
forms, and by section 4762(b) of such Code 
[former section 4762 of Title 26) to provide 
for the registration of and the imposition of 
special and transfer taxes upon persons in the 
Virgin Islands who import, manufacture, pro-
duce, compound, sell, deal in, dispense, pre-
scribe, administer, or give away marihuana: 
Provided, that the Secretary of the Interior 
shall perform the functions referred to in this 
subsection in consultation with the Depart-
ment of the Treasury. 
(g) The authority vested in the President 
by section 2343 of the Revised Statutes [sec-
tion 46 of Title 30) to establish additional 
land districts and to appoint necessary offi-
cers under existing laws when deemed neces-
sary for the public convenience in executing 
certain provisions of law with respect to min-
eral lands and mining. 
(h) The authority vested in the President 
by section 2252 of the Revised Statutes as 
affected by section 403 of Reorganization 
Plan No. 3of1946, 60 Stat. 1100 [section 121 
of Title 43], to order the discontinuance of 
any land office and the transfer of any of its 
business and archives to any other land office 
within the same State or Territory. 
(i) The authority vested in the President by 
section 2250 of the Revised Statutes [section 
125 of Title 43) to discontinue a land office in 
a land district under certain circumstances 
and to annex the same to some other adjoin-
ing land district. 
(j) The authority vested in the President by 
section 2251 of the Revised Statutes [section 
126 of Title 43] to change the location of the 
land offices in the several land districts estab-
lished by law and to relocate the same from 
time to time at such point in the district as 
may be deemed expedient. 
(k) The authority vested in the President 
by section 2253 of the Revised Statutes [sec-
tion 127 of Title 43) to change and re-estab-
lish the boundaries of land districts. 
(/) The authority vested in the President 
by section 2 of the act of March 2, 1917, ch. 
145, 39 Stat. 951, as amended [section 737 of 
Title 48), to approve the payment out of the 
Treasury for other purposes of money derived 
from any tax levied or assessed for a special 
purpose in Puerto Rico. 
(m) The authority vested in the President 
by section 7 of the act of March 2, 1917, ch. 
145, 39 Stat. 954; as amended [section 748 of 
Title 48), to convey to the people of Puerto 
Rico lands, buildings, or interests in lands, or 
other property owned by the United States, 
• 
and to accept lands, buildings, or other inter· 
ests or property by legislative grant from 
Puerto Rico. 
(n) The authority vested in the President 
by section 3(b) of the Act of March 3, 1925, 
ch. 426, 43 Stat. 1111, as amended [see sec-
tion 167d of Title 50), to approve regulations 
governing the production and sale of helium 
for medical, scientific, and commercial use. 
(o) The authority vested in the President 
by section 6 of the act of April 26, 1906, ch. 
1876, 34 Stat. 139, to remove from office the 
principal chief of the Choctaw, Cherokee, 
Creek, or Seminole tribe or the governor of 
the Chickasaw tribe, to declare any such 
office vacant, and to fill any vacancy in any 
such office arising from removal, disability, or 
death of the incumbent. 
(p) The authority vested in the President 
by section 28 of the act of April 26, 1906, ch. 
1876, 34 Stat. 148, to approve acts, ordi-
nances, or resolutions of the tribal council or 
legislature of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cher-
okee, Creek, and Seminole tribes or nations, 
and to approve contracts, involving the pay-
ment or expenditure of money or affecting 
property belonging to any of the said tribes or 
nations, made by them or any of them or by 
any officer thereof. 
(q) (Superseded by section 3 of Ex.Ord. 
No. 10752, Feb. 12, 1958, 23 F.R. 973, set 
out as a note under section 7 l 5j of Title 15, 
Commerce and Trade). 
(r) The authority vested in the President 
by section 55 of the act of April 30, 1900, 31 
Stat. 150, as amended (section 562 of Title 
48) and by section 4 of the act of August 24, 
1954, 68 Stat. 785, as amended [former sec-
tion 562o of Title 48), to approve the issuance 
of bonds or other instruments of indebtedness 
by the Territory of Hawaii. 
2. The Secretary of the Interior is hereby 
designated and empowered to perform, with-
out the approval, ratification, or other action 
of the President, the following functions 
which have heretofore, under the respective 
provisions of law cited, required the approval, 
ratification, or other action of the President 
in connection with their performance by the 
Secretary of the Interior: 
(a) The authority vested in the Secretary of 
the Interior by section 1 of the act of June 6, 
1942, ch. 330, 56 Stat. 326 [section 459r of 
Title 16), to convey or lease to the States or 
to the political subdivisions thereof any or all 
of certain recreational demonstration projects 
and lands and equipment comprised within 
such projects or any parts of such projects; 
and to transfer to other Federal agencies any 
of the said recreational demonstration areas 
that may be of use to such agencies. 
(b) The authority vested in the Secretary of 
the Interior by section 3 of the act of July 3, 
1918, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755, as amended, and 
as affected by section 4(0 of Reorganization 
Plan No. II, effective July l, 1939, 53 Stat. 
1433 [section 704 of Title 16), to promulgate 
regulations permitting and governing the 
hunting, taking, capture, killing, possession, 
sale, purchase, shipment, transportation, car· 
riage, or export of any migratory bird includ-
ed in the terms of certain conventions, or any 
part, nest, or egg thereof. 
3. As used in this order, the term "func-
tions" embraces duties, powers, responsibil· 
ities, authority, or discretion, and the term 
"perform" may be construed to mean "exer· 
cise". 
4. All actions heretofore taken by the 
President in respect of the matters affected by 
this order and in force at the time of the 
issuance of this order, including regulations 
prescribed by the President in respect of such 
matters, shall, except as they may be incon-
sistent with the provisions of this order, re-
main in effect until modified or revoked pur-
suant to the authority conferred by this order. 
S. The Secretary of the Interior is hereby 
authorized to redelegate to the Under Secre-
tary of the Interior any of the authority 
delegated to the Secretary of the Interior by 
section 1 of this order. 
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10289 
Sept. 17, 1951, 16 F.R. 9499, as amended by Ex.Ord. No. 10583, Dec. 20, 
1954, 19 F.R. 8725; Ex.Ord. No. 10882, July 18, 1960, 25 F.R. 6869; 
Ex.Ord. No. 11110, June 4, 1963, 28 F.R. 5605; Ex.Ord. No. 11825, 
Dec. 31, 1974, 40 F.R. 1003 
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 
1. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby 
designated and empowered to perform the 
following-described functions of the President 
without the approval, ratification, or other 
action of the President: 
• 
(a) The authority vested in the President 
by section I of the act of August I, 1914, c. 
223, 38 Stat. 609, 623, as amended [section 2 
of Title 19), (I) to rearrange, by consolidation 
or otherwise, the several customs-collection 
districts, (2) to discontinue ports of entry by 
abolishing the same and establishing others in 
their stead, and (3) to change from time to 
time the location of the headquarters in any 
customs-collection district as the needs of the 
service may require. 
(b) The authority vested in the President 
by section I of the Anti-Smuggling Act of 
August 5, 1935, c. 438, 49 Stat. 517 [section 
170 I of Title 19), (1) to find and declare that 
at any place or within any area on the high 
seas adjacent to but outside customs waters 
any vessel or vessels hover or are being kept 
off the coast of the United States and that, by 
virtue of the presence of any such vessel or 
vessels at such place or within such area, the 
unlawful introduction or removal into or 
from the United States of any merchandise or 
person is being, or may be, occasioned, pro-
moted, or threatened, (2) to find and declare 
that certain waters on the high seas are in 
such proximity to such vessel or vessels that 
such unlawful introduction or removal of 
merchandise or persons may be carried on by 
or to or from such vessel or vessels, and (3) to 
find and declare that, within any customs-en-
forcement area, the circumstances no longer 
exist which gave rise to the declaration of 
such area as a customs-enforcement area. 
(c) The authority vested in the President 
by section 2 of the act of August 18, 1914, c. 
256, 38 Stat. 699 [section 82 of Title 46), to 
suspend the provisions of law requiring sur-
vey, inspection, and measurement of foreign-
built vessels admitted to American registry. 
(d) The authority vested in the President 
by section 5 of the act of May 28, 1908, c. 
212, 35 Stat. 425, as amended [section 104 of 
Title 46), to determine (as a prerequisite to 
the extension of reciprocal privileges by the 
Commissioner of Customs) that yachts used 
and employed exclusively as pleasure vessels 
and belonging to any resident of the United 
States are allowed to arrive at and depart 
from any foreign port and to cruise in the 
waters of such port without entering or clear-
ing at the custom-house thereof and without 
the payment of any charges for entering or 
clearing, dues, duty per ton, tonnage taxes, or 
charges for cruising licenses. 
(e) The authority vested in the President 
by section 2 of the act of March 24, 1908, c. 
96, 35 Stat. 46 [section 134 of Title 46), to 
name the hospital ships to which section 1 of 
the said act shall apply and to indicate the 
time when the exemptions thereby provided 
for shall begin and end. 
(f) The authority vested in the President by 
section 4228 of the Revised Statutes, as 
amended (46 U.S.C. 141), (I) to declare 
that-upon satisfactory proof being given by 
the government of any foreign nation that no 
discriminating duties of tonnage or imposts 
are imposed or levied in the ports of such 
nation upon vessels wholly belonging to citi-
zens of the United States, or upon the pro-
duce, manufactures, or merchandise imported 
in the same from the United States or from 
any foreign country-the foreign discrimina-
ting duties of tonnage and impost within the 
United States are suspended and discontin-
ued, so far as respects the vessels of such 
foreign nation, and the produce, manufac-
tures, or merchandise imported into the Unit· 
ed States from such foreign nation, or from 
any other foreign country, and (2) to suspend 
in part the operation of section 4219 of the 
Revised Statutes, as amended (46 U.S.C . 
121), and section IV, J, subsection I of the 
act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, 38 Stat. 195, as 
amended (46 U.S.C. 146), so that foreign 
vessels from a country imposing partial dis· 
criminating tonnage duties upon American 
vessels, or partial discriminating import 
duties upon American merchandise, may en· 
joy in our ports the identical privileges which 
the same class of American vessels and mer-
chandise may enjoy in such country: Provid· 
ed, that prior to the issuance of an order of 
the Secretary of the Treasury suspending and 
discontinuing (wholly or in part) discrimina· 
ting tonnage duties, imposts, and import 
duties within the United States, the Depart-
ment of State shall obtain and furnish to the 
Secretary of the Treasury the proof required 
by the said section 4228, as amended, as the 
basis for that order. 
(g) The authority vested in the President 
by section 3639 of the Revised Statutes, as 
amended [section 521 of Title 31 ), to regulate 
and increase the sums for which bonds are, or 
may be, required by law, but only to the 
extent that such section affects collectors of 
customs, comptrollers of customs, and sur-
veyors of customs (and the successors thereof 
under section 1 of the act of July 5, 1932, c. 
430, 47 Stat. 580, 584 [former section Sa of 
Title 19)). 
(h) The authority vested in the President 
by section 3650 of the Internal Revenue Code 
[now covered by section 7621 of Title 26), to 
establish convenient collection districts (for 
the purpose of assessing, levying, and collect· 
ing the taxes provided by the internal revenue 
laws), and from time to time to alter such 
districts. 
(I) The authority which is now vested in 
the President by section 2S64(b) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code [section 2S64(b) of Title 26 
(l.R.C.1939) ), and which on and after Janu-
ary I, I 9SS, will be vested in the President by 
section 473S(b) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 19S4 [section 473S(b) of Title 26 (l.R.C. 
t 9S4) ), to issue, in accordance with the pro-
visions of the said section 2S64(b) or 473S(b), 
as the case may be, orders providing for the 
registration and the imposition of a special 
tax upon all persons in the Canal Zone who 
produce, import, compound, deal in, dis-
pense, sell, distribute, or give away narcotic 
drugs. 
(j) The authority vested in the Prei;idcnt hy 
paragraph (b) of section 43 of the A~·t of May 
12, 1933, as amended (31 U.S.C. 821(h)) [JI 
U.S.C.A. § S301(a) and (b) ]. to issue sil\'cr 
certificates against any silver bullion, silver. 
or standard silver dollars in the Treasury not 
then held for redemption of any outstanding 
silver certifkates, to prescribe the denomina-
tions of such silver certificates, and to coin 
standard silver dollars and subsidiary silver 
currency for their redemption. 
2. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby 
designated and empowered to perform with-
out the approval, ratification, or other action 
of the President the following functions which 
have heretofore, under the respective provi-
sions of law cited, required the approval of 
the President in connection with their per-
formance by the Secretary of the Treasury: 
(a) The authority vested in the Secretary of 
the Treasury by section 6 of the act of July 8, 
1937, c. 444, SO Stat. 480 [section 728 of Title 
40), to make rules and regulations necessary 
for the execution of the functions vested in 
the Secretary of the Treasury by the said act, 
as amended. 
(b), (c) [Re\'oked by Ex.Ord. No. 11110, 
June 4, 1963, 28 F.R. S60S.J 
(d) [Revoked by Ex.Ord. No. I 182S, Dec. 
31, 1974, 40 F.R. 1003.) 
(e) The authority vested in the Secretary of 
the Treasury by section I of Title II of the act 
of June IS. 1917. c. 30, 40 Stat. 220 [section 
191 of Title SO), to make rules and regula-
tions governing the anchorage and movement 
of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in the 
territorial waters of the United States, exclu-
sive of the territory and waters of the Canal 
Zone. 
(f) The authority vested in the Secretary of 
the Treasury by section 6 of the act of June 
19, 1934. c. 674, 48 Stat. 1178 [section 316b 
of Title 31 ]. to investigate, regulate, or pro-
hibit. by means of licenses or otherwise, the 
acqu1S1t1on, importation, exportation, or 
transportation of silver and of contracts and 
other arrangements made with respect there-
to, and to require the filing of reports in 
connection therewith. 
3. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury and 
the Postmaster General are hereby designated 
and empowered jointly to prescribe without 
the approval of the President regulations, un-
der section I of the act of July 8, 1937, c. 
444, SO Stat. 479 [section 721 of Title 40), 
governing the shipment of valuables by the 
executive departments, independent establish-
ments, agencies. wholly-owned corporations, 
officers, and employees of the United States. 
(b) The Postmaster General (now United 
States Postal Service] is hereby designated 
and empowered to exercise without the ap-
proval, ratification, or other action of the 
President the authority vested in the Presi-
dent by section S04(b) of Title 18 of the 
United States Code to approve regulations 
issued by the Secretary of the Treasury under 
the authority of the said section S04(b) (relat-
ing to the printing, publishing. or importa-
tion, or the making or importation of the 
necessary plates for such printing or publish-
ing, of postage stamps for philatelic pur-
poses). and to approve any amendment or 
repeal of any of such regulations by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury. 
4. As used in this order, the term "func-
tions" embraces duties, powers, responsibil-
ities, authority, or discretion, and the term 
"perform" may be construed to mean "exer-
cise". 
S. All actions heretofore taken by the 
President in respect of the matters affected by 
this order and in force at the time of the 
issuance of this order, including regulations 
prescribed by the President in respect of such 
matters, shall, except as they may be incon-
sistent with the provisions of this order, re-
main in effect until amended. modified, or 
revoked pursuant to the authority conferred 
by this order. 
• 
• 
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DELEGATION OF MISCELLANEOUS FUNCTIONS 
PART I. DIRECTOR OF THE 
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET 
[Superseded by Ex.Ord. No. 11230, § 2(1), 
(3), (5) to (14), June 28, 1965, 30 F.R. 8447) 
PART II. THE OFFICE OF PERSON-
NEL MANAGEMENT 
[Superseded by Ex.Ord. No. 11228, § 3(1), 
(2), (5), June 14, 1965, 30 F.R. 7739) 
PART Ill. THE HOUSING AND 
HOME FINANCE 
ADMINISTRATOR 
[Superseded by Ex.Ord. No. 11196, Feb. 2, 
1965, 30 F.R. 1171) 
PART IV. THE FEDERAL 
COM MUNI CATIONS 
COMMISSION 
Sec. 5. (a) The Federal Communications 
Commission is hereby designated and empow· 
ered to exercise, without the approval, ratifi-
cation, or other action of the President, all 
authority vested in the President by the act of 
May 27, 1921, ch. 12, 42 Stat. 8 [sections 34 
to 39 of Title 47), including the authority to 
issue, withhold, or revoke licenses to land or 
operate submarine cables in the United States: 
Provided, That no such license shall be grant· 
ed or revoked by the Commission except after 
obtaining approval of the Secretary of State 
and such advice from any executive depart· 
ment or establishment of the Government as 
the Commission may deem necessary. The 
Commission is authorized and directed to 
receive all applications for the said licenses. 
(b) Executive Order No. 3513 of July 9, 
1921, as amended by Executive Order No. 
6779 of June 30, 1934, is hereby revoked. 
PART V. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
AND THE ADMINISTRATOR OF 
GENERAL SERVICES 
Sec. 6. The Attorney General and the 
Administrator of General Services are hereby 
designated and empowered jointly to perform 
the following-described functions without the 
approval, ratification, or other action of the 
President: 
(a) The authority vested in the President 
by section 5(a) of the act of July 26, 1935, ch. 
417, 49 Stat. 501, as amended [section 
1505(a) of Title 44), to determine from time 
to time the documents or classes of docu-
ments having general applicability and legal 
effect. 
(b) The authority vested in the President 
by sections 6, I !(a), and l l(f) of said act, as 
amended [sections I 506 and I 5 IO(a), (f) of 
Title 44), to approve (or disapprove), respec-
tively, (I) regulations, prescribed by the Ad-
ministrative Committee of the Federal Regis-
ter, for carrying out the provisions of that act 
(including the regulations referred to in sec· 
tion 5(b) of the act [section 1505(b) of Title 
44), authorizing publication in the FEDER-
AL REGISTER of certain documents or 
classes of documents), (2) actions of the Ad-
ministrative Committee of the Federal Regis-
ter requiring, from time to time, the prepara-
tion and publication in special or supplemen-
tal editions of the FEDERAL REGISTER of 
complete codifications of the documents, de· 
scribed in the said section I !(a) [section 
1510(a) of Title 44), of each agency of the 
Government, and (3) regulations, prescribed 
by the Administrative Committee of the Fed-
eral Register, for carrying out the provisions 
• 
of section l l of the said act (section 1510 of 
Title 44), as amended. 
PART YI. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Sec. 7. All actions heretofore taken by 
the President in respect of the matters affect· 
ed by this order and in force at the time of 
the issuance of this order, including any regu-
lations prescribed or approved by the Presi-
dent in respect of such matters, shall, except 
as they may be inconsistent with the provi-
sions of this order, remain in effect until 
amended, modified, or revoked pursuant to 
the authority conferred by this order. 
Sec. 8. As used in this order, the term 
"functions" embraces duties, powers, respon· 
sibilities, authority, or discretion, and the 
term "perform" may be construed to mean 
"exercise." 
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10621 
July 1, 1955, 20 F.R. 4759, as amended by Ex.Ord. No. 11294, Aug. 4, 
1966, 31 F.R. 10601; Ex.Ord. No. 12396, Dec. 9, 1982, 47 F.R. 55897 
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Section I. The Secretary of Defense, and, 
as designated by the said Secretary for this 
purpose, any of the Secretaries, Under Secre-
taries, and Assistant Secretaries of the mili-
tary departments, are hereby designated and 
empowered to perform the following-describ-
ed functions of the President without the 
approval, ratification, or other action of the 
President: 
(a) The authority vested in the President 
by the act of March 3, 190 I, c. 852, 31 Stat. 
1107, 1133 [see sections W41 and 7291 of 
Title 10, Armed Forces), to establish and 
modify, as the needs of the service may re-
quire, a classification of vessels of the Navy, 
and to formulate appropriate rules governing 
assignments to command of vessels and 
squadrons. 
(b) The authority vested in the President 
by the act of August 22, 1912, c. 335, 37 Stat. 
328, 331 [see sections 509 and 1171 of Title 
IO, Armed Forces]. to approve regulations of 
the Secretary of the Navy under which any 
enlisted man may be discharged within three 
months before the expiration of the term of 
his enlistment, and under which an enlisted 
man may voluntarily extend the term of his 
enlistment. 
(c) The authority '·ested in the President 
by the act of May 22, 1928, c. 688, 45 Stat. 
712 [see section 6152 of Title to, Armed 
Forces] to approve regulations governing the 
advancement of public funds to naval person-
nel when required to meet expenses of officers 
and men detailed on emergency shore duty. 
(d) The authority vested in the President 
by the act of June 22, 1938, c. 567, 52 Stat. 
839, as amended (see sections 5083, 5133, 
5148, 5201 of Title 10), section 201(a} of the 
act of August 25, 1941, c. 409, 55 Stat. 680 
[see sections 5063, 5064 of Title 10], section 3 
of the act of December 28, 1945, c. 604, 59 
Stat. 666, as amended [see section 5138 of 
Title 10), section 2 of the act of August 1, 
1946, c. 727, 60 Stat. 779 [see section 5150 of 
Title 10), and section 7(a) of the act of March 
5, 1948, c. 98, 62 Stat. 68 [see Department of 
Defense Reorganization Order set out as a 
note under former section 5111 of Title 10], 
to authorize, in his discretion, for any officer 
of the Regular Navy or Marine Corps who 
retires while serving as Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, as Chief of a Bureau of the Navy 
Department, as Judge Advocate General of 
the Navy, as Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, as Director of Budgets and Reports, as 
Chief of the Dental Division, as Chief of 
Naval Research, or as Chief of Naval Materi· 
al, or while serving in a lower rank if he has 
previously served in any of such offices two 
and one-half years or more, retirement in the 
highest grade or rank in which he so served 
and with retired pay based on that rank. 
(e) The authority vested in the President 
by the act of June 15, 1940, c. 374, 54 Stat. 
400, to prescribe from time to time the num-
ber of warrant and commissioned warrant 
officers for the Marine Corps. 
<0 The authority vested in the President by 
the act of June 24, 1941, c. 231. 55 Stat. 260 
[see section 7306 of Title 10, Armed Forces), 
to approve the use for experimental purposes 
of vessels of the United States Navy stricken 
from the Navy Register pursuant to the act of 
August 5, 1882, 22 Stat. 296, as amended [sec 
section 7304 of Title 10, Armed Forces). 
(g), (h) [Revoked by Ex.Ord. No. 12396, 
Dec. 9, 1982, 47 F.R. 55897). 
(i) The authority vested in the President by 
section 302 of the act of June 22, 1944, c. 
268, 58 Stat. 287 [see section 1554 of Title 
10), to approve or disapprove the proceedings 
and decisions of boards of review established 
under that section by the Secretary of the 
Army, the Secretary of the Air Force, or the 
Secretary of the Navy, and to issue orders in 
such cases. 
(j) to (n) [Revoked by Ex.Ord. No. 12396, 
Dec. 9, 1982, 47 F.R. 55897). 
(o) The authority vested in the President 
by section 3 of the Travel Expense Act of 
1949, 63 Stat. 166, as amended (5 U.S.C. 836) 
[see sections 2105, 5701, 5702, 5707 of Title 
5), to establish maximum rates of per diem 
allowances for civilian officers and employees 
of the Government to the extent that such 
authority pertains to travel status in localities 
in Alaska, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and possessions 
of the United States. 
Sec. 2. The Secretary of Defense, and, as 
designated by the said Secretary for this pur· 
pose, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and 
any of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, 
are hereby designated and empowered to per· 
form the following-described functions of the 
President without the approval, ratification, 
or other action of the President: 
(a) The authority vested in the President 
by section 1547 of the Revised Statutes of the 
United States [see section 6011 of Title to, 
Armed Forces) to approve alterations made 
by the Secretary of the Navy in Navy Regula-
tions. 
(b) The authority vested in the President 
by section I of the act of April 9, 1906, c. 
1370, 34 Stat. 104 (see section 6961 of Title 
10, Armed Forces), to approve the dismissal 
by the Secretary of the Navy of a midship-
man from the United States Naval Academy. 
Sec. 3. All actions heretofore taken by 
the President with respect to the matters 
affected by this order and in force and effect 
at the time of the issuance of this order, 
including any regulations prescribed or ap-
proved by the President with respect to such 
matters, shall, except as they may be incon-
sistent with the provisions of this order, re-
main in force and effect until amended, modi-
fied, or revoked pursuant to the authority 
conferred by this order. 
Sec. 4. As used in this order, the term 
"functions" includes duties, powers, responsi-
bilities, authority, and discretion, and the 
term "perform" may be construed to mean 
"exercise". 
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10637 
Sept. 19, 1955, 20 F.R. 7025 
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 
Section l. The Secretary of the Treasury 
is hereby designated and empowered to per· 
form the following-described functions with· 
out the approval, ratification, or other action 
of the President: 
(a) The authority vested in the President 
by section 149 of title 14 of the United States 
Code, in his discretion, to detail officers and 
enlisted men of the Coast Guard to assist 
foreign governments in matters concerning 
which the Coast Guard may be of assistance. 
(b) The authority vested in the President 
by section 229 of title 14 of the United States 
Code to revoke the commission of any officer 
on the active list of the Coast Guard who, at 
the date of such revocation, has had less than 
three years of continuous service as a com-
missioned officer in the Coast Guard, and to 
prescribe regulations relating to such revoca-
tions. 
(c) The authority vested in the President 
by section 232 of title 14 of the United States 
Code, in his discretion, to retire from active 
service any commissioned officer of the Coast 
Guard, upon his own application, who has 
completed twenty years of active service in 
the Coast Guard, Navy, Army, Air Force, or 
Marine Corps, or the Reserve Components 
thereof. 
(d) The authority vested in the President 
by section 235 of title 14 of the United States 
Code (sec section 25 I ct seq. of Title 14], to 
retire, to approve the retirement of, to place 
out of line of promotion, and to approve the 
placing out of line of promotion of. officers of 
the Coast Guard. 
(e) The authority vested in the President 
by section 492 of title 14 of the United States 
Code to present a distinguished service medal 
(including incidental items) to any person 
who, while serving in any capacity with the 
Coast Guard, distinguishes himself by excep-
tionally meritorious service to the Govern· 
ment in a duty of great responsibility. 
<0 The authority vested in the President by 
section 493 of title 14 of the United States ' 
Code to present the Coast Guard medal (in· 
eluding incidental items) to any person who, 
while serving in any capacity with the Coast 
Guard, distinguishes himself by heroism not 
involving actual conflict with an enemy. 
(g) The authority vested in the President 
by section 494 of title 14 of the United States 
Code to award emblems, insignia, rosettes, 
and other devices, to the extent that such 
• 
authority relates to the awarding of such 
items to be worn with the distinguished ser-
vice medal or the Coast Guard medal. 
(h) The authority vested in the President 
by section 498 of title 14 of the United States 
Code to make posthumous awards of decora-
tions and to designate representatives to re-
ceive such awards, to the extent that such 
authority relates to the awarding of the dis-
tinguished service medal or the Coast Guard 
medal, or ribbons, emblems, insignia, rosettes, 
or other devices corresponding thereto. 
(() The authority vested in the President by 
section 499 of title 14 of the United States 
Code to make rules, regulations, and orders 
to the extent that they shall relate to the 
authority described in sections l(f), l(g), and 
l(h) above. 
(j) The authority vested in the President by 
the first paragraph of section 806 of the act of 
September 8, 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 799 
[section 77 of Title 1 S], to direct the detention 
of any vessel, American or foreign, by with-
holding clearance or by formal notice forbid-
ding departure; but such authority shall be 
exercised by the Secretary of the Treasury 
only upon a finding by the President that 
there is reasonable ground to believe that the 
vessel concerned is making or giving undue or 
unreasonable preference or advantage to any 
party, or is subjecting any party to undue or 
unreasonable prejudice, disadvantage, injury, 
or discrimination, as described in the said 
paragraph; and the authority so vested to 
revoke, modify, or renew any such direction. 
(I<) The authority vested in the President 
by the second paragraph of the said section 
806 of the act of September 8, 1916 [section 
77 of Title IS], to withhold clearance from 
one or more vessels of a belligerent country 
or government until such belligerent shall 
restore to American vessels and American 
citizens reciprocal liberty of commerce and 
equal facilities for trade, and the authority to 
direct that similar privileges and facilities, if 
any, enjoyed by vessels and citizens of such 
belligerent in the United States or its posses-
sions be refused to vessels or citizens of such 
belligerent; but such authority shall not, in 
either instance, be exercised by the Secretary 
of the Treasury with respect to any vessel or 
citizen of such belligerent unless and until the 
President proclaims that the belligerent na-
tion concerned is denying privileges and facil-
ities to American vessels as described in the 
said paragraph. 
(/) The authority vested in the President by 
section 963(a) of title 18 of the United States 
Code to detain, in accordance with the provi-
sions of such section, any armed vessel, or 
any vessel, domestic or foreign (other than 
one which has entered the ports of the United 
States as a public vessel), which is manifestly 
built for warlike purposes or has been con-
verted or adapted from a private vessel to one 
suitable for warlike use, and to determine, in 
each case, whether the proof required by such 
section is satisfactory. 
(m) The authority vested in the President 
by section 967(a) of title 18 of the United 
States Code, during a war in which the Unit-
ed States is a neutral nation, to · withhold 
clearance from or to any vessel, domestic or 
foreign, or, by service of formal notice upon 
the owner, master, or person in command or 
in charge of any domestic vessel not required 
to secure clearances, and to forbid its depar-
ture from port or from the United States, 
whenever there is reasonable cause to believe 
that such vessel is about to carry fuel, a~s. 
ammunition, men, supplies, dispatches, or in-
formation to any warship, tender, or supply 
ship of a foreign belligerent nation in viola-
tion of the laws, treaties, or obligations of the 
United States under the law of nations. 
(n) The authority vested in the President 
by section IO(a) of the act of November 4, 
1939, ch. 2, S4 Stat. 9 [section 4SO(a) of Title 
22), to require the owner, master, or person 
in command of a vessel to give a bond to the 
United States, as prescribed by the said sec-
tion IO(a). 
(o) The authority vested in the President 
by section IO(b) of the act of November 4, 
1939, ch. 2, S4 Stat. 9 [section 4SO(b) of Title 
22), to prohibit the departure of a vessel from 
a port of the United States, in accordance 
with the provisions of the said section IO(b). 
(p) The authority vested in the President 
by section 2 of the act of August 18, 1914, ch. 
2S6, 38 Stat. 699 [section 236 of Title 46], to 
suspend, in his discretion, by order, so far 
and for such length of time as he may deem 
desirable, the provisions of law prescribing 
that all watch officers of vessels of the United 
States registered for foreign trade shall be 
citizens of the United States. 
(q) The authority vested in the President 
by section 2 of the act of October 17, 1940, 
ch. 896, S4 Stat. 1201 [section 643b of Title 
46), to extend, whenever in his judgment the 
national interest requires, the provisions of 
subsection (b) of section 4SSI. Revised Stat-
utes, as amended [section 643(b) of Title 46], 
to such additional class or classes of vessels 
and to such waters as he may designate. 
(r) The authority vested in the Secretary of 
the Treasury by the first paragraph of section 
I of Title II of the act of June 15, 1917, ch. 
30, 40 Stat. 220. as amended [section 191 of 
Title 50), during a national emergency pro-
claimed as provided in the said paragraph, (I) 
to make rules and regulations governing the 
anchorage and movement of any vessel, for-
eign or domestic, in the territorial waters of 
the United States, and (2) to take full posses-
sion and control of such vessel for the pur-
poses set forth in the said paragraph. 
(s) The authority vested in the President 
by section 6 of the act of July 24, 1941, ch. 
320, 55 Stat. 604, as amended [see note set 
out under section 5501 of Title 10, Armed 
Forces), to make appointments of officers 
below flag rank without the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, to the extent that such 
authority relates, pursuant to section I l(b) of 
the said act, as amended [see section 5787 of 
Title 10, Armed Forces), to officers of the 
United States Coast Guard. 
Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury is 
hereby designated and empowered to perform 
without the approval, ratification, or other 
action of the President the following describ-
ed functions to the extent that they relate to 
the United States Coast Guard: 
(a) The authority vested in the President 
by Article 4(a) of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (section I of the act of May 5. 
1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 110) [see section 804 
of Title 10, Armed Forces), to convene a 
general court-martial to try any dismissed 
officer, upon application by the officer con-
cerned for trial by court-martial. 
(b) The authority vested in the President 
by Articles 4(c) and 75 of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice (64 Stat. 110, 132) [see 
sections 804 and 875 of Title 10, Armed 
Forces), to reappoint a discharged officer to 
such commissioned rank and precedence as 
the former officer would have attained had he 
not been dismissed, and to direct the extent to 
which any such reappointment shall affect the 
promotion status of other officers. 
(c) The authority vested in the President 
by section 10 of the act of May 5, 1950, ch. 
169, 64 Stat. 146 [see sections 1161 and 6408 
of Title 10, Armed Forces), to drop from the 
rolls any officer who has been absent without 
authority from his place of duty for a period 
of three months or more, or who, having been 
found guilty by the civil authorities of any 
offense, is finally sentenced to confinement in 
a Federal or State penitentiary or correctional 
institution. 
(d) The authority vested in the President 
by section 219 of the Armed Forces Reserve 
Act, approved July 9, 1952 (66 Stat. 487) [see 
section 593 of Title to, Armed Forces], to 
make appointments of Reserves in commis-
sioned grades below flag officer grades. 
(e) The authority vested in the President 
by section 221 of the said Armed Forces 
Reserve Act [see section 593 of Title 10, 
Armed Forces), to determine the tenure in 
office of commissioned officers of the reserve. 
(() The authority vested in the President by 
section 248 of the said Armed Forces Reserve 
Act [see section 1162 of Title 10, Armed 
Forces], to effect the discharge of commis-
sioned officers of the reserve. 
(g) The authority vested in the President 
by section 6 of the act of February 21, 1946, 
ch. 34, 60 Stat. 27 [see section 6323 of Title 
10, Armed Forces]. as made applicable to the 
Coast Guard Reserve by section 755(a) of 
title 14 of the United States Code, in his 
discretion, to place upon the retired list any 
officer of the Coast Guard Reserve, upon his 
own application, who has completed more 
than twenty years of active service as describ-
ed in the said section 6. 
Sec. 3. All actions heretofore taken by 
the President with respect to the matters 
affected by this order and in force at the time 
of issuance of this order, including any regu-
lations prescribed or approved by the Presi-
dent with respect to such matters. shall, ell-
cept as they may be inconsistent with the 
provisions of this order, remain in effect until 
amended. modified, or revoked pursuant to 
the authority conferred by this order. 
Sec. 4. As used in this order, the term 
"functions" embraces duties, powers, respon-
sibilities, authority, or discretion, and the 
term "perform" may be construed to mean 
"exercise". 
Sec. 5. Whenever the entire Coast Guard 
operates as a service in the Navy, the refer-
ences to the Secretary of the Treasury in the 
introductory portions of sections I and 2 of 
this order shall be deemed to be references to 
the Secretary of the Navy. 
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10661 
Feb. 27, 1956, 21 F.R. 1315 
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND 
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 
Section l. The Secretary of Defense, and, 
when designated by the Secretary of Defense 
for such purpose, the Secretary of the Army 
are hereby designated and empowered to ex· 
ercise, without the approval, ratification, or 
other action of the President, the authority 
vested in the President by the first section of 
the act of June 26, 1946, ch. 493, 60 Stat. 
311, as amended [see sections 4344 and 9344 
of Title 10, Armed Forces] to designate per· 
sons from the American Republics (other 
than the United States) and Canada who may 
be permitted to receive instruction at the 
United States Military Academy at West 
Point, New York. 
Sec. 2. The Secretary of Defense, and, 
when designated by the Secretary of Defense 
for such purpose, the Secretary of the Navy 
are hereby designated and empowered to ex· 
ercise, without the approval, ratification, or 
other action of the President, the following· 
described authority to designate persons who 
may be permitted to receive instruction at the 
United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, 
Maryland: 
(a) The authority vested in the President 
by the act of July 14, 1941, ch. 292, 55 Stat. 
589, as amended [see section 6957 of Title 10, 
Armed Forces], with respect to persons from 
the American Republics (other than the Unit· 
ed States) and Canada. 
(b) The authority vested in the President 
by the act of June 24, 1948, ch. 616, 62 Stat. 
583 [see section 6957 of Title 10, Armed 
Forces], with respect to Filipinos. 
Sec. 3. The Secretary of Defense, and, 
when designated by the Secretary of Defense 
for such purpose, the Secretary of the Air 
Force are hereby designated and empowered 
to exercise, without the approval, ratification, 
or other action of the President, the authority 
vested in the President by the first section of 
the said act of June 26, 1946, as made appli· 
cable to the United States Air Force Acade· 
my by section 5 of the act of April I, 1954, 
ch. 127, 68 Stat. 48 [see section 9344 of Title 
10, Armed Forces), to designate persons from 
the American Republics (other than the Unit· 
ed States) and Canada who may be permitted 
to receive instruction at the United States Air 
Force Academy. 
Sec. 4. The Secretary of Commerce is 
hereby designated and empowered to exercise 
without the approval, ratification. or other 
action of the President, the authority vested 
in the President by the act of August 9, 1946, 
ch. 928, 60 Stat. 961 [section 1126b of Title 
46), to designate persons from the American 
Republics (other than the United States) who 
may be permitted to receive instruction in the 
United States Merchant Marine Cadet Corps 
and at the United States Merchant Marine 
Academy at Kings Point, New York. 
Sec. 5. No person shall be designated un· 
der the authority of this order to receive 
instruction except after consultation by the 
designating officer with the Secretary of State. 
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10950 
June 27, 1961, 26 F.R. 5787 
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 
By virtue of the authority vested in me by 
section 6(b) of the Alaska Statehood Act of 
July 7, 1958 (72 Stat. 339) (set out as a note 
preceding former section 21 of Title 48, Terri· 
tories and Insular Possessions), and as Presi· 
dent of the United States, I hereby designate 
the Secretary of the Interior as my represent· 
ative to exercise the authority vested in me by 
section 6(b) of the act to approve selections of 
land made by the State of Alaska under the 
provisions of section 6(b) in instances in 
which those selections include land lying 
north and west of the line described in section 
IO(b) of the act: Provided, that no selection 
by the State shall be approved pursuant to 
this order, in whole or in part, without the 
concurrence of the Secretary of Defense or 
his designated representative. 
As the Secretary of the Interior may direct, 
the Under Secretary of the Interior, an Assist· 
ant Secretary of the Interior, the Director of 
the Bureau of Land Management, or the 
Operations Supervisors of the Bureau of Land 
Management in Alaska are severally authoriz-
ed to exercise the authority vested in the 
Secretary by this order. 
JoHN F. KENNEDY 
• 
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11012 
Mar. 28, 1962, 27 F.R. 2983, as amended by Ex.Ord. No. 11230, 
June 28, 1965, 30 F.R. 8447. 
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES 
By virtue of the authority vested in me by 
Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States 
Code, and as President of the United States, 
it is hereby ordered as follows: 
Section l. [Superseded by Ex.Ord. No. 
11230, § 2(11), June 28, 1965, 30 F.R. 8447) 
Sec. 2. The Administrator of General 
Services is hereby designated and empowered 
to exercise, without the approval, ratification, 
or other action of the President, so much of 
the authority vested in the President by Sec-
tion I (b} of the Act of August 2, 1946, ch. 
744, 60 Stat. 807 (5 U.S.C. 73b-l(b}) [see 
section 5724 of Title 5, Government Organi-
zation and Employees], as pertains to the 
establishment of the rates to be used in reim-
bursing civilian officers or employees of the 
Government on a commuted basis in lieu of 
the payment of actual expenses of transporta-
tion, packing, crating, temporary storage, 
drayage, and unpacking of their household 
goods and personal effects in the case of 
transfers from one official station to another 
within the continental United States for per-
manent duty. 
Sec. 3. The initial regulations to be is-
sued by the Director of the Bureau of the 
Budget and by the Administrator of General 
Services under the authority delegated to each 
of them by this order shall be effective on the 
same date and effective as of that date the 
following-described Executive orders are re-
voked: 
(a) Executive Order No. 9778 of September 
to, 1946. 
(b) Executive Order No. 9805 of Novem-
ber 25, 1946. 
(c) Executive Order No. 9933 of February 
27, 1948. 
(d) Executive Order No. 9997 of Septem-
ber 8, 1948. 
(e) Executive Order No. 10069 of July 14, 
1949. 
CO Executive Order No. 10177 of October 
27, 1950. 
(g) Executive Order No. 10196 of Decem-
ber 20, 1950. 
(h) Executive Order No. 10274 of July 18, 
1951. 
(i) Executive Order No. 10381 of August 
6, 1952. 
(j) Executive Order No. 10507 of Decem-
ber 10, 1953. 
Sec. 4. Existing regulations prescribed by 
the Director of the Bureau of the Budget 
under the authority of Section l(b) of Execu-
tive Order No. 10530, as amended and in 
effect immediately prior to the issuance of 
this order, shall remain in effect until they are 
superseded in pursuance of the provisions of 
this order. 
1011:-.; F. KE'l;'l;[OY 
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11023 
May 29, 1962, 27 F.R. 5131 
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 
By virtue of the authority vested in me by 
section 301 of title 3 (this section] of the 
United States Code, and as President of the 
United States, it is ordered as follows: 
Section l. The Secretary of Commerce is 
hereby designated and empowered to perform 
the following described functions without the 
approval, ratification, or other action of the 
President: 
(a) The authority contained in section 6(b) 
of the Coast and Geodetic Survey Commis-
sioned Officers Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 298; 33 
U.S.C. 853e(b)) (section 853e(b) of Title 33, 
Navigation and Navigable Waters] to revoke 
the commissions of ensigns of the Coast and 
Geodetic Survey who are found not fully 
qualified and to separate such ensigns from 
the commissioned service. 
(b) The authority vested in the President 
by section 12(a} of the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey Commissioned Officers Act of 1948, 
as amended (75 Stat. 506; 33 U.S.C. 
853j-l(a}) [section 853j-t(a} of Title 33], to 
make temporary appointments in the grade of 
ensign in the Coast and Geodetic Survey. 
(c) The authority vested in the President 
by section 12(b} of the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey Commissioned Officers Act of 1948, 
as amended (75 Stat. 506; 33 U.S.C. 
853j-l(b)} [section 853j-l(b) of Title 33], to 
• 
• 
temporarily promote officers in the perma-
nent grade of ensign in the Coast and Geodet-
ic Survey, and to appoint such officers to the 
grade of lieutenant junior grade whenever 
vacancies exist in higher grades. 
(d) The authority vested in the President 
by section 12(c) of the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey Commissioned Officers Act of 1948, 
as amended (75 Stat. 506; 33 U.S.C. 
853j-l(c)) [section 853j-l(c) of Title 33], to 
temporarily promote any officer one grade. 
(e) The authority vested in the President 
by section 13(b) of the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey Commissioned Officers Act of 1948, 
as amended (75 Stat. 506; 33 U.S.C. 853k(b)) 
(section 853k(b) of Title 33], to defer the 
retirement of an officer of the Coast and 
Geodetic Survey serving in a rank above that 
of captain who has attained the age of sixty· 
two years. 
(f) The authority vested in the President by 
section 14 of the Coast and Geodetic Survey 
Commissioned Officers Act of 1948, as 
amended (75 Stat. 506; 33 U.S.C. 853/) (sec· 
tion 853/ of Title 33), to retire from the active 
service any commissioned officer of the Coast 
and Geodetic Survey, upon his own applica· 
tion, who has completed twenty years of ac· 
tive service in the Coast and Geodetic Survey. 
(g) The authority vested in the President 
by section 23(a) of the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey Commissioned Officers Act of 1948, 
as amended (75 Stat. 506; 33 U.S.C. 853t(a)) 
[section 853t(a) of Title 33), (1) to find that 
any officer appointed under section 23 is not 
qualified for service, (2) to revoke the com· 
missions of officers in respect of whom such 
findings are made, and (3) to prescribe the 
regulations referred to in that section. 
(h) The authority contained in section 1(1) 
of the Act of December 3, 1942 (56 Stat. 
1038; 33 U.S.C. 854a-l(l)) [section 
854a-l(I) of Title 33], to temporarily pro-
mote to higher ranks or grades, upon recom-
mendation of the Secretary of the military 
department concerned, commissioned officers 
of the Coast and Geodetic Survey transferred 
to the military departments. 
(I) The authority contained in section 1(2) 
of the Act of December 3, 1942 (56 Stat. 
1038; 33 U.S.C. 854a-1(2)), [section 
854a-1(2) of Title 33] to temporarily promote 
commissioned officers of the Coast and Geo· 
detic Survey to fill vacancies in ranks and 
grades caused by transfer of commissioned 
officers to the service and jurisdiction of the 
military departments. 
(j) The authority contained in section 1(3) 
of the Act of December 3, 1942 (56 Stat. 
1038; 33 U.S.C. 854a-1(3)) [section 
854a-1(3) of Title 33] to temporarily appoint 
deck officers and junior engineers to the 
grade of ensign to fill vacancies caused by 
transfer of officers to the military depart-
ments. 
(k) The authority vested in the President 
by section 16 of the Act of May 22, 1917 (40 
Stat. 87; 33 U.S.C. 855) [section 855 of Title 
33], to transfer to sen·ice and jurisdiction of 
the Department of Defense, as he may deem 
to be to the best interest of the country, 
vessels, equipment, stations, and personnel of 
the Coast and Geodetic Survey; but the Sec-
retary of Commerce may effect such transfers 
only during the existence of a state of nation-
al emergency proclaimed by the President. 
Commissioned officers so transferred shall 
serve under their commissions in the Coast 
and Geodetic Survey and while so serving 
shall constitute a part of the active armed 
forces of the United States and shall be under 
the direct orders of, and shall be subject to 
the applicable laws, regulations, and orders 
for the government of, the armed forces to 
which they are transferred, respectively. The 
Secretary of Commerce may return such ves-
sels, equipment, stations, and personnel to the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce, 
but in time of national emergency such return 
shall be effected only with the concurrence of 
the Secretary of Defense. 
(() The authority vested in the President by 
section 8 of the Act of August 6, 1947 (61 
Stat. 788; 33 U.S.C. 883h) (section 883h of 
Title 33] to employ public vessels, and to give 
instructions for regulating their conduct, to 
carry out the provisions of the Act of August 
6, 1947; but the employment by the Secretary 
of Commerce of vessels, except those of the 
Department of Commerce or of any subordi-
nate entity thereof, shall require the concur-
rence of the head of the department or other 
executive agency having custody or control of 
the vessel. 
Sec. 2. Upon receipt by Secretary of 
Commerce from the President or from the 
President's representative of' information 
showing that the Senate has confirmed nomi· 
nees of the President for appointment as com-
missioned officers of the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey, and without any further action on t.he 
part of the President, (1) the Secretary of the 
Commerce or an officer of the Department of 
Commerce designated by the Secretary may, 
upon completion of statutory requirements 
for such appointments, tender offers of ap-
pointment to the nominees and upon accept-
ance such persons shall be deemed to be 
appointed accordingly, (2) the Secretary of 
Commerce, in the name of the President, 
shall issue to each such person a commission 
evidencing the appointment of such person 
accordingly, and (3) the commissions of such 
persons shall be deemed to have been signed 
by the President. The effective date specified 
in any commission so issued shall be deemed, 
for all pur~. to be the date of the appoint-
ment evidenced by such commission. 
Sec. 3. In connection with making ap-
pointments or promotions under authority 
delegated to him by subsections (b), (c), (d), 
(h), (i), and (j) of section 1 of this order, the 
Secretary of Commerce shall issue to each 
person appointed or promoted by him there-
under a certificate evidencing the appoint-
ment or promotion of such person. Such 
certificate may be issued in the name of the 
President. 
Sec. 4. Any requirement of any provision 
of law that commissions of officers under the 
direction and control of the Secretary of 
Commerce be signed by the President before 
the seal of the Department of Commerce may 
be affixed thereto shall, in the case of officers 
appointed under the procedure set forth in 
section 2 of this order and in the case of 
officers appointed or promoted under authori-
ty delegated by subsections (b), (c), (d), (h), 
(i), and (j) of section l of this order, be 
deemed to be satisfied by signature of the 
commission or certificate by the Secretary of 
Commerce, before the departmental seal is 
affixed thereto. 
Sec. 5. The Secretary of Commerce is 
hereby authorized to accept, in the name of 
the President, the resignation of a commis-
sioned officer, either permanent or tempo-
rary, of the Coast and Geodetic Survey. 
Sec. 6. The authority delegated by the 
provisions of subsections (b), (c), (d), (h), (i), 
and (j) of section l of this order shall be 
deemed to include the authority to terminate 
any appointment or promotion made under 
the provisions of law referred to in those 
subsections. 
Sec. 7. All actions heretofore taken by 
the President with respect to the matters 
affected by this order and in force at the time 
of issuance of this order, including any regu-
lations prescribed or approved by the Presi-
dent with respect to such matters shall, ex-
cept as they may be inconsistent with the 
provisions of this order, remain in effect until 
amended, modified or revoked pursuant to 
the authority conferred by this order. The 
following are hereby superseded: (l) Letter of 
the President to the Secretary of Commerce, 
dated April 23, 1929, and relating to the 
general subject of section 2 of this order, and 
(2) letter of the Secretary to the President, 
dated July I, 1919, and directed to the Secre-
tary of Commerce, relating to the general 
subject of section S of this order. 
Sec. 8. As used in this order the term 
"functions" embraces duties, powers, respon-
sibilities, authority or discretion, and the term 
"perform" may be construed to mean "exer-
cise". 
JoHN F. KENNEDY 
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11110 
June 5, 1963, 28 F.R. 5605 
AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10289, RELATING TO PERFORM-
ANCE OF CERTAIN FUNCTIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
By virtue of the authority vested in me by 
section 301 of title 3 of the United States 
Code [this section], it is ordered as follows: 
Section 1. Executive Order No. 10289 of 
September 19, 195 I, as amended [set out as a 
note under this section], is hereby further 
amended-
(a) By adding at the end of paragraph 1 
thereof the following subparagraph (j): 
"(j) The authority vested in the President 
by paragraph (b) of section 43 of the Act of 
May 12, 1933, as amended (31 U.S.C. 821(b)) 
(section 82l(b) of Title 31, Money and Fi-
nance], to issue silver certificates against any 
silver bullion, silver, or standard silver dollars 
in the Treasury not then held for redemption 
of any outstanding silver certificates, to pre-
scribe the denominations of such silver certifi-
cates, and to coin standard silver dollars and 
subsidiary silver currency for their redemp-
tion," and 
(b) By revoking subparagraphs (b) and (c) 
of paragraph 2 thereof. 
Sec. 2. The amendments made by this 
Order shall not affect any act done, or any 
right accruing or accrued or any suit or 
proceeding had or commenced in any civil or 
criminal cause prior to the date of this Order 
but all such liabilities shall continue and may 
be enforced as if said amendments had not 
been made. 
JoHN F. KENNEDY 
• 
• 
SUBCHAPTER I-COMMISSIONS, OATHS, AND RECORDS 
§ 2901. Commission of an officer 
The President may make out and deliver, after adjournment of 
the Senate, the commission of an officer whose appointment has 
been confirmed by the Senate. 
§ 2902. Commission; where recorded 
(a) Except as provided by subsections (b) and (c} of this section, 
the Secretary of State shall make out and record, and affix the seal 
of the United States to, the commission of an officer appointed by 
the President. The seal of the United States may not be affixed to 
the commission before the commission has been signed by the 
President. 
(b) The commission of an officer in the civil service or uniformed 
services under the control of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Sec-
retary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a 
milital")' department, the Secretary of the Interior, or the Secretary 
of the Treasury shall be made out and recorded in the department 
in which he is to serve under the seal of that department. The de-
partmental seal may not be affixed to the commission before the 
commission has been signed by the President. 
(c) The commissions of judicial officers and United States attor-
neys and marshals, afpointed by the President, by and with the 
advice and consent o the Senate, and other commissions which 
before August 8, 1888, were prepared at the Department of State 
on the requisition of the Attorney General, shall be made out and 
recorded in the Department of Justice under the seal of that de-
partment and countersigned by the Attorney General. The depart-
mental seal may not be affixed to the commission before the com-
mission has been signed by the President. 
§ 2903. Oath; authority to administer 
(a) The oath of office required by section 3331 of this title may be 
administered by an individual authorized by the laws of the United 
States or local law to administer oaths in the State, District, or ter-
ritory or possession of the United States where the oath is adminis-
~ed. . 
(b) An employee of an Executive agency designated in writing by 
the head of the Executive agency, or the Secretary of a military de-
partment with respect to an employee of his department, may ad-
minister-
(1) the oath of office required by section 3331 of this title, in-
cident to entrance into the executive branch; or 
(2) any other oath required by law in connection with em-
ployment in the executive branch. 
(c) An oath authorized or required under the laws of the United 
States may be administered by-
(1) the Vice President; or 
(2) an individual authorized by local law to administer oaths 
in the State, District, or territory or possession of the United 
States where the oath is administered. 
§ 2904. Oath; administered without fees 
An employee of an Executive agency who is authorized to admin-
ister the oath of office required by section 3331 of this title, or any 
other oath required by law in connection with employment in the 
executive branch, may not charge or receive a fee or pay for ad-
ministering the oath. 
• 
§ 2905. Oath; renewal 
(a) An employee of an Executive agency or an individual em-
ployed by the government of the District of Columbia who, on origi-
nal appointment, subscribed to the oath of office required by sec-
tion 3331 of this title is not required to renew the oath because of a 
change in status so long as his service is continuous in the agency 
in which he is employed, unless, in the opinion of the head of the 
Executive agency, the Secretary of a military department with re-
spect to an employee of his department, or the Commissioners of 
the District of Columbia, the public interest so requires. 
(b) An individual who, on appointment as an employee of a 
House of Congress, subscribed to the oath of office required by sec-
tion 3331 of this title is not required to renew the oath so long as 
his service as an employee of that House of Congress is continuous. 
§ 2906. Oath; custody 
The oath of office taken by an individual under section 3331 of 
this title shall be delivered by him to, and preserved by, the House 
of Congress, agency, or court to which the office pertains . 
• 
• 
• 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
In accordance with the provisions of § 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, I hereby transmit to 
you my written declaration that I am presently unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of the Off ice of President of the 
United States. Pursuant to those provisions, the Vice President, 
Albert Gore, Jr., shall discharge those powers and duties as 
Acting President during the period of my disability. 
The Honorable Thomas s. Foley 
Speaker 
Sincerely, 
United States House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
• 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
Dear Mr. President: 
In accordance with the provisions of § 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, I hereby transmit to 
you my written declaration that I am presently unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of the Off ice of President of the 
United States. Pursuant to those provisions, the Vice President, 
Albert Gore, Jr., shall discharge those powers and duties as 
Acting President during the period of my disability. 
The Honorable Robert c. Byrd 
President Pro Tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, o.c. 20510 
Sincerely, 
• 
• 
• 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
In accordance with the provisions of S 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, I hereby transmit to 
you my written declaration that I am able to discharge the powers 
and duties of the Off ice of President of the United States. 
The Honorable Thomas s. Foley 
Speaker 
sincerely, 
United states House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
• 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
Dear Mr. President: 
In accordance with the provisions of § 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, I hereby transmit to 
you my written declaration that I am able to discharge the powers 
and duties of the Office of President of the United States. 
The Honorable Robert c. Byrd 
President Pro Tempore 
United states Senate 
Washington, o.c. 20510 
Sincerely, 
•• 
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THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
In accordance with the provisions of § 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, we hereby transmit 
to you our written declaration that the President of the United 
states, William J. Clinton, is presently unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office. Pursuant to these provisions, 
the Vice President, Albert Gore, Jr., shall discharge those 
powers and duties as Acting President. 
The Honorable Thomas s. Foley 
Speaker 
Sincerely, 
Albert Gore, Jr • 
United States House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
• 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
Dear Mr. President: 
In accordance with the provisions of § 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to the United states Constitution, we hereby transmit 
to you our written declaration that the President of the United 
States, William J. Clinton, is presently unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office. Pursuant to these provisions, 
the Vice President, Albert Gore, Jr., shall discharge those 
powers and duties as Acting President. 
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd 
President Pro Tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, o.c. 20510 
Sincerely, 
Albert Gore, Jr • 
• 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
In accordance with the provisions of § 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, I hereby transmit to 
you my written declaration that I am able to discharge the powers 
and duties of the Off ice of President of the United States and 
that I am resuming those powers and duties. 
The Honorable Thomas s. Foley 
Speaker 
Sincerely, 
United States House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
Dear Mr. President: 
In accordance with the provisions of § 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, I hereby transmit to 
you my written declaration that I am able to discharge the powers 
and duties of the Off ice of President of the United States and 
that I am resuming those powers and duties. 
The Honorable Robert c. Byrd 
President Pro Tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
Sincerely, 
• 
• 
• 
The Honorable Robert c. Byrd 
President pro tempore 
of the Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
Dear Mr. President: 
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I will be briefly 
and temporarily incapable of discharging the Constitutional 
powers and duties of the Off ice of the President of the United 
states. 
After consultation with my counsel and the Attorney General, I am 
mindful of the provisions of Section 3 of the 25th Amendment to 
the Constitution and of the uncertainties of its application to 
such brief and temporary periods of incapacity • 
Not intending to set a precedent binding anyone privileged to 
hold this Office in the future, I have determined and it is my 
intention and direction that Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., 
shall discharge those powers and duties in my stead commending 
with the administration of anesthesia to me in this instance. 
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I determine that I 
am able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional powers and 
duties of this off ice. 
Sincerely, 
William J. Clinton 
• 
The Honorable Thomas s. Foley 
Speaker of the 
House of Representatives 
Washington, o.c. 20515 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I will be briefly 
and temporarily incapable of discharging the Constitutional 
powers and duties of the Office of the President of the United 
States. 
After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney General, I am 
mindful of the provisions of Section 3 of the 25th Amendment to 
the Constitution and of the uncertainties of its application to 
such brief and temporary periods of incapacity • 
Not intending to set a precedent binding anyone privileged to 
hold this Off ice in the future, I have determined and it is my 
intention and direction that Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., 
shall discharge those powers and duties in my stead commending 
with the administration of anesthesia to me in this instance. 
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I determine that I 
am able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional powers and 
duties of this office. 
Sincerely, 
William J. Clinton 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd 
President pro tempore 
of the Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
Dear Mr. President: 
Following up on my letter to you of this date, 
please be advised I am able to resume the 
discharge of the Constitutional powers and 
duties of the Off ice of the President of the 
United States. I have informed the Vice 
President of my determination and my resumption 
of those powers and duties. 
Sincerely, 
• 
The Honorable Thomas S. Foley 
Speaker of the 
House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
Following up on my letter to you of this date, 
please be advised I am able to resume the 
discharge of the Constitutional powers and 
duties of the Off ice of the President of the 
United States. I have informed the Vice 
President of my determination and my resumption 
of those powers and duties. 
Sincerely, 

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY CENcRAL 
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 
llnitru §tatrs Erpartmrnt of 3.fustirt 
lD<rnl1ingtan. il ffi. 21l33D 
3 AP!~ 1981 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT AND SUCCESSION TO H.IS DUTIES 
PURSUA.N'T TO THE PROVISIONS OF ART. II 1 SEC .. l, _CL. 5, OF 
THE CONSTITUTION, IN CASE OF THE "INABILITY" OF THE PRESIDENT 
"TO DISCHARGE THE POliERS AND DUTIES OF [HIS] OFFICE," THOSE 
POliERS SHALL DEVOLVE ON THE VICE PRESIDENT. [THE FULL TEXT OF 
THIS PROVISION IS ATTACHED HERETO AS APPENDIX l.] 
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1 OF THE 25TH. AMEND-
MENT, "IN CASE OF THE REMOVAL OF THE PRESIDENT FROM OFFICE OR OF 
HIS DEATH OR RESIGNATION, THE VICE PRESIDENT SHALL BECOME PRESI-
DENT." [TF.E FULL TEXT OF TEE 25TH AMENDMENT IS ATTACHED HERETO 
AS J..PPENDIX 2] . 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 3 OF THE 25TH AMEND:L-lENT, "WHENEVER THE 
PRESIDENT TRANSMITS TO THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE AND 
THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HIS WRITTEN DECLARATION 
THAT HE IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, 
AND ln\TIL HE TRANSMITS TO THEM A WRITTEN DECLARATION TO THE CON-
TRARY, SUCH POWERS AND DUTIES SHALL BE DISCHARGED BY THE VICE 
PRESIDENT AS ACTING PRESIDENT." [THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 3 HAVE 
NEVER BEEN IMPLEMENTED.] 
----- ---·· -·--- - ... -- --- -----··-· --- -·-- - -- ---- - --- .. - -- -
PURSUANT TO SECTION 4 OF THE 25TH AMENDMENT, "NHENEVER THE 
VICE PRESIDENT AND A MAJORITY OF EITHER THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS 
OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OR OF SUCH OTHER BODY AS CONGREss· 
. . 
MAY BY LAW PROVIDE, TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE 
SENATE AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THEIR 
WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE. TO DISCHARGE THE. 
-
POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE VICE PRESIDENT SHALL IMMEDI-
-
ATELY ASSUME THE POi\'ERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE AS ACTING 
PRESIDENT." [THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4 HAVE NEVER BEEN 
IHPLE..'111.ENTED ~l CONGRESS HAS NOT DESIGNATED ANY "OTHER BODY" TO 
EXERCISE THE AUTHORITY SPECIFIED IN SECTION 4. THEREFORE, THE 
OPERABLE LANGUAGE WOULD BE "THE VICE PRESIDENT AND A MAJORITY 
OF ••• THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS." 
IF THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE PRESIDENCY ARE ASSUMED BY 
THE VICE PRESIDE~~T UNDER SECTION 3, THE PRESIDENT RESUMES HIS 
FULL POWERS BY TRANSHITTING.A DECLARATION THAT HE IS ABLE TO 
DISCHARGE HIS DUTIES. 'THE SAME IS TRUE UNDER SECTION 4, EXCEPT 
THAT IN SUCH A CASE A MECHANISM IS PROVIDED FOR THE VICE PRESI-
DENT, THE CABINET AND THE CONGRESS TO OVERRIDE THE PRESIDENT. 
IN CASE OF SUCH A DISAGREEMENT OVER THE PRESIDENT'S DISABILITY 
UNDER SECTION 4, THE VICE PRESIDENT REaAINS ACTING PRESIDENT 
UNTIL THE ISSUE IS RESOLVED. 
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··-···· ..... -· --- - .. . ---=----=-·----:·----·----:.. __ . -·-- --- ---- ----=--==--- ---
SECTION 19 OF TITLE 3 OF THE U.S. CODE [THE FULL TEXT OF 
WHICH IS ATTACHED AS APPENDIX 3] SETS FORTR THE STATUTORY LINE 
OF SUCCESSION FOR THE DEVOLUTION OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AFTER THE 
VICE PRESIDENT, AS AUTHORIZED BY .ART. II, SEC. 1, CL. 5. ·THE 
STATUTE PROVIDES THAT THE SPECIFIED ORDER OF SUCCESSION APPLIES UPON 
DEATH, RESIGNATION, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE OR "INABILITY" OF AN INDI-
VIDUAL ACTING AS PRESIDENT .. SECTION 19 SPECIFIES THAT THE "POWERS 
AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT" , IF THERE IS NO VICE 
PRESIDENT ABLE TO DISCHARGE THEM, DEVOLVE FIRST UPON THE SPEAKER 
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE..~ UPON THE PRESIDENT PRO TEM.PORE 
OF THE SENATE, THEN (IN THE ORDER SPECIFIED) UPON THE SECRETARY OF 
STATE, SECRETARY OF TREASURY'· SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL, SECP£TARY OF INTERIOR, SECRE.TARY .OF AGRICULTURE, SE<;RE-
TARY OF COMMERCE, SECRETA.~Y OF LABOR, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 
HUM.AN SERVICES, SECRETARY OF HOUSING Al~D URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, SECRETARY O? ENERGY, AND SECRETARY 
OF EDUCATION. 
The following additional considerations may be important 
in certain circumstances: 
1. The Vice President does not have to take a new oath · 
of off ice upon assuming the powers and duties of the 
President in the case of a President's inability to 
act. The Vice.President assumes only the powers and 
duties of the President and the designation "Acti~g 
President" in these circu:-;i.stances and does not become 
-3-
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President. The legislative history of the 25th Amend-
ment and the actual la~gu~ge of the Amendment support 
this conclusion. The answer seems to be "different and 
more complex in the case of the subsequent officers in 
the line of succession, Title 3, Section 19, treats 
the Legislative Branch successors sornewh~t differently 
than those in the Executive Branch.· ·The .technicalities 
of succession to temporary presidential· authority are 
not considered herein beyond the Vice Presidential level. 
2. The written dec"larations of disability and recovery 
specified in sections 3 and 4 of the 25th Amendment may 
consist of short letters framed in the constitutional 
terminology. 
3. The phrase the "principal officers of the Executive 
Departments" in the 25th Amendment includes only 
those Cabinet members specified in Title 3 ,· .Sec.tion 19. 
Other "cabinet-level" officials might arguably be em-
braced but the far stronger position is that they are not. 
4. The "transmittal" of the declarations contemplated by 
the 25th Amendment is the operative event to effect 
the transfer of authority rather than the receipt of 
the declaration by the addressees. Arguments in favor 
of the latter circumstance as the operative event are 
-4-
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not persuasive. ·Transmittal should be made both. "to . · 
the ·offices of the addressees and to them personally. 
5. A si~gle ·declaration with all the ·nec·essary s:Lgnatures 
would not appear to be necessary under Section 4 .0£ 
.. • 
the 25th Amendment. While this would be the ·preferable -
- .. 
course if all s~gnatures were available; _counterpart 
-declarations would be an adequate alternative: 
6. Under Section 4, actual physical signatures on ·the 
declarations would not appear to be neces·sary if r for 
' . 
example, the critical official was out of town or on 
board an· aircraft. He could authorize ·another to affix 
h - -_.:::;, name. The imperatives of the.situation wo~ld_govern 
t e approach.taken, but if a prompt ~ansfer of authorit: 
i necessary, the fastest ge~uine ·expression of endorse~ 
ment would be appropriate. 
7. Under Section 3, a· voluntary Pres.idential declaration of 
disability should be signed personally by him. if possibl 
but a reliable manifestation of his understanding.and 
assent should suffice. In cases of doubt ·regarding 
>is capacity to understand and assent, the section 4 
procedure should be used. 
Theodore B. Olson 
-s-
i 
r 
11m'triJ 5tntr.a t!rpnrtmrnt of Jlustirr 
IDa!dfingtun. D. m. 20530 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY CENERAL 
OFFICE OF LEG.:l.L COUNSEL 3 APR ·1961 
• MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Re: : Presidential Succession and Delegation in Cases 
. of Disabilitv 
As a result of the recent assassination attempt on President 
Reagan, this Office has researched several issues that relate 
to presidential succession ~nd the delegation of pre~idential 
power in the event of a temporary disability of the President. 
This memorandum sets forth our conclusions on the relevant 
1ega1 issues • 
I. Presidential Succession 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
establishes a mechanism for presidential succession in the event 
that the President becomes unable to perform his constitutional 
duties. Succession may take place in two ways. First, if the 
President is able and willing to do so, he may provide for the 
temporary assumption of the powers and duties of his office by 
the Vice President by "transmit[ting] to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House his written 
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of the President." See U.S. Const. , Amend. XXV, § 3. 
When the Pr~sident transmits such a declaration, his powers 
and duties devolve upon the Vice President as Acting President .±_/ 
until the President transmits an additional written declaration 
stating that he has become able to perform his responsibilities. 
1/ There appears to be no requirement that the Vice President 
resign from his position as Vice President or take the President's 
oath of office to serve as "Acting President." As a general 
rule, an official who is "acting" in a certain capacity need 
not vacate the office previously held or take the oath of 
off ice ordinarily taken. by the person whose duties he has 
temporarily assumed. This conclusion is supported by Hearings 
on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of 
Vice President Before the 'SU'bcomm. on ConstTtlltional Amendments 
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 
215, 232 (1965); Hearings on Presidential Inability and Vice 
Presidential Vacancy Before-the House Comm. on the Judiciarv, 
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1965). See also J. Ferrick, The 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment 199 (1976)-.-The rule as to resignation 
and/or taking the President's oath appears to be different for 
those officials further down the line of succession. See 3 
U.S.C. § 19. This memorandum does· not address the issues 
involved in the devolution of powers beyond the position of 
Vice President. . 
--··--· ----·· - ---··-··-------- -···----· - -- ·---·-··-···-···· ·-----··. --- ··--·-·-
Second, if the President is unable or unwilling to transmit 
a declaration of his inability to perform his duties, the Vice 
President will become Acting President 2/ if the Vice· President 
and a majority of the "principal officers of the executive-depart-
ments" transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and 
the Speaker of the House a written declaration that the President 
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. See 
U.S. Const., Amend. XXV, § 4. The term "principal officers of the 
executive departments" is intended to mean "the Cabinet," although 
the term 11 Cabinet" has no precise legal definition. }_/ 
2/ The Vice President will evidently continue to exercise the . 
duties of Vice President while he serves as Acting President. 
The Vice President would, however, lose his title ~s President 
of the Senate. See 111 Cong. Rec. 3270 (1965) (Sen. Saltonstall); 
J. Ferrick, The TW'enty-Fifth Amendment 199 (1965). 
3/ See S. Rep. No. 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1966). We believe 
that the "principal officers of the Executive departments, u for 
purposes of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, include the Secretary of 
State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney· 
General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, 
Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,· 
Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, and Secretary 
of Education. That conclusion is supported by the legislative 
history. See 111 Cong. Rec. 7938 (1965)(Rep. Waggoner); id. at 7941 
(Rep. Poff-r;--id. at 7944-45 (Rep. Webster); id. at 7952, 7954 
(Rep. Gilbert):" See also J. Ferrick, supra,at 202-203. See 
also 5 u.s.c. 101-.~As a practical matter, and in order to avoid any 
doubt regarding the sufficiency of any given declaration, it 
would be desirable to obtain the assent of a sufficient number 
of 0£ ficials to satisfy any definition of the term "principal office 
of the executive departments." 
There is some indication that acting heads of departments 
may participate in the presidential disability determination. 
Al though the legislative history is conflicting, the House Judiciar~· 
Committee's report supports this conclusion, see H.R. Rep. No. 203, 
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 ("1966), as do the Senate debates, ~ 
111 Cong. Rec. 15380 (June 30, l965)(Sen. Kennedy); id. at· 
12385 (July 6, 1965) (Sen. Javits); and a leading commentator on 
the Amendment reaches the same conclusion. See J. Ferrick, The 
Twentv-Fifth Amendment ·203 (1976). Contra, lll Cong. Rec. 3284 
(Feb. 19, 1965)(Rep. Hart). The contrary view proceeds on the 
assumption that such a decision should be made only by persons 
whom the President personally selected for his Cabinet. Such 
persons are presumably intimately familiar with the President 
and are of relatively equal status with the other decisionmakers. 
-2-
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We have prepared drafts of appropriate declarations that 
might be utilized by the President or the appropriate officers 
pursuant to the provisions of sections 3 or 4 of_ the .Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment. Copies of those drafts are attached. 
If, during the period in which the Vice President is Acting 
President, pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment, the President submits to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House a written 
declaration that no inability exists, he will ~esume the powers 
of his office unless, within four days, the Vice President and a 
majority of the Cabinet heads transmit an additional written 
declaration stating that the President is unabl~ to discharge 
his powers and duties. At that point, Congress must decide the 
issue within specificed time limits. See U.S. Const., Amend. 
XXV, cl. 4. !/ 
!/ Under the Amendment, we believe that there is no requirement 
that the requisite writ ten declara t_ions of disabil.i ty be personally 
signed by the Vice ·President· and a majority of the heads of · · 
executive departments. The only requirements are tha-t their -
assent to the declaration be established in a reliable fashion 
and that they direct that their names be ad_ded ·.:.o the document. 
Moreover, the Vice President and the Cabinet he~ds may send 
separate declarations if necessary. See Hearir:s on Presidential 
Inability and Vice Presidential Vacancy-Before ~he-"House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80 ( .965). Finally, 
we believe that under both sections 3 and 4 of =he Amendment, 
the transfer of authority to the Vice President takes effect 
"":"' "immediately" when the declaration is transmitted or sent, and 
is not delayed until receipt of the document by the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. Although 
the question is not free from doubt, the language aria the history 
of the Amendment tend to support this conclusion. See S. Rep. · 
No. 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1965); H.R. Rep. No. 203, ,~·-----
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1965). But see H.R. Rep. No. 564, 
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (Statement of Managers on the Part of 
the House to the effect that "after recei-ot of the President's 
written declaration of his inability • • • such powers and duties 
would then be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President"). 
The better construction would allow the devolution of powers ~JJ.>~.~/'.: 
"immediately" (the word used in sect ion 4 of the Twenty-Fifth ·, · 
Amendment) upon transmittal. No meaningful pur1 ~se would be 
served by awaiting the arrival of the document. The alternative 
construction allows a more rapid transition of presidentia~ 
power when the national interests require it • 
. ---~-:--:--:-:-.=...;.:..~ .·=--~-
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II. Presidential Delegation 
Under circumstances in which it is not considered necessary 
or appropriate to invoke the provisions of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, it may nonetheless be desirable for the President 
to delegate certain powers to other officials, including the 
Vice President. Under statute, see 3 U.S.C. § 30/1, and under 
the Constitution, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 
(1926), the President has broad authority to delegate functions 
vested in him by law. At the same time the Constitution and 
certain statutory provisions impose limits on the President•s 
power to confer his authority on subordinate· officials. The 
nature and extent of those limits are considered in this section. 
A. Constitutional Limitations on the President's 
Power to Delegate his Functions. 
As early as 1855, Attorney General Cushing articulated 
the general rule that the functions vested in the President by 
the Constitution are not delegable and must be performed by him. 
7 Op. A.G. 453, 464-65 (1853) •. The Attorney General opined: 
Thus it may be presumed that he, the man 
discharging the presidential office, and he alone, 
grants reprieves and pardons for offenses against the 
United States, not another man, the Attorney General 
or anybody else, by delegation of the President. 
So he, and he alone, is the supreme commander-in-
chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of 
the militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual service of the United States. That is a power 
constitutionally inherent in the person-of the President. 
No act of Congress, no act even of the President 
himself, can, by constitutional possibility, authorize 
or create any military officer not subordinate to the 
President. 
So he appoints and removes ambassadors and other 
officers of the United States, in the cases and 
-4-
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with the qualifications indicated by the Constitution. 
So he approves or disapproves of bills· which have 
passed both Houses of Congress: that is a personal 
act of the President, like the vote of a Senator 
or a Representat~ves in Congress, not capable of 
performance by a Head .of Department or any other person. 
A study prepared by this Office in the 1950 1 s reaches tLe 
same conclusions. This study and our research suggest that 
the following are nondelegable functions of the President: 
1. The povier to nominate and appoint the officers 
of the United States to the extent provided in 
Article II, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution. 
2. The power to approve or return legislation 
pursuant to Art. I,§ 7, cl. 2 and 3, and the 
power to call Congress into special session or 
to adjourn it according to Article II, § 3. 
3. The power. to make treaties by and with the advic.e 
and consent of the Senate. Article II,·§ 2, cl. 2. 
It should be noted, however, that the power to 
negotiate treaties and the power to enter into 
Executive agreements may be delegated. See 7 Op. 
A.G., supra, at 465. 
4. The power to grant pardons. 
5. The power to remove purely executive Presidential 
appointees. This pc~er is vested in the President 
as an incident of his appointment power. Myers 
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926). 
6. The power to issue Executive Orders. Only 
the President cari issue formal Executive orders 
and Proclamations. He can, however, delegate the 
power to issue many orders which cover substantially 
the same subject matter as Executive · 
orders and Proclamations as long as they are not 
so named.· 
7. The powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief 
of the Army and Navy. Article IIr § 2, cl. 1. In vie 
of Article I, § 8, cl. 12 and 13, which state that 
Congress shall have the power to raise and support·the 
Army and to provide and maintain a Navy, many of the 
-5-
President's powers as Commander-in-Chief are 
statutory in part. To conclude that the President 
rnay not delegate his ultimate constitutional 
responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief is not 
to suggest that he is the only officer of the 
Government who may make military decisions in 
time of emergency, when immediate response may 
be necessary. The President may make formal 
or informal arrangements with his civilian and 
military subordinates, in order to ensure that 
rr---~.,__-t e of command will function swiftly and 
effectively in time of crisis. Of course, every 
military officer must be subordinate· to the 
President. 
B. Statutory Limitations on the President's Power 
to Delegate his Functions. 
The foregoing discussion sets forth the general rule that 
the President may not delegate inherent powers that are con-
ferred on him by the Constitution. On the other hand, he may 
generally delegate powers that have been conferred on him by i 
Congress. Congress has so provided in 3 u.s.c. § 3ap.., which 
states: · 
The President of the United Sta1tes is authorized 
to designate and empower the head of any department 
or agency in the executive branch, or any official 
thereof who is required to be appointed by and · 
with the advice and consent of the Senate,. to perforl41 
without approv~l, ratification, or other action by 
the President (1) any function which is vested in 
the President by law, or (2) any function which 
such officer is required or authorized by law to 
perform only with or subject to the approval, 
ratification, or other action of the President: 
Provided, That nothing contained herein shall relieve 
the President of his responsibility in office for 
the acts of any such head or other official designatea 
by him to perform such functions. Such designation 
and authorization shall be in writing, shall be 
published in the Federal Register, shall be subject 
to such terms, conditions, and limitations as the 
President may deem advisable, and shall be revocable 
at any time by the President in whole or in part. 
Congress has further provided, in 3 U.S.C. § 302, that: 
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The authority conferred by this chapter shall apply 
to any function vested in the President by law if such 
law does not affirmatively pr oh ibi t delegation of 
the performance of such function as herein provided 
for, or specifically designate the officer or 
officers to whom it may be delegated. This chapter 
shall not be deemed to limit or derogate from any 
existing or inherent right of the President to 
delegate the performance of functions vested in 
him by law, and nothing herein shall be deemed to 
require express authorization in any case in which 
such an official would be presumed in law to have 
acted by authority or direction of the President. 
As a result of these statutes, the President is authorized 
to delegate any power vested in him by statute unless the 
statute "affirmatively prohibit[s] delegation." In our view, 
a statute should be construed as an "affirmative" prohibition 
of delegation only if it prohibits delegation expressly or by 
unmistakable implication. The purpose of sections 301 and 302 is 
to facilitate the functioning of the Executive by specifically 
authorizing delegation in the great majority of cases. To. this. 
end, section 301 states a general rule in favor of delegation. 
In light of the breadth of this general rule, the exception in 
section 302 should be .narrowly construed. The same_ inference 
can be drawn from the fact that Congress took care in section 
302 not.to derogate from any "existing or inherent right of 
the President to delegate the performance of functions vested 
in him by law." 
Statutes w~ich do expressly or by unmistakable implication 
prohibit delegation are subject to the possible constitutional 
objection that the power to delegate is inherent in the Executive 
and may not be restricted by Congress. The issue is a difficult 
one and has never been resolved in cour~. In our view, the 
wiser course is to comply with any clear congressional intention 
to prohibit delegation, in order to avoid testing the limits 
of this constitutional question, unless circumstances imperatively 
reguire delegation. 
In the brief time .we have had to review the matter, we 
hQve discovered only a very few statutes that expressly 
or by U.'1mistakable implication prohibit delegation. What 
follows is a description of categories of statutes that fall 
or may fall within this general class. 
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1. Statutes Explicitly Prohibiting Delegntion 
The clearest cases are those in which the statute explicitly 
prohibits delegation. An example is found in the Export 
Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 2403(e){Supp. III 1979), 
which provides that: 
The President may delegate the power, 
authority, and discretion conferred upon him 
by this Act to such departments, agencies, 
or officials of the Government as ·· · 
he may consider appropriate, except that no 
authority under this Act may be delegated 
to, or exercised by, any official of any 
department or agency the head of which is 
not appointed by the President, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate. The 
President may not delegate or transfer his 
power, authority, and discretion to overrule 
or modify any recommendation or decision 
made by the Secretary [of Commerce] , the 
Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of State 
pursuant to the provisions of this Act. 
2. Statutes Conferring Nondelegable Functions 
An unmistakable congressional intent to prohibit delegation 
may also be inferred from statutes that impose on the President a 
duty or power to exercise a nondelegable function. For example, 
it is conwtonly thought that only the President may issue an 
Executive Order or Proclamation. Statutes that authorize the 
President to take an action, but require him to act by way of 
Executive Order or Proclamation, can therefore be r~ad as precludinc 
delegation. An example is found in 22 U.S.C. § 44l(a): · 
·wnenever the Pres id en t • • • shall find that 
there exists a state of war between foreign 
states, and that it is necessary to promote the 
security or preserve the peace of the United 
States o~ to protect the lives of citizens of 
the United States, the President shall issue a 
proclamation naming the states involved; and he 
shall, from time to time by proclamation, na~e 
other states as and when they become involved in the 
war. 
-8-
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3. Statutes Implicitly Prohibiting Delegation 
A broad range of statutes confer power~ on the President 
but do not state in terms or in the legislative _history whether 
those powers are delegable. In some instances, the character or 
importance of the powers in question, or other special circumstances, 
may constitute a sufficient indication of a legislative intent 
to prohibit delegation. 
. . 
In the brief time available, we have been unable to reach 
any firm conclusions regarding particular statutes in this category. 
In general, it would appear that statutory powers that have been 
exercised by the President himself on a consistent and longstanding 
basis are more likely than others to be held nondelegable. An. 
example might be the President's statutory power to enter into 
or terminate trade agreements with certain nations under 19 
u . s • c • § 13 51 • 
A second special circumstance that can give rise ·to an 
inference of nondelegability occurs when Congress gives authority 
to an agency but subjects that authority to a requirement of 
_presidential approval. In this circumstance, it can be argued 
that a delegation of the President's approval authority back to 
the agency would subvert the evident legislative intent to assure 
review by someone outside the agency, while a delegation to 
anyone else would conflict with the congressional intent to 
centralize prinary administrative responsibility in the agency.-
For an example of such a statute, see § 12(k) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 l(k). ~/ 
III. Delegable Functions 
All remaining functions of the President may be delegated 
to subordinate officers. Many statutes explicitly authorize 
delegation. See, e.g., 22 u.s.c. § 2381 (delegation of certain 
foreign affairs-powers). In the absen~e of specific authorization, 
the general delegation statute, 5 u.s.c. §§ 301, 302, explicitly 
authorizes delegation except where precluded by statute. It 
is beyond the scope of this memorandum to describe the full 
5/ We emphasize that the above examples are entirely tentative; 
Tt may well be that, upon further examination of the statutes 
and their legislative histories, this Office would conclude 
that Congress did not intend to prohibit delegation. 
-9-
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extent of the presidential powers and responsibilities that 
may be delegated. !/ In general, powers which ~ay be delegated 
include those of approval, authorization, and assignment; powers 
to establish and convene certain administrative commissions, to 
designate responsible officers, and to raake certain factual 
determinations; powers to direct that certain actions be taken, 
to fix compensation of officers, to p~escribe certain rules and 
regulations, and to make recommendations or reports. 
It bears repetition that the President may_n9~ delegate 
his power to delegate his own functions. This is, in our 
view, a function that is constitutiona!ly vested in the President 
personally. The President may delegate ~is powers if he is 
capable of a conscious decision to do so. If,. however, he is 
incapable of such a decision, delegation cannot occur. If 
such a situation continues for a substantial period of time, 
it would appe~r desirable to initiate procedures for presidential 
succession under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. l/ 
.. 
. . . 
IV. Form and Method of Delegation 
Whenever a presidential function or power is delegable, 
it may be delegated to the head of any department or agency in 
the Executive Branch, or any official thereof, if the official 
is appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. 3 U.S.C. 
§ 301. By statute, such a delegation is ordinarily accomplished 
through the preparation and publicatiorr of a written order or 
menorandum. The relevant document is normally signed by the 
President personally; but there is no express sta~utory requirement 
6/ For a description of the President's general authority, see 
President's Council on txecutive Organization, The Powers and 
Responsibilities of the President (1970). ~- -~ 
21 It might be possible for the President to delegate his powers 
contingent upon the occurrence of a specified event such as a 
certification by the President's personal physician that the 
President is temporarily incapable of making a conscious decision. 
We would emphasize, however, that this procedure should not be 
used if its effect is contrary to the intent of the procedures 
for presidential succession contained in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
-10-
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to that effect. In our opinion, the relevant &tatutory requirement 
are satisfied as long as the President actually makes the delegatic 
in question and c~uses an appro~riate written memorial to be 
prepared and published. He need not sign the document by his 
own hand. See United States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84 (1893); 7 
Op. Att'y Gen. 453, 472-73 (1855); 22 Op. Att'y Gen. 82 (1898). 
Moreover, the statute does not purport to restrict the President's 
constitutional power to delegate his powers and functions. · See 
3 u.s.c. § 302. We believe that a President may determine in an 
exigent circumstanc~ that it is ·necessary to delegate a power or 
function without immediate compliance with the normal. formal 
· requisite$ (i.e., publication of a written document). Such a 
delegation is effective if it is necessary to enable the President 
to discharge his constitutional duty. 
.· 
Theodore B. Olson 
Off ice of Legal Counsel 
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APR ·1~01 
MEMORAi.~DUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Re: Prior Presidential Disabilities 
This is a summary of prior Presidential disabilities 
and the resulting effect on Presidential authority. 1/ 
1. James Madi son suffered from a severe fever in the 
summer of 1813 in the midst of disputes with Congress on how 
to pay for the War of 1812. I. Brant, James Madison: 1812-
1836, at 184-94 {1961). Daniel Webster reported at one point 
that Madison was too weak to read resolutions brought to his 
bedside. Id. at 186-87. Both Houses of Congress became 
11 engrossed~or over a month in speculation on the succession, 2/ 
since the Vice President was.aged and there was a vacancy in the 
position of President pro ternpore of the Senate. J. Feerick, 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment 4_.:.5 { 1976) {Feerick). Madison 
recovered, however, and no legislation was passed nor were 
formal arrangements for the delegation or transfer of power 
implemented. 
1/ Material consulted included the New York Times, S. Rep. 
No. 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) and hearings held in 
1958. Presidential Inability: Hearings on S.J. Res. 100, 
S.J. Res. 133, S.J. Res. 134, S.J. Res. 141, S.J. Res. 143, 
S.J. Res. 144, S. 238, and S. 3113 Before the Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciarv, 
85th Conq., 2d Sess. (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 Hearingsl. 
A list of articles on presidential inability can be found in 
the 1958 Hearings, at 41-42. 
~/ The first succession act was passed in 1792. Act of March 1, 
1792, §§ 9-11, 1 Stat. 239. Unsuccessful efforts to change this 
statute occurred in 1820, 1856 and 1881 . 
-· . . -- ·- - . --
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2. William Henry Harrison was inaugurated on March 4, 
1841 and died of pneumonia on April 4, 1841. His illness wa~ 
so short that the question of inability apparently did not 
arise. ~/ 
3. James A. Garfield was wounded on July 2, 1881 by an 
assassin and died 80 days later on September 19, 1881. Vice 
President Chester A. Arthur did not act in his stead. Arthur 
refused to do so because of a fear, shared by many constitutional 
scholars of the time, that once he had assumed the powers and 
duties of the office, they would "devolve on the Vice President" 
permanently, leaving him unable to turn the reins back to the 
President. U.S. Const., art. II, sec. 1, cl. 6. See S. Rep. 
No. 66, at 26. Al·though the entire Cabinet believed. Garfield 
to be unable to carry out his duties, 4/ four of them, including 
the Attorney General, agreed with Arthur's analysis. Secretary 
of State James G. Blaine was in fact criticized for attempting 
to usurp Presidential powers during Garfield's lengthy illness. 
1958 Hearings, at 149-50. ~/ 
4. Grover Cleveland had two major operations for cancer 
of the mouth in July, 1893. He. told almost no one, including 
Vice President Adlai Stevenson. The two operations took place 
on a friend's yacht, with Cleveland unconscious and strapped 
3/ When Harrison died, Secretary of State Daniel Webster 
questioned whether the Constitution meant that Vice President 
Jbhn Tyler became "Acting President," rather than the President. 
Tyler disagreed and took the oath as President, thus establishing 
the "Tyler precedent" that the Vice President does succeed 
to the off ice of the President when the prior occupant dies. 
The deaths of Zachary Taylor (July 9, 1850) and Abraham 
Lincoln (April 15, 1865) were apparently so swift that their 
Vice Presidents (Millard Fillmore, Andrew Johnson) assumed 
control without trouble. 
4/ Garfield was able to conduct only one minor piece of 
business -- the signing of an extradition paper. 
~/ Arthur, who succeeded Garfield, suffered from an increasingly 
debilitating kidney disease while in office. Although he gradually 
reduced his schedule, he does not appear to have become completely 
incapacitated. 
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to a chair propped against the mast. Ferrick, supra, at 11-12. 
The complete secrecy was due to fears that the country might 
suffer an economic panic if it knew the President had cancer. 
The truth was apparently suppressed until 1917. ~/ 
5. William McKinley was wounded on Friday, September 6, 
1901. He underwent emergency surgery and his doctors issued 
optimistic statements about his recovery. So positive was the 
outlook that Vice-President Theodore Roosevelt and the Cabinet 
members who h3d gathered in Buffalo over the weekend began to 
disperse. M. Leech, In the Days of McKinley 598-99 (1959). . 
"[T] he Vice-President was so firmly convinced that the emergency 
was over that he went to join his family at a camp. in the · 
Adirondacks, twelve miles· from telegraph or telephone." Id·.· 
When McKinley began to fail, a guide was sent up into the-
mountains to fetch Roosevelt. Although he rushed back, Roosevelt 
arrived to take the oath of office twelve hours after McKinley's 
death on September 14. 
6. Woodrow Wilson was incapacitated from a stroke for 
about eight months of his second term. At no time did Vice 
President Thomas R. Marshall attempt to take over. See 1958 
Hearings, at 19. The hesitation was due to a fear ~hat such 
action would be viewed as an effort to oust Wilson· permanently. 
When he recovered, Wilson forced Secretary of State Lans1ng, who 
had called Cabinet meetings and suggested .that Marshall take 
over as Acting President, to resign, charging him with disloyalty. 
Id. 
7. Franklin R6osevelt was in declining health during 
his last year in office; and died on April 12, 1945. Vice 
President Harry S Truman had had only two conversations with 
Roosevelt since the inauguration, neither dealing with 
disability. Perhaps as a reaction to this, Truman supported 
a new succession statute, Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 677 
(1948). 
8. Dwight D. Eisenhower suffered three major illnesses 
while in office~ a heart attack (1955), ileitis (1956) and a 
"mild" stroke (1957). From the first, Vice President Richard 
6/ It was the death of.Cleveland's first Vice President, 
Thomas A. Hendricks, in 1885, while Congress was out of session, 
which accelerated passage of the Presidential Succession Act, 
24 Stat. 1 ( 1886). 
- 3 -
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Nixon consulted with the Cabinet and developed a procedure 
for relaying important matters to the President. A White 
House request for an opinion on the temporary delegation of 
presidential power was not acted upon because Attorney General 
Brownell felt there were sufficient legal arrangements in 
place to handle day-to-day operations. 
Eis~nhower was very troubled by the implications of the 
disability problem during each of his illnesses. He asked the 
Department of Justice to study the problem and ~ecommend a 
solution, urged Congress to act, and entered into an informal 
agreement with Mr. Nixon. Ferrick, supra at 20-22. The 
agreement provided that: 
1. In the event of inability 
the President would -- if possible 
so inform the Vice President, and the 
Vice President would serve as Acting 
President, exercising the powers and 
duties of the office until the inability 
had ended. 
2. In the event of an inability 
which would prevent the President from 
so communicating with the Vice President, 
the Vice President, after such consul-
tation as seems to him appropriate under 
the circumstances, would decide upon the 
devolution of the powers and duties of the 
off ice and would serve as Acting President 
until the inability had ended. 
3. Tt2 President, in either event, 
would determine when the inability had 
ended and at that time would resume the 
full exercise of the powers and duties 
of the Office. 
s. Rep. No. 66, at 27. 21 Although Congress did hold hearings, 
7/ See also N.Y. Times, March 4, 1958, at 1, col. 2. Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson entered into similar agreements with their 
vice-presidents. s. Rep. No. 66, at 27; N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 
1965, at 13, col. 1. The Johnson-Humphrey agreement was identi-
cal to the Eisenhower-Nixon agreement. The Kennedy agreement 
differed only in that it urged the Vice-President to consult 
with the Cabinet and the Attorney General "as a matter of wisdom 
and sound j udgrnen t." Id. 
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hearings, no permanent action was taken. !f 
9. Lyndon B. Johnson was hospitalized four times·, the 
first time being for a major bout with the flu (January 23-27, 
1965). 9/ In October, 1965 Johnson was hospitalized for gall 
bladder-surgery. 10/ He was anesthetized for three to four hours, 
after which Press Secretary Moyers announced that Johnson was 
again able to make Presidential decisions. 11/_ 
The same pattern was repeated in November, 1967 when 
Johnson underwent simultaneous surgery for a polyp on his vocal 
cord and repair of a ventral hernia. He was anesthetized for 
about an hour and a half. Note was made of the agreement that 
could make Humphrey 11 Acting President 11 and columni!::.t Tom Wicker 
urged that the 25th Amendment be ratified. 
In December, 1968, Johnson was again hospitalized for 
the flu. The papers, however, said little other than that he 
worked on governmen~ papers on one day of his stay. 
10. Richard M. Nixon was hospitalized from July 12-20, 
1973 for viral pneumonia. The President's.press office said 
that he would be able to do necessary work and that he was not 
sick enough to require the Vice President to make.special 
arrangements. In an interview, Vice Pres~dent Spiro T. Agnew 
~/ See 1958 Hearings and Hearings before the Special Subcommittee 
to Study Presidential Disability of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). 
9/ At the time, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey stated that 
there had been discussions of when he would take over and a copy 
of the Johnson-Humphrey accord was made available to the press 
on January 28. See n.7 and text. 
10/ The accord was again noted by the press and columnist Arthur 
Krock urged the states to ratify the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
11/ Citing recent history, Johnson had urged Congress to act 
on the disability problem in his State of the Union address in . 
January, 1965. The proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment was sent to 
the states in July, 1965. 
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said that there was no agreement between the President and 
him on what to do in the event of Nixon's disability and. that 
the issue had never been discussed. 
Although there were persistent rumors about Nixon's 
health during the months prior to his resignation, the only 
White House announcement was an acknowledgement that.the 
President suffered from phlebitis. The operation on his leg 
did not occur until September 23, 1974, after his resignation. 
11. "Jimmy Carter's scheduled surgery for hemorrhoids 
in late December, 1978 was cancelled. Preparations for the 
Vice President to assume power under section 3 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment were also cancelled. 
Larry L. Simms 
Acting Assistant Attorney General 
Off ice of Legal Counsel 
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THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
August 21, 1975 
SUBJECT: 25th Amendment 
25th Amendment Provisions 
The 25th Amendment provides for Presidential succession in the case of 
removal, resignation, or death of a President and stipulates the 
procedures for determining both the existence of Presidential incapacity 
and the termination of that state of incapacity. 
Section 1 of the Amendment specifies that in the case of the death or 
resignation of the President or his removal from office, the Vice President 
shall become President. Section 2 states that if there is a vacancy in the 
office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President 
who would take office upon being confirmed by a majority vote of both 
houses of Congress. 
Section 3 provides for a Presidential declaration of incapacity. Under 
this Section, the President transmits a written statement to the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives declaring that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
his office. Upon that action, the Vice President becomes Acting 
President, discharging the powers and duties of the office of the 
President, until such time as the President transmits to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House a written declaration 
that he has regained his ability to execute the responsibilities of his 
office. The President then resumes the powers and duties of his office. 
• 
• 
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Section 4 provides for a situation in which the President either is unable 
or unwilling to declare his own incapacity. In such a case, the Vice 
President and a majority of the Secretaries of the Ex1.cutive Departments, 
or such other body as Congress may by law provide, can transmit to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House their 
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office. Upon this occurrence, the Vice President 
immediately assumes the powers and duties of the office as Acting 
President. The President can regain his authority by transmitting a 
written declaration to the President pro tempore and the Speaker of the 
House that no incapacity exists. He then resumes his powers and duties 
unless the Vice President and a majority of the Executive Department 
Secretaries transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House their written declaration that the 
President remains unable to discharge the responsibilities of his office. 
In that event, the Congress must decide the issue, with the requirement 
that it assemble within 48 hours for that purpose if it is not in session. 
A decision must be reached within 21 days after receipt of the written 
declaration or the date of assembly when Congress is not in session. If 
Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of both houses that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the 
Vice President shall continue to discharge those duties as Acting 
President. If the Congress does not vote by two-thirds of each house, 
the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office. 
Implementation of the 25th Amendment 
The 25th Amendment was ratified on February 10, 1967. Its provisions 
have been utilized twice, once upon Ford's nomination and confirmation as 
Vice President and once upon Ford's succession to the Presidency upon 
President Nixon's resignation. Despite the fact that the 25th Amendment 
was in effect during the last two years of Lyndon Johnson's Presidency, 
there is no record of his modifying the written agreement on incapacity 
between himself and Vice President Humphrey to reflect the provisions of 
the Amendment. 
1 The Congress has not provided by legislation for any other system. 
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As a result of President Eisenhower's heart attack in 1955 and his ileitis 
attack during the start of his second term, the President and Vice 
President Nixon reached an agreement on the temporary devolution of 
Presidential authority in the event of an inability rendering the President 
incapable of exercising the powers and duties of his office. This 
agreement was in effect during President Eisenhower's stroke in 1957, and 
its existence was not made publicly known until a written agreement was 
released in March, 1958. 
Following the Eisenhower example, President Kennedy and Vice President 
Johnson signed an incapacity agreement which was publicly released in 
August, 1961. President Johnson and Speaker of the House McCormick 
signed an agreement in December, 1963, and President Johnson and Vice 
President Humphrey signed an agreement in January, 1965. The 
Johnson /McCormick agreement was not made public, and the Johnson I 
Humphrey agreement was not publicly released until the President's gall 
bladder operation in October, 1965. All the written agreements, attached 
at Tab A, were identical. President Kennedy, however, in his accom-
panying press release, specifically stated that he and the Vice President 
had agreed on the wisdom of Cabinet concurrence in and Attorney General 
legal support for the incapacity judgment. 
The principal difference between the aforementioned agreements and the 
~5th Amendment is that the agreements made no provision for resolving a 
dispute between the President and Vice President on the question of 
incapacity. Rather, as one would expect in any voluntary agreement 
signed by a President, control over determination of the existence of 
incapacity rested solely with the President, as long as he could 
communicate, and control over termination of the incapacity rested solely 
with the President, even if it was the Vice President who had declared 
the existence of the incapacity due to the President's inability to 
communicate at that time. 
The pre-25th Amendment agreements were written in order to circumvent 
Constitutional ambiguity and thus overcome Vice Presidential reluctance to 
exercise the Presidential power necessary to preserve continuity in 
executive leadership. There were a number of inadequacies with relying 
solely on the operation of a personal agreement between a President and 
Vice President: ( 1) it only applied to the terms of office of the 
signatories; (2) it did not carry the force of law and could be 
Page 4 
challenged; and (3) it authorized the Vice President to act without the 
protection of unequivocal Constitutional authority. This uncertainty and 
the very serious implication of a Vice Presidential assumption of 
Presidential power were the focus of arguments in favor of a 
Constitutional amendment. 
Issues 
There are a number of issues which can be of concern in relation to the 
25th Amendment: 
( 1) Under Section 3, when a President voluntarily declares his own 
inability to govern, he alone has the power to declare that the inability 
no longer exists. There is no recourse under the Amendment for the 
Vice President, the Cabinet Secretaries, or the Congress to block his 
resumption of power by disagreeing with the termination of that inability. 
( 2) Under Section 4, when a President is either unable or unwilling to 
declare his own incapacity, what standards must the Vice President and a 
majority of the Cabinet Secretaries use to make their determination that 
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office? 
The legislative history of the Amendment does not provide guidance in 
this area. 
(3) Must the incapacity of the President be physical or mental or can it 
result from outside events, ~. _g:. , a mechanical inability to communicate? 
The legislative history is not clear on this point. The issue of disability 
which is neither mental nor physical was only mentioned in passing a few 
times during the Committee hearings and was never focused on. How-
ever, there is nothing to preclude a President and Vice President from 
voluntarily entering into a written agreement which would include 
provisions for dealing with a non-mental and non-physical disability. 
• 
• 
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( 4) Under Section 4, Congress has 21 days in which to make a 
determination on the continuation or termination of Presidential incapacity, 
if the President did not himself declare the original incapacity and the 
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet Secretaries disagree with the 
President's declaration of an end to his incapacity. Who governs during 
this period? The legislative history of the Amendment indicates that the 
Vice President continues to exercise the powers and duties of the office 
of the President during the 4-day period for transmittal of an objection to 
resumption of power by the President and during the 21-day period in 
which Congress must act. However, during both those periods of time, it 
would be very difficult to avoid a feeling of serious uncertainty and this 
atmosphere could be debilitating to the exercise of executive leadership. 
( 5) Under Section 4, if the Congress votes that the Presidential 
incapacity is continuing, may the President ask for another vote at any 
time by resubmitting his written declaration that no inability exists? 
According to the legislative history, the answer would seem to be in the 
affirmative . 
( 6) Under Section 4, the Amendment requires a majority vote of the 
Congress for Vice Presidential confirmation; the vote of the Vice 
President and a majority of the Cabinet Secretaries to declare Presidential 
incapacity when the President is unable or unwilling to declare his own 
incapacity; and the vote of the Vice President and a majority of the 
Cabinet Secretaries, together with a two-thirds vote of the Congress, to 
prevent the President, on the grounds of continuing incapacity, from 
resuming the powers and duties of his office. 
Are these votes to be based on the body's total membership or only 
on those present and voting, a quorum being present? In voting on 
Ford's confirmation as Vice President, the Congress interpreted a majority 
vote as requiring a simple majority of those present and voting. In his 
1965 testimony before both the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, 
Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach stated that the votes required 
by the Amendment were based on those present and voting, a quorum 
being present. He asserted that this interpretation was consistent with 
long standing precedent. Both the House and Senate Committee Reports 
support that view. In specific reference to the two-thirds of Congress 
•• 
• 
Page 6 
required under Section 4, both Reports note that this vote is in 
conformity with the Constitutional provision on impeachments. That 
provision provides for a two-thirds vote in the Senate of those members 
present. Given the legislative history and legal precedents, a challenge 
to this interpretation would have very little, if any, chance of prevailing. 
Presidential/Vice Presidential Written Agreement 
A written agreement between you and Vice President Rockefeller might be 
beneficial for two reasons: ( 1) to clarify for your own operating 
procedures the ambiguities raised by some of the provisions of the 
25th Amendment; and (2) if you should choose to release the agreement, 
to educate the public and foreign nations as to the procedures that will 
be followed to insure continuity of executive leadership during a period of 
Presidential incapacity. Such an agreement should list the procedures 
provided for in the Amendment, emphasizing the specific powers of the 
President, Vice President, Cabinet Secretaries and Congress in relation to 
incapacity, and should set standards for the Vice President and Cabinet 
Secretaries to follow pursuant to Section 4 in the event that the President 
is unable or unwilling to declare his own incapacity. In establishing such 
standards, the agreement would define, to the extent possible, what 
constitutes an incapacity. The agreements written prior to the 25th 
Amendment did not attempt to define incapacity, but they also did not 
provide for Vice Presidential disagreement with the President over the 
issue of incapacity. Since the ratification of the 25th Amendment allows 
for a Vice Presidential and Cabinet Secretarial challenge to the President, 
it is prudent in our opinion to provide a written Presidential/Vice 
Presidential agreement on the subject. 
Recommendations 
It is the recommendation of the Counsel's Office that you and Vice 
President Rockefeller sign a written agreement on incapacity. 
Disapprove 
~~~~~~~~~-
Comment 
•• 
Johnson/Humphrey 
Procedures for Use in the Event of 
Presidential Inability 
Announcement of Procedures Agreed Upon 
by President Johnson and Vice Presiclent Humphrey. 
October 5, 1965 
The following procedures, which are identical to the 
procedures adopted by President Eisenhower and Vice 
President Nixon as well as President Kennedy and Vice 
President Johnson, have been agreed upon by President 
Johnson and Vice President Humphrey: 
( 1) In the event of inability the President would-if 
possible-so infol"I!l the Vice President, and the Vice 
President would serve as Acting President, exercising the 
powers and duties of the Office until the inability had 
ended. 
( 2) In the e\'ent of an inability which would prevent 
the President from so communicating with the Vice Pres-
. ident, the Vice President, after such consultation as seems 
to him appropriate under the circumstances, would 
decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of 
the Office and would serve as Acting President until the 
inability had ended. 
(3) The President, in either event, would determine 
when the inability had ended and at that time would 
resume the full exercise of the powers and duties of the 
Office. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958 
40 CdI Agreement Between the President and the 
Vice President as to Procedures in the Event of 
Presidential Disability. A1arch 3, r 958 
I 
. \' 
I 
I 
TI-IE PRESIDENT and the Vice President have agreed that the follow- I 
ing procedures are in accord with the purposes and provisions of Article 
2, Section 1, of the Constitution, dealing with Presidential inability. 
They believe that these procedures, which are intended to apply to 
themselves only, are in no sense outside or contrary to the Constitution 
but are consistent with its present provisions and imp1ement its clear 
intent. 
( 1) In the event of inability the President would-if possible-so in-
form the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve as Acting 
President, exercising the powers and duties of the Office until the inability 
had ended. 
( !2) In the e\"ent of an inability which would preYcnt the President 
from so communicating with the Vice President, the Vice President, 
after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circum-
stances, would decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of 
the Office and would serve as Acting President until the inability had 
ended. 
( 3) The President, in either event, would determine when the in-
abilitv had ended and at that time would resume the full exercise of the 
' ' powers and duties of the Office. · . . 
!\On:: This is the text of agreement as set forth in a 'Vhite House news release. of 
this date. 
\ 
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m:itters when our information is so faulty, 
so incomplete. 
[ :z 3.] Q. Mr. PrcsiJent, in connection 
with the Berlin crisis, there has been quite 
a bit of speculation about one or more 
summit conferences. \Vould you tell us 
wh:it your attitude is at this time toward 
summit negoti:itions? 
THE PRESIDENT. \Veil, the attitude which 
I h<tYe held and still hold is that no summit 
between East and West is useful unless the 
groundwork has been laid beforehand which 
will insure some success. As far as a summit 
of \Vestern leaders, I think that if it should 
pro\'e important in coordinating our policy 
on any matter, Berlin, I think that that 
meeting should be held and would be 
prepared to do so. 
[24.] Q. Mr. President, during the for-
eign aid debate, there has been some con-
cern expressed by legislators based upon the 
reports from MonteYideo that some of the 
L::itin American nations are not, apparently, 
e:iger to institute the self-help measures 
which you've made a condition of your 
progr:im, and that the administration m:iy 
not mmt upon those conditions. Do you 
intend to insist upon those conditions? 
THE PRESIDENT. We're prepared to make a 
major effort in this regard and we're hope-
ful that other countries who also have high 
living stand:irds will do so. Bue of course 
it would be completely useless unless an 
effort were made by all concerned. One of 
the proposals which have been made in 
Montevideo which is of particular interest 
is that under the aegis of the Inter-American 
Bank, that a study by independent experts 
be made of each country's economic planning 
and progress and commitment, and it seems 
· to me that this is a great basis for ·a hemi-
spheric effort. We're not interested in mak-
ing the contributions which I think we have 
to make unless we feel that they're going to 
improYe the life of the people. And, there· 
fore, there's a responsibility on us all, for 
us to contribute to the success of this goal 
and for the countries involved to make 
sure that this effort hdps the people, because 
otherwise the effort will fail and those socie-
ties will inevitably be wiped away-unless 
some real progress is made. 
Reporter: Thank you, Mr. President. 
Non: The Presidc:nt's fifteenth news conference was 
held in the State Department Auditorium at 10 
o'clock on Thursday morning, August 10, 1961. 
319 \Vhite House Statement and Text of Agreement Between the 
President and the Vice President on Procedures in the Event of 
Presidential Inability. August ro, 1961 
THE PRESIDENT and the Vice President 
have agreed to adhere to procedures iden-
tical to those which former President Eisen-
hower and Vice President Nixon adopted 
with rcgJrd to any questions of Presidential 
in:ibility. Those procedures are as follows: 
( r) In tl1e event of inability the President 
would-if possible-so inform the Vice Presi-
de:-.t, and the Vice President would serve 
as Acting President, exercising the powers 
and duties of the Office until the inability 
had ended. 
(2) In the event of an inability which 
would prevent the President from so com-
municating with the Vice President, the 
Vice President, after such consultation :is 
seems to him appropriate under the circum-
stances, would decide upon the devolution 
[319) Aug. JO Public Papers of the Presidents 
of the powers and duties of the Office and 
would serve as Acting President until the 
inability had ended. 
(3) The President, in either event, would 
determine when the inability had ended and 
at that time would resume the full exercise 
of the powers and duties of the Office. 
After consultation with the Attorney Gen-
eral, it is the understanding of the President 
and the Vice President that these procedures 
reflect the correct interpretation to be ·given 
to Article II, Section I, clause 5 of the Con-
stitution. This was also the view of the 
prior Administration and is supported by 
the great ·majority of constitutional scholars. 
The relevant constitutional provision is: 
.. In Case of the Removal of the President 
from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or 
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties 
of the said Office, the same shall devolve 
on the Vice President, and the Congress 
m.'.ly by Law provide for the Case of Re-
moval,. Death, Resignation or Inability, 
both of the President and Vice President, 
declaring what Officer shall then act as 
President, :md such Officer shall act accord-
ingly, until the Disability be removed, or 
a Presi<len~ shall be elected." 
Under this proYision, upon a proper de-
termin:nion of Presidential inability, the 
Vice President succeeds tempor.'.lrily to the 
powers and duties of the Presidency until 
such time as the President is enabled to act 
again. Unlike the case of remov.:il, death, 
or resignation, the Vice President does not 
permanently become President. 
Under the arrangement quoted above, the 
Vice President agrees to serve as Acting 
President "after such consultation as seems 
to him appropriate under the circum-
stan~es." There is no provision of the 
Constitution or of law prescribing any pro-
cedure of consultation, but the President and 
Vice President felt, as a matter of wisdom . 
and soun_d judgment, that the Vice President 
would wish to have the support of the 
Cabinet as to ~e necessity and desirability· 
of disch.:irging the powers and duties of the 
Presidency as Acting Pres!dent as well as 
legal advice from the Attorney General that 
the circumstances would, under the Consti-
tution, justify his doing so. The under-
standing between the President and the Vice 
President authorizes the Vice President to 
consult with these officials with a free mind 
that this is what the President intended in 
the event of a crisis. 
Prior to the Eisenhower-Nixon arrange-
ment, there were no similar understandings· 
of a public nature. For this reason, prior 
Vice Presidents haYe hesit..lted to take any 
initiative durinf; the period when the Presi-
dent was dis:ibled. Obviously, this is a risk 
which cannot· be t.:iken in these times, and 
it is for that reason th.lt President Kenned)' 
and Vice President Johnson have agreed to 
follow the precedent established by the past 
Administration. 
NOT.E: The: Attorney Gener::i!'s op:nion upon th:: 
construction to be given to the: Presidential in::ibilit;-
clausc: of the: Com:.itution was sub:ninc:d to the 
President in a letter d:ned Au~us: :: (::7 pp., Gov-
ernment Printinf! O:'Ece, 1961). 
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THE WHITE HOUSE 
'\\'ASHINGTON 
December Z3, 1963 
Confirming our oral agreement regarding the 
procedures to be followed in the event of my 
inability to exercise the powers and duties of the 
Presidency, I am reducing the agreement to 
writing and would appreciate your signing the 
original of this letter and returning it to me for 
safekeeping in the Presidential files. Enclosed 
for your use is a signed duplicate original. The 
terms of the agreement are as follows: 
1. In the ·event of inability, the President would 
if possible -- so inform the Speaker of the House, 
and the Speaker of the House would serve as Acting 
President, exercising the powers and duties of the 
Office until the inability had ended. 
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent 
the President from communicating with the Speaker 
of the House, the Speaker of the House, after such 
consultation as seems to him appropriate under the 
circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of 
the powers and duties of the Office and would serve 
as Acting President until the inability had ended. 
3. The President. in either event, would determine 
when the inability had ended and at that time would 
resume the full exercise of the powers am duties of 
the Office. 
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4. After being informed by the President o! his 
inability or, in the event o! an inability which would 
prevent the President from communicating with th~ 
Speaker of the House, after the latter satisfies himself 
that such inability exists, the Speaker of the House will 
resign as Speaker and as Representative in Congress 
before undertaking to act as President. 
Honorable John W. McCormack 
Speaker of .the House of Representatives 
.. Washington, D. C. 
Page 2 of 2 pages. 
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MEMORANDUM 
• 
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT 
WASHINGTON 
March 21, 1978 
MEMORANDUM TO: Michael Berman 
FROM: Rob~rt Tor.ricelH ·-q 
RE: Presidential Succession and the Ambiguities 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
INTRODUCTION 
Serious ambiguiEies in the Twenty-Fifth Amenement create 
the need for a state~ent of definitions and principles. Without 
the President and Vice President concluding such a joint state-
ment, serious problgms of interpretation could arise in a number 
of circumstances . 
It a?pears that no attention has been given to these 
potential difficulties. This memorandum seeks to identify the 
Constitution's ambiguities, outline previous Administration's 
solutions and propose an advisable course of action. 
A) Previous President/Vice President Agreements on Succession 
and Disability 
----
There are five documented instances where written agree-
ments have been signed on this issue. ·Since the public release 
of such understandings has been a recent development, it is pos-
sible that other Ad'11inistrations dealt with this problem as well. 
Procedural understandings relating to Presidential succession 
can be divided into two categories: 
1. i·1ri tten agreements before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
The purpose of these signed memoranda was to establish 
a orocedure for Presidential succession in the event 
of· a Presidential disability. The first in a modern 
series of such accords was drafted in 1957. The 
Eisenhower/Nixon Administration feared the uncertain-
ties of leadership that arose during the crit~cal 
illnesses of Presidents Garfield and Wilson. 
-· ----· f 
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Succeeding Administrations continued the Eisenhower 
precedent. Similar agreements were entered into by 
Kennedy/Johnson, Johnson/McCormick and Johnson/Humphrey. 
2. Written Agreements after the Twenty-Fifth Amendment_ 
The Johnson/Humphrey agreement remained in effect 
after the Constitution was amended in 1967 .. The 
Nixon Administration made no public acknowledgement 
of any similar understanding. In 1975, however, the 
President's Counsel proposed to President Ford that· 
he ente~·into such an accord with Vice President 
Rockefeller. The Counsel's Office advised President 
Ford that, despite the passage of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendmen~, serious ques~ions regarding succession 
still persisted.* 
B) Summary of Previous Written Agreements · 
Each of the prior agreements can be easily characterized~ 
Power was specificaJly granted to the Vice President to assume 
the position of "Acting President" if the President should become 
disabled and unable to communicate his condition. The power to 
reassume the office was always vested entirely in the President. 
Since the Kennedy/Johnson memorandum in 1961 each succeeding docu~ 
ment provided that the Vice President consult with the "appropriate" 
persons before initiating the succession process. Each of these 
agreements appe1rs to have been adequate at the time. The enact-
ment of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, however, raises additional 
procedural and definitional problems due to the complex process 
of succession that it establishes. 
C) Possible Problems of Interpretation of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment 
Potential conflicts arising out of the use of this amend-
ment appear in three major instances. It was these same potential 
problems that prompted the Counsel's Office memorandum to President 
Ford. 
* 
1. Section 3 of the Amendment provides for the 
President temporarily removing himself from office 
due to a_disability. Only the President's own 
actions are required. Upon the transmittal of an 
appropriate written statement to the Congressional 
leadership, the Vice President becomes "Acting 
President". 
I am awaiting your authorization before researching the 
eventual disposition of this advice. 
---------- --------- --------· 
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The area of concern is the means by which the 
President reassumes the Office of President. 
If the President voluntarily removes himself from 
office he can reassume office at will. No con-
current opinions as to his mental or physical 
condition are required. Other members of the 
government would be without recourse under the 
provisions of the Amendment if they disagreed with 
the President as to his condition. 
2. Section 4 of the Amendment provides for those 
instances when the President is unable or unwilling 
to declare his d~_sability. In such a situation the 
Cabinet and Vice President, by majority vote, are 
entitled to appoint the Vice President as Acting 
President. When the Presicent considers himself 
well enough to reassume the Presidency he may ·do so. 
If the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet 
do not feel that the President is sufficiently ·able, 
they may challenge his resumption of office. _The 
challenge must be made within four days of the Presi-
dent's attempted resumption of office and the Congress 
must vote upon the challenge within twenty-one days.· 
The actual language of the Anendrnent does not reveal 
who presides as President curing the twenty-one day 
challenge period. The legislative history of the 
amendment strongly suggests that the Vice President 
continues as Acting President. The possibility of a 
period of uncertainty as to the nation's leadership 
would continue, however, illltil the matter was litigated. 
3. Both Sections 3 and 4 refer to the "disabilities" of 
the President. It is not clear what types of illnesses 
or impairments were intended to be included as "dis-
abilities" for purposes of this amendment. The Ford 
Administration seemed to conclude that both the language 
and the legislative history of the anendr!lent were un-
clear as to any definition. It is uncertain, therefore, 
under what conditions each of these procecures for a 
shift in executory power arise and when they revert. 
Once again, the potential difficulty is the uncertain 
status of executive leadership while the definition of 
these terms is litigated. 
---------------.- ---·---~---·---·-~ 
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D) Recommendations 
The specific contents of any written agreement between 
the President and_~ice President must include the following: 
1. A stipul"ation of the procedures which will be 
followed before the President reassumes office 
after removing himself under Section 3. While 
such an agreement would not have a sufficient force 
of law to prevent a disabled President from re-
. suming office, it is necessary. · International 
fears about the possible resumption of office by a 
disabled President could be quelled by the. release 
of such a document during the period of disability. 
The fact that such an understanding is in force 
could be extremely useful in preserving a clear 
continum of leadership and reassuring any doubts. 
As previously stated, such a document might not 
succeed in preventing a resumption of power, but 
it would lessen speculation and doubt during the 
disability period. 
2. An expression by the .President and Vice President 
as to their interpretation of Section 4 is also 
necessary. If a President's resumption of office 
under Se~tion 4 is challenged, tremendous uncertain-
ty would result. A statement that makes it clear that 
the Vice President was intended to continue in office 
during the Congress' deliberations would be of great 
value. While the legislative history of the amend-
ment suggests t.he eventual determination, a mutual 
expression would be of considerable use in both 
answering the public's fears and in aiding the eventual 
outcome of the litigation. 
3. Definitional problems are certain to arise whenever 
Section 3 or 4 of the Amendment is used. It appears 
that the public, the Congress, and the courts will 
have little to rely on in interpreting the legisla-
tive intent. There is even a question as to whether 
mental or emotional illnesses were contemplated. 
The record of the hearings reveals no definitions of 
"disability", "unable", "no inability" and "Acting 
President". The process for determining the legal 
definitions of these terms might be lengthy. Serious 
questions as to the status of the nation's leadership 
could arise. A signed statement of definitions would 
certainly not be any more controlling in this context 
than in others. However, the public release of such 
·- ---- --·-·-----·-·----. - . -· --· --·- - -· ----· ·-·· ·------· ---·-- ··-. ·--·· --·-- --------.---- ------ ··---------
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a previously concluded agreement would greatly 
add to the stability of the nation. Such a 
statement, for example, need only list those in-
stances considered to be disabling. The history 
of President/Vice President agreerrents reveals 
considerable fear that a Vice President would 
hesitate to assume power if there was doubt as to 
the existence of the necessary circumstances. A 
memorandum to this effect would eliminate some 
of this apprehension while reassuring the public 
about the· cont in um of leadership. 
E) Conclusion 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment seems to have created almost as 
many questions ·as it has answered. The timing of modern events 
will not allow for the uncertainty that arises from a lo__ng process 
of legal interpretation.. The nation and the world must never be 
put in a position of having to speculate as to the nation's leader-
ship. From a legal vantage point there may be no way of pro- · 
tecting against a certain degree of uncertainty. However, the 
public's perception about the immediate right to exercise power 
can be influenced and reinforced·by the proper written agreement. 
An agreement of this nature can be withheld from the public 
and released only w~en necessary to address the anticipated situation. 
Alternatively, the agreement could be released upon its signing 
as most recent Administrations have done. A public acknowledgement 
has two advantages. First, it evidences the close and trusting 
relationship between the President and the Vice President. Second, 
it serves to show the Administration's concern about every con-
tingency surrounding the continum of leadership. The impact of 
this reassurance would seem to be considerable on both the domestic 
and international scene. 
The need for an agreement of this type might not appear as 
necessary today as it did when the President was disabled in 1957 
or 1965, however, such documents have a way of being used by suc-
ceeding Administrations. By continuing the use of such safeguards, 
we will be enhancing the chance of their future use while protecting 
ourselves against remote circumstances. 
I would recommend that you raise these issues with the 
Vice President ·and then offer an outline of the major issues to 
the President's Counsel. 
cc: Marilyn Haft 
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MEMORANDUM FOR: MIKE BERMAN 
FR.OM: FRANK WIGGINS 
RE: "The 25th Amendment and Beyond_ 
What follows addresses two categories of problems associated 
with succession to the Presidency. I take up ~i~st problems. sur-
.rounding the mechanics of the Ar.iendment.and, in part II, broader 
concerns. 
I. Gaps in the operation of the 25th Amendment 
A. Desc=iption, brief history and some g~neral thoughts 
on the valu~ of a letter of understanding. 
The 25th .Amend.Inent provides two mechanisms for temporarily vesting 
the Vice President with Presidential powers: 
1. The President may declare himself unable to discharge 
his duties, and act which deeds Presidential power to the Vice 
President u.itil the President issues a countermanding statement 
asser~ing that his inability is at an end. 
2. The Vice President and a majority of the cabinet 
may declare that the President is unable to discharge his duties. 
I 
. I 
I 
l 
I 
! 
I 
! 
1 
I 
l 
{ 
_, 
I 
This action.also devolves Presidential powers upon the Vice President l 
until the President issues a writing indicating that he believes ~ 
himself able to perform. If, upon the issuance of such a Presi- I 
dential decla=ation, the V.P. and a majority of the cabinet dis- I 
agree with.the President's appraisal they may put the question 
of fit.iess to a resolution by the Congress. This step is effected 
by the issuance of a letter within four days of the President's 
avowal of fitness which triggers a 21-day (somewhat longer if 
Congress is not in session) period during which the Congress can, 
by the vote of a 2/3 majority, uphold the Vice President and cab-
inet. Should that congressional action not be forthcoming, the 
Preside~t will then res~~e his off ice. _!./ 
It was suggested by the CotL~sel to the President during the Ford 
Administration t.li.at certain of the mechanics of this process should 
be clarified in a letter of agreement running between the President 
and Vice Preside~t Rockefeller. That suggestion did not mature 
into an agreement but does raise a possibility which ought to at 
least be conside~ed. 
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Agreement between the principals clarifying matters left 
uncertain by the terms.of the 25th Amendment will prove-
of little or no legal significance. The powers i!_I)d pro-·._. 
cddures given expression in the Amendment are not subject 
to alteration through negotiation. Similarly, the readi~g- · 
given the Amendment by those to whom the powers devolve and-. 
procedures apply is not really germane to the meaning in-
tended by those who gave the measure force through the 
ratification process. Those conclusions are not, however,. 
very responsive to the question of the advisability of. an 
articulation of understanding; hard core legalism-m.iSses =-===~::::: .. =.-
the mark. · ·: . .:_==~ ~.::.=- . 
_-, ·--·-
Litigation and the consequent niceities of courtly analysis·.· 
could grow out of the circumstances which call for appl~­
cation of the Amendment -- for example, as challenges to 
the legality of actions undertaken by a party __ exerci~ing 
power under the authority of the thing -- but_ the most. . . . 
important and surely most immediate focus must rest=on- :..:..===.::.=z· 
encouraging the abatement of anxiety and confusion which 
will inevitably accompany any occasion for employing the-· 
Amendment. It is, then, efficacy in portraying-a sense- --~--. 
of legitimacy in troubled times.which ought to be the 
standard by which perfecting an agreement should.be judged •. 
Cast that way, it would seem wise to pursue agreement where-~ 
uncertainities, even sma11· ones, are likely to be-decreasea:=-~ 
or eliminated thereby in the first moments of the Amend-
ment 1 s application. ·rt remains important that any accord 
be not only pacifying but also consonant with predictions--~~ 
of legal outcomes, but insofar as both ambi tions-·can -be:-- ---· -...:.-
accomoda ted the former is surely ascendant. With that - - - - =- --- -
standard in head, I turn to specific areas which might be-:~ 
clarified. 
B. Defining "Inability" 
The most obviously troublesorreprovision of the A.uenCL~ent is 
t.~e use of the indefinite phrase "unable to discharge the= · 
po·,.;ers and duties of his office" to describe the appropriat~­
occasion for involuntary removal of the President from· nis :....._:;. 
position. The primary focus of the Ford Administration's· 
suggestion for agreement encouraged more precise definition. __ 
I am not persuaded that an at.tempt at a more refined formula-· 
tion would be proquctive. 
The chief difficulty with such an attempt is the ominous portent 
of an under-inclusive description. A pre-existing accord which 
pretended to be exhaustive would only exacerbate difficulties 
if it omitted an arguably disqualifying condition which be-
came the ground for an exercise of the Amendment. And the 
likelihood of bei~g under-iP-clusive in any definition seems 
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great~ Once one gets beyond a comatose state, .or perhaps, 
massive"paraiysis, defining "inability~is likely to nec-
essitate some reference to the urgency-of surrounding cir-
cumstances_. Ther~ was .. suggestion in the _hearings preceeding 
congressional ·actiori ori:the Joint.Resolution which was ratified 
as ·the ·2sth Amendment,_ .for e·xample, _that the period of.·con-
valesence following President Eisenhower's heart attack did 
not signific·ant"Iy di~iupt-the "government largely because 
nothing _much __ was happenin·g, whereas .the period of similarly 
constricted acti"vity during ·the .Wilson Administration had 
much broader impact because of the ~endency_ o~ the-Oecision 
on P.articipation in the· -League of Nations. -Even were one to 
conclude that reference to outside events could so~ehow be 
elided, charting disabling.occurences would __ have a chance 
-- at su'fficient breadth ·only~_it: lt- took-.-the- form--of a schedule 
of capabilities _necessary ·to- _conduct of presidential duties.· 
And measuring those capabili tie-s against_ -the huge number of 
combinations of· affliction- which might. come into play would 
be a difficult,_exhausting_and somewhat macabre affair. When· 
one shifts from physical disabiilty to mental problems both 
of the difficulties which .I've.suggested above escalate to 
the level of near impossibility. Though I have not consulted 
with· anyone claiming expertis·e on this particular question 
~• • 
my own experience in the appiication of statutes authorizing 
civil co~~itment for rne~tally disordered individuals -- an 
analogous endeavor from the vantage of formulating standards 
persuades me that doing an adequately good job is beyond the 
range of the disciplines involved. ' •I i• 
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The Ford memorandum, and some of the discussion prior to 
ratification, suggests a third variety--of- disabling event 
denoted as neither physical or mental but "-(the) result of 
outside events, e.g., a mechanical inability to communicate." 
At least as prominently here as when one is dealing with 
physical or mental difficulties, the range of possible in-
stances for the invocation of the Amendment is so great as 
to make ready description very difficult. 
~~ough I think it unarguable that tha trauma almost certain 
to be linked to ouster of a President would be mitigated 
if the Vice President ~nd Cabinet could point back to an 
agreement, the difficulties in forming a pact which would 
substantially foreclose the risks of omission, overcome 
that value. The Senate Report which accompanied the Amend-
ment to the floor noted that the mechanisms recommended were 
not "mechanical or procedural solution(s) (to) provide a 
complete answer" but depended "upon public opinion with 
a possession of 'constitutional morality.'" I think that 
invocation of that mood is about as precise as one can be. 
----------
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c. Matters of Time 
There are two questions involving the timing of transi-
tion in the Presidential power which do not raise such intractibJ 
definitional questions. Both revolve around the process of dis-
puting the re-assumption of power by a President who contends 
that his period of disability has passed. Recall that· the 
Vice President and Cabinet may .take four days following trans-
mittal .of the· Presidential letter asserting fitness to challenge 
that conclusion and, thereby, put the matter before the Congress. 
Congress then has twenty-one days (or sornewhat·longer if not in 
session) to resolve the matter. The Ford White House thought 
there to. be sufficient ambiguity in the Amendment's ·response 
to the question of who was to have Presidential authority during 
the four days, and the subsequent 21 days to recommend clarifica-
tion by agreement. . . 
The matter of the 21 days, the time during which Congress must 
vote to uphold the assertion of unfitness, does not seem doubt-
ful at all. The structure of the language of the Amendment runs 
as follows: 
~)~ ""When the President transmits (his avowal of fitness) 
he shall resume (office} unless the V.P. and (Cabinet) 
transmit (their conclusion to the contrary} ••• there-
upon Congress shall decide." 
The resumption is made conditional upon the absence of action 
by the Vice President and Cabinet: if such action is·forth-
coming resumption must await the Congressi~~al decision. 
Support for this reading goes beyond syntax; the Senate Report · 2 
is unequivocal -- "the intent .•• is that ._the Vice President is 
to continue to exercise the powers and duties of the office ••• 
until a determination ·an the President's inability is made by 
Congress" -- the conclusion was endorsed by, inter alia, Sen-
ator Bayh and Representative Cellar, the floor managers of t~e 
Resolution, and logic would dictate that when substantial 
question has been raised as to the President's abilities he 
ought not to be moved back into power until the Congress has 
resolved those questions. 
Thus, I think that a letter of agreement on the matter of who 
presides during the 21-day period is simply unnecessary. Such 
an agreement would not, however, do any harm and just might 
provide some balm should occasion for its invocation arise. 
Page Four 
The matter of the four days is less clear. Here the 
structure of the Amendment's language is not so help-
ful because the "unless" condition to resumption is 
its elf qualified by-the-four--day.-period. One could 
read the language to provide.~i~her for immediate·_ 
resumption defeasible by the-maturing ~f the condi~=--~~ ~=-=-~:~ 
tion or· to support resumption only after the unless._· _ . -~-·:...:~-
condition could--not be fulfilled, resumption after .. ·· _ - -- -
the· four days for challenging action· had passed. . __ :: .:::_::.=· 
The latter construction makes more sense if contin- ·· 
_uity is a primary value. Passing the sceptre un-- .--..:· ---- - -··--....,._ 
necessarily often,, particularly -in an atmosphere of:.:::..-~-,_.-. -=-- ·:- . --=-··-:- .. 
some· discord, is .probably _not to be preferred. Se?ator_ · _. =-::-==~-
Bayh endorsed this reading on the Senate floor~ . ·- .. 
as did Congressman Cellar in the House. _. _4/ BU:t some - - - .- ___ .:_:_ --
uncertainty is raised by Senator Dirksen' s. wondering. . -·: -· - ~-:. ·· 
on the question -- both in his dissenting position. 
in the Cammi ttee Report and again ori the floor _..;.. and-=-::::;._-:: - ·- - - -
--- - - --in a confusing exchange in the Senate occasioned by an 
amendment to this t~ming provision offered by Senator 
Hruska. -2.I · · 
· .... --·- --
Though I am fairly confident that a court would adopt 
the reading leaving control in the Vice President until 
the four day period had elapsed and doubt, in all events, 
that it would ever be necessary for the Vice President 
and Cabinet to defer the· issuance of their challenge 
letter for such a protracted period, it may be advisable 
to remove a11· doubts by dealing with the matter in a letter 
of agrea~ent. The impediment to this course is that the 
President may well be disinclined to commit himself--tcr· it-; 
One can easily hypothesize circumstances in which a ~esi-
dent would think it advisable to immediately resume power 
without the specter of a waiting·period imposed by a re-
calcitrant Vice President. Because this may prove a 
touc~y question, I think that before drafting the language 
of an agreement the matter should be raised with the Presi- . 
dent's people. If this question is coupled with the relatively 
more clear-cut business of the twenty-one days and the 
voting matter discussed below perhaps the pac~age can be 
characterized as nothing more than an abundantly cautious 
step to remove all vestiges of doubt about fairly certain 
matters. 
• 
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D. Voting Problems= 
- ~-.=--=-:-. .:._-~. := 
A third variety of mechanical question_~aised by 
the Arnendment_centers on the .two voting processes which it 
embodies. It. was .. passingly suggested in the ~oJ;_c;l -rnemorandum 
that there is some ambiguity to_the descriptio~_of the con-
gressional vote. The history seems to-me quite~Glearly to 
indicate that two-thirds means .two-thi:i::.ds .. Of-those present 
and voting, a quorum-having.been assempled and-the two chambers 
voting separately. .Moreover, an agreement between the Presi-
dent and th"'e Vice President. purporting to ;establis.h rules_~ 
for the Congress woul.d_be out of 1ine •. ..: _ _:_~: .. .::~=:.= 
- . 
·- - - - .. - . - -
The only genuine uncertainty which I~sea..:.in the business of 
voting concerns the .vote of ·the Cabinet. ~ Becaus-e.-that body 
has no statutory·-or .other. official .recognition~..:rules for 
voting on other matters are not -available _for analogy. The ~.­
history is somewhat.· two-sided on how one .. counts a majority 
in the Cabinet •.. In .. explaining .. the Conunittee amendment which 
had exchanged the phrase "heads of the executive departmentsR 
for the evantually ratified language "the principal officer 
in each of the executive departments," the House Report notes 
t.'1-iat, "in case of the death, resignation, absence, or sickness 
of the head of any executive department, the acting-head of 
the department would be authorized to participate in.a presi-
dential inavility determination." __§_/ This suggests that a 
majority would necessarily consist of the expressions of more 
than one-half of the executive departments through some ~pokes­
person. On the Senate floor, however, Senator Bayh r~ad the 
measure d_ifferently: _ . _ _ _ --
MR. HART. Is it the understanding of the Sena~e, 
in taking this action, that the Under Secretary, 
in the event of a vacancy in the office of Secretary, 
shall be empowered as would the Secretary himself, in 
participating· in the decision with respect to ability 
or disability? 
MR. BAYH: It is the opinion of the junion Senator 
from Indiana that it is not. · 
M,.q. HART: This would reduce it by as many Under 
Secretaries as may be involved in the situation 
with respect to those who would participate in the 
Cabinet decision. Is that correct? 
l .. .....A. 
• 
• 
------
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The point pressed-by-Senator-Hart was that the decision 
on disability could end up in the hands of a very small 
group.· While neither construction leads to the contre-
temps which you suggested -- the situation in which a . 
disability· decision could not be reached because fewer=~~ .. __ _ 
than half of the Cabinet members are able to participat~-~~-:-:_-­
it might well be appropriate to supply clarification 
through agreement. _ 
I am not persua_ded _that there is either __ a _"_right"_ answe_r -~ - ~-­
or a preferable position on this question. Unless -you..:. ~ ---:-
have powerful feelings in one drrection or the other·, . ~, - ~~-· 
this might be something to give the White House people 
in trade for the four day provision. . _ __ 
- ·-----
l 
r 
~'. 
f 
II.· Beyond the 25th Amendmen1: . -- _f J 
There is a second sort of question raised by the _ - - - __ 
problems of Presidential inavility which is really beyortq ___ _ 
the purport of the 25th ~.rnendment. What is to happen if-=-· -
both t.~e President and the Vice President are unable to 
function? Though the enquiry was not lost on the Congress 
neit.~er was there any attempt to deal with the problem. 
A very weak statutory response is available. The Succession -
to the Presidency Act, codified at 3 U.S.C. 19, provides that, 
"if by reason of • • • inability • • • there is neither a Presi- . 
dent nor a Vice President to discharge the powers and duties 
of the Office of the President, then the Sepaker of the House ••• 
shall ••• act as President ••. until the removal of the disability 
of one of the individuals." There are two overarching difficulties 
with reading this language as an escape mechanism. First, it 
necessarily contemplates a determination of Presidential -- and 
perhaps Vice Presidential -- inability which is at odds with the 
25th Amendment procedure. This is so because of the role of the 
Vice President in the ~.mendment. Quite as crushingly, there are 
no procedures articulated for the decision, even were it con-
stitutionally permissible. This second flaw might conceivably 
be remedied by statute, but even putting aside the problems of 
conflict with the 25th Amendment, the wisdom and legality of 
dealing with the matter of removal for inability by legislation 
is very questionable. _E/ 
--------
t 
l 
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In addition to the problem of how to provide for·an in-
capacitated Vice President; there are .hard questions· of 
what any such pr.ovision should. contain •.. I am persuaded 
and Marilyn concurs with this- :--· that .. the Speaker and· the 
Cabinet ought to make- the-decision. to:: oust the Vice President. 
- Obviously the President_should~be;~onsulted in the circumstances 
of a sound President, but-making some-act by the President a 
part of the procedure·will:foil·the-process if both the Vice· 
President and ~he President are incapacitated. And the pro-
vision should apply as well to a situation in which the Vice 
President is dead and the·. President. is either unable or un-
willing to make an appointment.- under ..§. 2 of the 25th Amend-
ment. Here, as in the .. case of. allegations· of Presi"dential -
inability, there ought to be·a resumption/challenge mechanism 
but here both the Vice .President..:who is being supplanted and. 
the President, who has a right to fill a vacancy in that·office, 
should be permitted to make the challenge. Something along the 
following lines seems to~meet;~though.rather cumbersomely, those 
amb:i tions_: ___ ·--- · · 
If the Speaker of the House of-Representatives 
(1) and a majority of .the principal officers of 
the.executive departments (2) (or of s~ch other-
body as Congress may be law provide) {3} evidence·· 
by a signed declaration their determination that, 
by reason of either death (4) or inability, the 
Vice President is unable to discharge the powers-
and duties of his.office or if the Vice President 
transmits to the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives and the President a written declaration of 
such inability ( 5) •.. -The Speaker of the House of 
Representatives may; after appropriate consultation--
with the President, (6) assume and discharge such 
powers and duties as Acting Vice President. 
If, thereafter, either the President or the Vice 
President transmits to the Acting Vice President, 
the President's pro tempore of the Senate and the 
6f the House of Representatives 
.....,.....,,....__~---,~-:-~~-,-~~ (7) a declaration that powers and duties of the 
Vice President ought no longer to be discharged 
by the .-a.cting Vice President ( 8) the Acting Vice-·-
Pres ident will be relieved of those powers and 
duties four days after such declaration unless, 
within that time, the Acting Vice Pr~sident and 
a majority of the principal officers of the 
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executive departments (or such other body as 
Congress may by law provide) transmit to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and the · 
of the House of Representatives:~ ·-
a written declaration of their contrary con-:~-~--­
clusion. Thereupon Congress shall decide the 
issue, assembling within forty-eight hours -~ - ~~-=~­
for that purpose if not in session. · -If the __ :..; - _ :-_-: _ :---=-.: ~ 
Congress within. twenty-one days after receipt :· __ ~ :- ··: 
of the latter written declaration, or,· if the-.-
Congress is not in session within twenty-one 
days after Congress is required to assemble, ,... _ 
determines by two-thirds vote of each-House ··-.··" _ -
that the Acting Vice President ought to .continue .:-:.~:.:.­
discharging the powers and duties of Vice Presi~-..:·-::.. :-:-
dent, he shall continue sn to dischrage them: = -"'" - ·--: :-....:.. ..;_ 
otherwise his powers and duties as Acting Vice __ --: . _ :_-__ 
President shall be at an end. -------------------------~----------__,;;~~--------------------------~· - . -
- . -=-==-
Before turning "to questions of implementing such ·a-:-pl:an;:..:--··- -:~:: z: -
a few further words of explication ~ay be helpful. 
MY COMMENTS TRACK THE NUMBERS IN THE TEXT • 
•
• . If both the .President and Vi~e President are dead, neither 
this nor the inability provisions of the 25th Amendment 
apply, and the Spea~er ta~es over. That argues for the 
·speaker's place in this proposal for, should the 25th .. 
Amendment disabjlity provision be employed on top· of.; 
this suggestion, he.would, symetrically, be the Acting · 
President. There may be some small doubt about the avail-
ability of that .;equence. The· 2Sth-·Amendment calls for 
the participation of the Vice President in relieving .the :. 
President and under this scheme there could be a (disabled) 
Vice President with the Acting Vice President/Speaker pur-
porting to play the Vice Presidential part.. This varianc~ 
could be cured by express provision if the new procedure 
takes the form of a constitutional amendment, otherwise 
I see no remediation other than the application-of good 
sense. 
2. This is modeled after the 25th Amendment and, unless paranoia 
generated by the possibility of a Cabinet-Congress COUE moves 
you, seems sensible for the same reaons as in that measure. 
-----
------------ -~-i.. - - ....,r 
':'J1: ;rr- - .:.::_··. -~-~~-... , . ·.· ~·::--::-: r::rr· ·~:. "'T:T 
. - I. -· 
' . 
• 
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3. The parenthetical phrase makes sense only in a con-
stitutional amendment and there only to parallel the 
25th Amendment. In either an agreement or a statute 
the language should be deleted. 
·4. The provisi~n for declaration of death, though odd, is 
included to provide for a Vice President to invoke the 
disability provision of the 25th Amendment. The diffi-
culty here is that there is a distinct tension with the 
President's 25th Amendment right to appoint.a Vice Presi-
dent when the office is vacant. My sop --- and it is little 
more than that --- is to insist on consultation. (Text.at (6)). 
One must assume that neither the Cabinet nor, if the inter-
jection were contested by th~ President, the Congress would 
go along with the Speaker were there some. good reason for 
deferral of appointment by the President.~ 
-5. Voluntary action by the Vice President ought to be included~ 
6. I don't suppose that this requirement has.any but a symbolic 
import. Surely in the case of a dead Vice President the 
Speaker and the Cabinet would talk with the President be-
fore trying to give him an Acting Vice President. The word 
"appropriate" is included to permit truncated or even non-
extant consultation where it would prove unavailing or · 
impossible. 
7. Since I have not insisted, as the Succession to the Presidency 
Ac~ does, that the Speaker resign before becoming Acting Vice 
President -- and, perhaps, such provision should be made --
it is not clear that there will be a Speaker or Acting Speaker 
in the House. Who best will serve as a recepticle .for the 
various notices? 
8. This is a much looser standard than the "unable due to death 
or inability" by which the Speaker and Cabinet are to make 
their decision. The greater latitude is in recognition that 
one may be dealing with a President -- perhaps reinstated after 
a period of 25th Amendment disability -- who is now ready to 
aoooint a Vice President. It also seems to me that, given 
th~ difficulties of defining inability, it makes scant diff-
erent how one verbalizes the basis for what will; in all events, 
be a political judgment. 
As to the question of mechanics, it strikes me, for reasons 
previously stated,· that only a constitutional. arne.ndment will 
be effective in establishing such a procedure. Given the time 
required for that step, however, little injury could be done by 
first articulating the process in a letter of agreement running 
between the Presiden~, Vice President and (though his participation 
would not be obligatory) the Speaker. Such a step could be 
integrated with the clarification agreement discussed in Part I. 
_, ... -...------_,...--. --· ~--~~ ------ --· -.....------~~------
'( 
FOOTNOTES 
---- ,..;._ ----::. 
.... 1/...:::---The full text of the amendment -=-=j_:.S--a,"ppended:-=- ·-==.: 
-1:_/ S. Rept. 89-66, 89th Cong., 1st _s_ess._,_ (1965) at p.3. 
Excepting their respective introduc_tory passages-,· the 
House Report {H. Rept. 89-203~ 89~~- Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1965)) is identical. Though in the discussion that 
follows I cite to the customart historic sources to. 
adduce meaning for equivocal language ·in the Amendment, 
two cautionary statements are in _ordei".~ The history-~ 
a· constitutional Amendment properly -includes -the delibera-
tions surrounding the ratificat1onprocess at the state 
level as well as that in Congr·es·s .: __ I have not consulted -
any of that broader history. Indeed my survey of tne 
congressional history has not he.en -exhaustive. My lack 
of rigor sterns from my feeling that the questions here 
raised will not be resolved in a court but in elevated--· 
political circles and in public opinion~ · 
_]_/ 111 Cong.~Record 3285. 
_!/ id at 7939. The positioh is further buttressed, albeit· 
in a somewhat backhanded fashion, by the comments of· 
Rep. Love who had introduced a Resolution which made 
explicit the conclusion that the Vice President was to 
be in chrage during the challenge period. Though his 
language was not approved by the Committee, he indicated, 
on the floor, that he read the language adopted.as reach-
ing the same result. id at 7958-9: 
. --
-· .. - - . 
21 id at 3274. -
~/ 
_]./ 
H. Rept. at 3. This language appears in the intoductory 
explanation of Committee amendments and is not present in 
the Senate Report. 
The Constitution provides that "congress may be law provide 
for the case of ••. inability ••• both of the President and 
Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as 
President .•• " Art. II, Sec. ·1·, Clause 5. The word "both" 
was seized-on by proponents to argue that a "mere statute" 
would not work to provide for succession in the event of a 
-
. -- - -·-
- --
. - - -
•• 4:1 
--------- --· -. -----------,-_, .-~.~.-____.,-= .~--C~~-~--:---·---
Footnotes Continued 
of a Presidential disability. (See, e.g., s. Rept. at-· ·-
8-9). This literal reading would equally debar legis-
lation providing for replacement of a disabled Vice 
President. Even more persuasive are the sentiment 
expressed during discussion of the 25th Amendment that 
a statutory remedy would always be clouded by uncer-
tainty and that matters going so clearly to the legitimacy 
of the country's leadership should not be.susceptible to· 
congressional alteration. -~ - . ~ · · 
~ .. ..:.._ 
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PRESIDENTIAL IN ABILITY AND VACANCIES ·IN THE 
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT 
FEBRUARY 10, 1965.-0rdered to be printed 
:\Ir. BAYII, from the Committee on the .Jud.icin.ry, submitted 
the following 
REPORT 
together with 
INDIVIDUAL \'JEWS 
[To accompany S. J. Res. 1] 
The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the reso-
lutiou (S.J. Iles. i), prnposing au u.111enllmenL Lo Lhe Con::>Litut,ion 
of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and 
Yice-Presiclen~v nnd to cases 'vhere the President is unable to dis-
charze the po~,·ers and duties of his office, having considered the 
same. report.s f:n·nrnbly thereon with amendments and recommends 
that the resolution ns amended be agreed to. 
A:.IIE::\D:\IE:-;TS 
On pn.ge '.2, in line 14, strike "If the President declares in writing" 
nn<l insert in lieu thereof: "\Thene-ver the President trnnsmits to the 
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tins his written clecbrntion". 
Oc pn.ge '.2. st,ike the entire text of section 4, and insert in lieu 
thereof tl.ie folloYv·ing: 
\\henever the Vice President, and a majority of the princi-
Ptcl officers of the executive departments or such other bo<ly 
as Con~rnss may by hw pronde. trnnsmit to the President 
of the Senate :.m<l the Speaker of the House of Representn.-
ti n~s their written clechtL1tion that the Presillent is un~ble 
to disch·c.r~c thQ powers and duties of his office, the Yice 
Pre,;~cbnt shall immediately tLssume the powers :incl duties 
of the office as ~\.cting President. 
:;;:J-f_1lV-G~1 
-. 
. ·' 
I'H LSIDf.::\Tl:\L 1::\.-\BILITY, 
On pag-e :3, in lines 1 and 2, strike the word "Con- gress" and iusert 
in lieu thereof the f ollowiug: 
President of the Senate ancl the Speaker of the House of 
H.epresentati \·es 
On page 3, in line 5, strike the word "heads" and insert in lieu 
thereof the following: "principal officers". 
On page 3, in line 9, strike the words "will immediately" and insert 
in lieu thereof "sh1lll immediately proceed to". 
PliRPOSE OF A::\IE);'D)lE:S-TS 
TLe text of Senate Joint Resolution 1, as introduced, requires, under 
certain contingencies, for a written declaration to be mude by the 
President, under section 3, n.nd by the Vice President and principal 
officers of the executive depustments under section 4, and by the 
President, the Vice President and principal officers of the executirn 
departments under section 5. It is the intention of the committee 
that for the best interests of the country to be sen-ed, notice by all 
parties should be public notice. The committee feels that notice by 
transmittal to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House of RepresentatiYes guarantees notice to the entire country. 
The committee is concerned about the pos:>ibility that such written 
declaration might be transmitted during a period in \',-hich Congress 
was not in session. In this e\·ent the committee feels that transmittal 
•
f such written declaration to the presiding officers of both Houses, 
!le President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Repre-
entati\·es, would be sufficient transmittal under the terms of this 
amendment. 
It is the opinion of the committee that, under the language of 
section 5, Congress i::; cmpowereJ tu reconveue iu sµeciul se::;siou to 
consider any disability question arising under this section. Further-
more, under the language of this section, the President of the Senate 
and tlie Speaker of the House of Repre::;entati\·e5 would be required 
to cull a. special session of the Congres:> to consider the q ue::;tion of 
presidential inability wheneYer the President's ability to perform the 
pO\Yers and duties of his office are questioned under the terms of 
section 5. Ho\Ve\·er, nothing: contained in this proposed amendment 
shoulll be construed to limit tile power of the President from exercising 
his existin;; constitutional authority to call for a. special session of 
the Con2:ress. 
It is further understood bv the committee that should the President 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatfres not be 
found in their offices at the time the declarn.tion 'vas transmitted that 
transmittal to the office of such presiding officers would suffice for 
sufficient notice under the terms of this amendment. 
It is the judgment of the committee that the language "principal 
officers of the executiYe departments" more adequately com·eys the 
intended meaning of sections 4 and 5, that only those members of the 
Pre::i<le11t's official Cabinet were to participate in any decision of 
cli:>a bi litY referred to under these sections. This hn<rurwe finds 
precedent under urticle II, section 2, cbuse 1, of the C~nstitution. 
The pcrti11e11 t language there refl.ds as follO\YS: 
• 
!te rnay require the Opinion, in i;rritin~, of the principal 
OHirer in f'flch of the executii;·e Dep1trtments, 
. '' 
PI: ES!DE:\TL\L IC\ ABILl n- 3 
111 its di::::cussion of the nunifieations of sectio11 5, the committee 
t:011:0iclercd it important to add ucl<litional stre::;s to the interpretntiuu 
of tm1 que;-;tions ,,·h.ich might arise: 
(1 l \Ylw has the powers and duties of the office of the President 
while the pru,·isions of section ,j <tre being implemented'? 
(2) Cnder wh:tt sense of urgency is Congress required to act in 
c11rr::i1!g out pnwision::; of this section? 
Under the terms of section 3 n. President who .-oluntarih- transfers 
his powers and duties to the Vice President ffi<ty resume th .. e::;e powers 
and dutie:-> by m1tking a written declaration of his ability to perform 
the flO\Hrs and duties of his office and transmitting such cleclarntion 
to tbe Presi<lent of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentati,·e::;. This will reduce the reluctirnce of the President to utilize 
the nro,-i::;ions of this section in the event he fe;m; it would be difficult 
for him to regain his powers r.nd duties once he has voluntarilv 
relinquished them. • 
HoweYer, the intent of section 5 is that the Vice President is to 
continue to exercise the po\vers and duties of the offica of Acting Presi-
dent until il. determination on the President's inability is made by 
Conc;ress. It is also the intention of the eommittee that the Con-
gres~ should act swiftly in mu.king this determination, but with suffi-
cient opportunity to gu.ther whatever e\·idence it determined necessary 
to make such a final determination. The language, u.s amended, reads 
1ts f ullows: 
!'hereupon Congress shall immediately proceed to decide the 
i:->sue. 
It was the opinion of the committee that the words "Thereupon", 
"o;lrnll", nncl "immediately" ;vere sufficiently strong to indicate the 
necessity for prompt action. 
Fr2ccLlt•11cc fur tl1·~ use o[ Ll1e \\'UrLl "inuite<li::i.teh" <!llJ Llie iuLer-
prC't~"ttion thereof mfLy be fonnd in the use of this.same word, "im-
mediatd\-" in the 12th amendment to the Constitution. In the 12th 
:tllll'!idment, in the; eYcnt. no orndidate for President reeeins a 
majorit~· of the electoral ,·otes, the House of Representatives "shall 
choose i1Hrnedia tely, ". The committee ·,,-as of the opinion that the 
s:uHe seme of urgency nttendant to the use of the word "immediatelv" 
in the 12th an{emlinent when Congress was in fact decidincr w·ho 
\\·ould be the Pre:sident of the united States should be nttend~nt in 
proceedin~s in \\·hich the Congress was deciding whether the President 
<•f I be C11ited Stat(:'S should he rerno,·ed from his office because of 
his in:'..hility tCJ perform the powers and duties thereof. 
ThP <.:ommittee is concerned th1:.t cou~ressional action under the 
tcr:m of srction 5 should be taken un<ler the greatest sense of urgencY. 
IImn' \·er, bemuse c1f t be complexities in \'oh-eel in determining different 
type-: of disability. it is felt ttnwise to prescribe any specific time 
lirnit:dion to con'.:;ressionnl deliberation thereupon. Indeed. the 
t'(J: 11rnittee feels tG·,Lt Congress should be permitt.e<l to collect all 
ncccs,;ary c•:iclencP :rnd to participate in the cleb:tte needed to make 
a cunsiderecl j ud~men t. 
The c\i,,c;u,:oion of the committee m:tde it abnnlbnth- dear that the 
pr<H:ecdin~..; in the Con~re:::::; pre;;cribecl in ~ection 5 \\·r.>ulcl be pursued 
ur1dn rule,.; prc:-:cribecl, or to he prescribed, by the Co11gres::; itself. 
. ·' 
PRESIDEXTIAL IXABILITY 
PlJ!cl'OSE OF THE TIESOLuTIOX AS A~lEXDED 
The purpose of Seuate Joint Resolutiou 1, as amencle<l, is to pro\~ide 
for <.:ontinuity in tlie office of tlie Chief Executive [in the e\·ent that 
the President becomes unable to exercise the powers and duties of the 
office] and further, to pro\ide for the filling of vacancies in the office 
of the Vice President whenever such vacancies may occur. 
STATEME:-<T 
The const.itutional wovisions 
The Constitution of the United States, in article II, section 1, 
clause 5, contains pro>isions relating to the continuity of the executi'e 
power at times of death, resignation, inability, or removal of a Presi-
dent. No replacement provision is made in the Constitution where a 
vacancy occurs in the Office of the Vice President. Article II, section 
1, clause 5 reads as follows: 
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or 
at his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the 
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve 
on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide 
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resi~nation or Inability, 
both of the President and Yice President, declaring what 
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act 
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President 
shall be elected. 
This is the language of the Constitution as it was adopted by the 
Coustitutional Convention upon recommendation of the Committee 
vu Style. ~/hen th~s po1tion cf the C0nstituti()!l ':(Tf!.S s11bmit.tecJ t.o 
that Committee it rea<l as follows: 
In case of his (the Presidenfs) remornl as aforesaid, 
death, al>sence, resignation, or inability to discharge the 
pmvers of duties of his office, the Yice President shall exer-
cise those powers and cluties until a not her President be 
chosen. or until the inability of the President be removed. 
The· Leffi5lature maY dechre by b,w v.-11at officer of the 
United SDttes shall act. as President, in case of the death, 
resi~nation. or disal.>i lity of the President and Yice President: 
n.n<l~ such o.flicer slrnJl act accordin~:lY. until such disabilitv 
be removed, or a President shall be· ~lecte<l. · 
\YL..ile the Committee on Stvle was giv-en no authoritv to change the 
substance of prior <letermin:1tions of ~the Com·ention, ·it is clear that 
this portion of the elm.ft \Yllich that Committee ultimately submitted 
\'>:::1s a considern.ble altemtion of the proposal which the Committee 
bad recei ve<l. 
The inability clause and the Tyler precedent 
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not contain any 
explicit interpretation of the pro,·isions as they relate to inabilit:r. 
As a mnttcr of Llet, tbe records of the Convention cont:i.in onl!- one 
!lpparcnt reference to the :~spects of this clause which cleal \\ith the 
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question of disability. It was 1fr. John Dickinson, of Delaware, who, 
on August 27, 17S7, asked: 
What is the extent of the term "disabilitv" and who is to be 
the judge of it? (Farra!'ld, "Record:; of-the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787," vol. 2, p. 427.) 
The question is not answered so far as the records of the Convention 
disclose. 
It was not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution was called 
into question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingencies. 
In that year President William Henry Harrison died, and Vice Presi-
dent John Tyler faced the determination as to whether, under this 
provision of the Constitution, he must serve as Acting President or 
whether he became the President of the United States. Vice President 
Tyler gave answer by taking the oath as President of the United States. 
While this evoked some protest at the time, noticeably that of Senator 
William Allen, of Ohio, the Vice President (Tyler) was later recognized 
by both Houses of Congress as President of the United States (Con-
gressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 10, pp. 3-5, 1fay 31-
June 1, 1841). 
This precedent of John Tyler has since been confirmed on se\·en 
occasions when Vice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency of 
the United States by virtue of the death of the incumbent President. 
Vice Presidents Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, 
oolidge, Truman, and Lyndon Johnson all became President in this 
anner. 
The acts of these Vice Presidents, and the acquiescence in, or 
confirmation of, their acts by Congress have served to establish a 
Dl'el:'edent. t.h~.t., in one of the contingenci.e~ under ~xt.ide IJ. $t?Cti.on J. 
clause 5, that of death, the Vice President becomes President of th~ 
United States. 
The clause which provides for succession in case of death also 
applies to succession in case of resignation. removal from office, or 
inability. In all four contingencies, the Constitution states: "the 
same shall devoh·e on the Vice President." 
Thus it is said that whatever devolves upon the Vice President 
upon death of the President, lil;:ewise devolves upon him by reason of 
the resignation, inability, or removal from office of the President. 
(Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, .North American Review," 
vol. 133, p. 442 (1919).) 
The Tyler precedent, therefore, has served to cause doubt on the 
ability of an incapacitated President to resume the Junctions of his 
office upon recovery. Professor Dwight, who later became president 
of Yale University, found further basis for this argument in the fact 
that the Constitution, while causing either the office, or the power and 
duties of the office, to "devolve" upon the Vice President, is silent on 
the return of the office or its functions to the President upon recovery. 
\\?here both the President and Vice President are incup,1ble of serving, 
the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare \vhat officer 
shall <LCt fl.S President "until the disabilitv is removed." 
These considerations a.ppfl.rently moved persons such as Daniel 
\"Yebster, \\·ho w:1::; Secretary of State 'vhen Tyler took office ns Presi-
dent, to declare that the powers of the office are insepa.rnble from the 
. ' 
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office itself n.ncl that a recovered President could not displace n Vice 
Pre:;iclcnt who h~Ld assumed the prerogati\·c::; of the Presiclencv. This 
interpretn.tion gains support by imi)licMion from the language of 
article I, section 3, clause 5 of the Constitution which provides thu.t: 
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also n. 
President pro tempore, in tile absence of the Vice President, 
or when he sh.i.11 exercise the office of President of the united 
Stt1tes. [Italic snpplierl.) 
The doubt engendered by precedent 'vas so strong that on two 
occasions in the historv of the united States it has contributed mnteri-
allv to the failure of Vi.ce Presidents to assume the office of President at 
a time when a President was disabled. The first of the:;e occasions 
arose in 1881 when President Garfield fell victim of an assassin's 
bullet. President Garfield lingered for some 80 days during v,·hich he 
performed but one official act, the signing of an extradition paper. 
There is little doubt but that there were pressing issues before the 
executive dep.-1.rtrnent at that time which required the attention of a 
Chief Executive. Commissions v..-ere to be issued to officers of the 
united States. The foreign relation::; of this Nation required attention. 
There was evidence of mail fraud:; involving officials of the Federal 
Government. Yet onl:.· such business a.s could be disposed of by the 
heads of Government departments, without Presidential supervision, 
wrrs handled. Yice President .Arthur did not act. Respected legal 
opinion of the clay wns divided upon the ability of the President to 
re::;nme the du ties of his office should he recover. (See opinions of 
Lyman Trumbull, Judge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler a.nd Prof. 
Theodore Dwight, "Presidenti:.1.l Inability, Korth .:\.merican Review," 
'.'ol.1:33, pp. ·il7-44fi (18Sl)-) 
The <li\·ision of leg;tl authority on this question apparently extended 
t(i the Cabinet, for newspapers of that day, notubly the l\ew York 
Herald, the :\" ew York Tribune, and the l\ ew York Times contnin 
accounts stating- tb.11.t the Cabinet considered the question of the 
ad\·isability of the Yice President acting during the period of the 
President's incapacity. Four of the seven Cabinet members were 
said to be of the opinion that there could be no temporary devolution 
of Presidential power on the Yice President .. This group reportedly 
included the then Attornev General of the Umted St.-1.te:>. :\Ir. \VaYne 
:\IacVettzh. .:\.11 cif G:1.rfielcl's c.1binet were of the ,-iew that it would 
he cle:;irable for the Yice President to act but since thev could not. 
as:ree upon the :ibility of the Pre::;iclent to resume his· office upon 
recovery, and heca.u:;e the President's condition pre-;entecl them from 
presenting: the issue to him directly the matter wus dropped. 
It wa::; nnt until Pre:::ident \Voodrow \Vibon suffered :t severe stroke 
in Hl19 that the matter became one of pressing urgencr :-tguin. This 
cbntu!le to Pre~iclent \Vibon·s health came at a time when the struggle 
cunc:crnin~ the po:::ition of the united States in tl1e Leitgue of Katl"r)ns 
was at it:; height. ;,Ltjor matters of foreign policy such as the Shan-
tung :Settlement were unre:;uh-ed. The British .:\mb:1.ssuclor spent 
4 month::; in 1.Yashinc:ton \\"it hnu t being recei nd h;.· the President. 
TwPntY-e\c;ht :1cts o( Congrc:-;,.; became' law without tbe Prc:siclent's 
si:::nri.tt!re -(Lincls~lY H.o'.!ers. "Presidenti:Ll Inahilit:.·, the Rc\·iew," 
:.lay S, 19:20: reprinted in 1 \J.:iS hcn.rin~s before Senate ~)ubcommittee 
on Con:::t it 11 tion:tl .:\tnendmen ts, pp. 202-~:\ii). The l'rcsiden t's 
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wif c :lllll :l ~roup of White House ussoci<ttes acted :b a screening-
bo:1rd on decisions \Yhich could Ge submitted to the Pre:;ident without 
impairment of his he,1lth. (See Edith Bolling \Vibon, ":'-.I,- :'-.Iemoirs," 
pp. :2~S-2DO; Hoover, "Forty-two Years in the White House," pp. 
105-lOG; Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 437-438.) 
A::: in lSS 1, the C,1binet considered the ad Yi:mbility of asking tb.e 
Yice "Pre,;ident to act as President. This time, there \Yas consider:tble 
opposition to the adoption of such procedure on the part of assistants 
of tbe President. It has been reported by a Presidential secretary 
of that day that he repro<lched the Secretary of State for suggesting 
such n. possibility (,Joseph P. Tumulty, ''"~Voodrow Wilson as I Know 
Him," pp. 443-444). Upon the President's ultimate recovery, the 
Pre:sident caused the displacement of the Secretary of State for 
reasons of alleged clisloyalt:;- to the President (Tumulty, "Woodrow 
\Yilson as I Know Him," pp. 444-445). 
On three occasions during the Eisenhower administration, incidents 
im-ol ving the physical he:ilth of the President sernd to focus attention 
on the inu bilitY clause. 
President Eisenhower became concerned about the gap in the 
Constitution relative to Presidential inability, and he attempted to 
reduce the hazards by means of an informal agreement with Vice 
President l\i.xon. The ri.greement provided: 
1. In the event. of inability the President would, if possible, 
so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve 
as Acting President. exercising the powers and duties of the 
office until the inabilitv had ended. 
• 
2. In the event o( an inability which would prevent the 
President from so communic,1ting with the Vice President, the 
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appro-
priate under the circumstances, would decide upon the devolu-
tion of thG po~,vers r ..nd duties of tl1c cffi~e and y~-vald scr7e as 
Acting President until the inability h:1d ended. 
:). The Pre.3iclent, in either event, would determine when the 
inu.bility hacl ended and at that time would resume the full 
exercise of the nuwer,:; and duties of the Office. 
President Kennecly entered into a similar agreement with Vice 
President J0hnson its did President ,Johnson with Speaker John 
.\IcCorm:Lck .rnJ Vice Pre:;iclent Hubert Humphrey. Such informal 
agreements c:mnot be co;isidered an adequate solution to the problem 
hec:wse: (A) Tb.cir oper;i.tion would differ according to tb.e relation-
ship h3t.,veen the p'.lrtir.nbr holders of the offices; (B) a private 
ag;·eemeat c:1nnot gi\'e the Yice President clear authority to dis-
charge powers conferred on the President by the Constitution, 
trn;tties, or ~t:ttntes; (C) no provision is m:lde for the situation in 
which :t dispute exi,;ts m·er whether or not the Presiclerrt is disti.bled. 
Fnr:-ner Attor:i.ev-.,; Gener:ll Brownell <tnd Rogers as well [13 Attornev 
General Kenn~'.i.v :1~ree tll.:1t the only definitive methoi to ::;ettle thve 
probl~m is by a1e'.rn::> of :1 co:istitutioru,l amea.t.lme!:lt. 
THE ~EEO FOR CHA~GE 
The l1i'it•Jrical re,·iew of the interpret.1tion of article II, section 1, 
r:bu,;c 5, su~~esL,; the~ difficulties \\"hich it has already presented. 
The bnguag-e of the cl:tuse i:; unclear, it,.; application uncertain. The 
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clause couples the contingencies of a permanent nature such as death, 
resignation, or remo...-al from office, with inability, n, contingency 
,..,-hich may be temporary. It does not clearly commit the determi-
nation of inability to any indi-vidual or group, nor does it define 
inability so that the existence of such a status may be open and 
notorious. It lea-ves uncertain the capacity in which the Vice Presi-
dent acts during a period of inability of the President. It fails to 
define the period during which the Vice President seITes. It does 
not specify that a recovered President may regain the prerogatives 
of his office if he has relinquished them. It fails to provide any 
mechn.nism for determining whether a President has in fact recovered 
from his inability, nor does it indicate how a President, who sought to 
recover his prerogatives while still disabled, might be prevented from 
doing so. 
The resolution of these issues is imperative if continuity of Execu-
tive power is to be preserved with a minimum of turbulence at times 
when a President is disabled. Continuity of executive authority is 
more important today than ever before. The concern which has been 
mainfested on previous occasions when a President was disabled, is 
increased when the disability problem is weighed in the light of the 
increased importance of the Office of the Presidency to the United 
States and to the world: 
This increased concern has in turn manifested an intensified exami-
nation of the adequacy of the provisions relating to the orderly transfer 
of the functions of the Presiclencv. Such an examination is not 
reassuring. The constitutional prov:'ision has not been utilized because 
its procedures have not been clear. After 175 years of experience 
·.ritli the Constitutiou the i.u.r..bility ~buse re!!:!.!1ins an imte:;;te<l pro-
vision of uncertain application. 
METHOD OF CHA~GE 
In previous instances in history when this question has arisen, one 
of the major considerations has been whether Congress could con-
stitutionally proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether 
an enablin~ constitutional amendment would be necessary. As early 
as 1920, when the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Rep-
resentatives, 66th Congress, 2d session, considered the problem, 
Representatives :Madden, Rogers, and :i\Id.rthur took the position 
that the matter of disability could be dealt with by statute without 
an amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess 
was of the opinion that Congress was not authorized to act under the 
Constitution, and that an amendment would first have to be adopted 
(hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Rep-
resentatives, February 26 rmd :Vforch 1, 1920). Through the years, 
this controversy has incret\sed in intensity among Con;ressmen and 
constitutional scholars who ha-ve considered the presidential inability 
problem. 
Those who feel that Conzre~s does not have the authoritv to resolve 
the matter by statute claim that the Constitution does no"t support a 
rcasonitble inference that Congress is empowered to 10~islate. They 
point out that article TI, section 1, cl:lllse 5 of the Constitution author-
ized Con~ress to pro\-ide by stfltnte for the c:1se \vhere hoth the Presi-
fknt and Vice Prr;;ident arc incap:tble of setTing. By implication 
Cun~rcss does not h:n-e the authority to legislate with regard to the 
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situation which concerns only a disabled President, with the Vice 
President succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this is 
the proper construction, because the first statute clea.ling with Presi-
dential succession under article II, section 1, clause u, which was 
enncted by contempornries of the framers of the Con::;titution, did 
not purport to establish succession in instances where the President 
alone was disabled (act of 1farch 1, 1792, 1Stat.239). 
Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether the "necessary 
and proper" authority of article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the 
Congress the power to legislate in this situation. The Constitution 
does not vest any department or office with the power to determine 
inability, or to decide the term <luring which the Vice President shall 
act, or to determine whether and aL what time the President may later 
regain his prerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to argue 
that article I, section 8, clause IS gives the Congress the authority to 
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out 
such powers. 
In recent years, there seems to have been a strong shift of opinion 
in favor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment isneces-
sury, and that o. mere statute would not be adequate to solve the 
problem. The last three Attorneys General who have testified on the 
matter, Herbert Brownell, William P. Rogers, and Acting Attorney 
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, have agreed an amendment is 
nece;;sary. In addition to the American Bar Association and the 
ericun Association of Law Schools, the following organizations 
e agreed an amendment is necessary: the State bar associations 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island, 
rrexns, Virgioln.., \ 1ermcnt; ~nd the brr~ ~sscci:::.tic~s cf Dcn~er, CclD.; 
the District of Columbia; Dade County, Fla.; city of New York; 
Pnssaic County, N.J.; Greensboro, N.C.; York County, Pa.; and 
1Iilwaukee, Wis. 
The most persuasive argument in favor of amending the Constitution 
is that so many legal questions have ~een raised about the authority 
of Congress to act on this subject without an amendment that any 
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge at 
the most critical time-that is, either when a President had become 
disabled, or when a President sought to recover his office. Under 
these circumstances, there is an urgent need to adopt an amendment 
which would dis tinctlv enumerate the proceedings for determination· 
of the commencement~ and termination of disability. 
Filling of vacancies in the Office of the President 
While the records of the Consititutional Convention disclosed 
little insight OB the framers' interpretation of the inability provisions 
of the Constitution, they do reveal that wide disagreement prevailed 
concerning whether or not a Vice President was needed. If he was 
needed, what were to be his official duties, :f any. 
The creation of the office of Vice President came in the closing 
days of the Constitutional Convention. Although such a position 
wns considered very early in the Convention, later proposals envisaged 
t.he President of the Senate. the Chief Justice and e\en a council of 
ad >'isers, us persons who wo,uld direct the executive branch should a 
pse of Executive authority come to pass; 
S, Itept. GG, Et•-1-'..! 
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On September 4, 1787, a Committee of Ele\·en, selected to deliberate 
those portions of the Constitution which hacl been postponed, recom-
mended that an office of Vice President be created and thut he be 
elected with the President by an electornl college. On ~eptember 7, 
1787, the Convention discussed the Vice-Presidency u.n<l the duties to 
be performed by the occupant of the office. Although much de-
liberu.tion ensued regarding the official functions of the office, little 
thought seems to lrnve been given to the succession of the Vice Presi-
dent to the office of President in case of the death of the President. 
A committee, designated to revise the style of uud arrange the 
articles agreed to by the House, returned to Convention on September 
12, 1787, a draft which for all practical purposes was to become the 
Constitution of the United States. It contemplated two official 
duties for the Vice President: (1) to preside over the Senate, in which 
capacity he would vote when the Senate was "equally divided" and 
open the certificates listing the votes of the presidential electors, and 
(2) to discharge the powers and duties of the President in case of his 
death, resignation, removal, or inability. 
While the Constitution does not address itself in all cases to specifics 
regarding the Vice President as was the case for the President, the 
importance of the office in view of the Convention is made apparent 
by article II, section 1, clause 3. This clause, the original provision 
for the election of the President and the Vice President, made it clear 
that it was designed to insure that the Vice President was a person 
equal in stn.ture to the President . 
The intent of the Convention, however, was totally frustrated when 
the electors began to distinguish between the two votes which article 
II, section 1, clause 3 had bestowed upon them. This inherent defect 
was made painfully apparent in the famous Jefferson-Burr election 
contest. of 1800, and in 1804 the 12tb nnrnndment. rnodiflPd the college 
voting to prevent a reoccurrence of similar circumstances. 
There is little doubt the 12th amendment rernoYed a serious defect 
from the Constitution. However, its ptlssage, coupled with the 
growing political practice of nominating Vice Presidents to appease 
disappointed factions of the parties, began a decline that was in ensu-
ing years to mold the Vice-Presidency into an office of inferiority and 
disparugemen t. 
Fortunately, this century saw a gradual resurgence of the importance 
of the Vice-Presidency. He has become a regular member of the 
Cabinet, Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, 
Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Op-
portunities, a member of the National Security Council, and a personal 
envoy for the President. He has in the eyes of Government regained 
much of the "equal stature" which the framers of the Constitution 
contemplt1.ted he should entertain. 
THE NEED FOR CHA~GE 
The death of President Kennedv and the accession of President 
Johnson in 19G3 pointed up once again the abyss which exists in the 
executi,-e brunch when there is no incumbent Vice President. Si..xteen 
times the United States of America has been without a Viee President, 
totaling 37 years during our.history. 
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wisdom forc5aw the need to luwe n. qualified and able occupant of the 
Yice President'::; office should the President die. They did not, 
howe\·er, proYi.de the mechanics \vhereby a. Vice-Presidential vacancy 
could be filled. 
The considerntions which enter into a determination of whether 
provisions for filling the office of Vice President when it becomes 
vacant should be made by simple legislation or require a constitutional 
amendment are similar to those which enter into the same kind of 
determination about Presidential inability provisions. In both cases, 
there is some opinion that Congress has authority to act. However, 
the arguments that an amendment is necessary are strong and sup-
ported by many indinduals. We must not gamble with the consti-
tutional legitimacy of our Nation's executive branch. When a 
President or a Vice President of the United States assumes his office, 
the entire Nation and the world must know without doubt that he 
does so as a matter of right. Only a constitutional amendment can 
supply the necessary air of legitimacy. 
The argument that ConO'ress can designate a Vice President bv law 
is at best~a weak one. The power of Congress in this regard is meas-
ured principally by article II, section 1, clause 6 which states that-
the Congress may by law provide for the Case of Removal, 
Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and 
Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as Presi-
• 
dent, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the 
Disfl.bility be removed, or a President shall be elected. 
his is not in specific terms a power to declare what officer shall be 
Vice President. It is a power to declare upon what officer the duties 
and oowers of the office of President shall devolve when there is 
neither President nor Vice .President to act. 
To stand by ready for the pO\vers and duties of the Presidential 
office to deYol ve upon him at the time of death or inability of the 
President, is the principal constitutional function of the Vice President. 
It is dear that Congress can designate the officer who is to perform 
thn.t function \Vhen ~the office of Vice President is vacant. Indeed 
it has clone so iH each of the Presidential Succession Acts. Should 
there be any more objection to designating that officer Vice President 
than there is to designating as Pr~sident the Vice President upon 
whom devolve the powers and duties of a deceased President, for 
which clesignt1.tion there is no specific constitutional authorization? 
The :rnswer to that question is "Yes." The Constitution has given 
the \~ice President another duty and sets forth specific instructions as 
to who is to perform it in his absence. A..rticle I, section 2, clause 4, 
pro ,-ides that the Vice President shall be the President of the Senate 
and chuse ii provides that the Senate shall choose its other officers 
including a "President pro Tempore, in the Absence of the Vice Presi-
dent or when he shall exercise the Office of the President of the United 
States." It is ven- difficult to argue that a person designated \-ice 
Pre:;ident hy Con~ress, or selected 'in any way other than ~by the pro-
ced 1.1re;; oullined in amendments 12 and 22 can be, the President of the 
Senate. 
One of the principal reasons for filling the office of \-ice President 
wh~n it becomes ,·acant is tu permit the person next in line to become 
.. ' 
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familiar with the problems he will face should he be called upon to act 
as President, e.g., to serrn on the National Security Council, head the 
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, partici-
pate in Cabinet meetings and take part in other top-level discussions 
which lead to national policymaking decisions. Those who consider 
a law sufficient to provide for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy point 
out that the Constitution says nothing about such duties and there is 
therefore nothing to prevent Congress from assigning these duties to 
the officer it designates as next in line in whatever Presidential suc-
cession law it enacts. Regardless of what office he held at the time of 
his designation as Vice President, however, he would have a difficult 
time carrying out the duties of both offices at the same time. 
When, to all these weaknesses, one adds the fact that no matter 
what laws Congress may write describing the duties of the officer it 
designates to act as Vice President, the extent to which the President 
takes him into his confidence or shares with him the deliberations lead-
ing to executive decisions is to be determined largely by the President 
rather than by statute, practical necessity would seem to require not 
only that the procedure for determining who fills the Vice-Presidency 
when it becomes vacant be established by constitutional amendment 
but that the President be given an active role in the procedure what-
ever it be. 
Finally, as in the case of inability, the most persuasive argument 
in favor of amending the Constitution is the division of authority con-
cerning the authority of Congress to act on this subject. With this 
division in existence it would seem that any statute on the subject 
would be open to criticism and challenge at a time when absolute 
legitimacy was needed. 
ANALYSIS 
jnability 
The proposal now being submitted is cast in the form of a con-
stitutional amendment for the reasons which have been outlined 
earlier. 
Article II, section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution is unclear on two 
important points. The first is whether the "office" of the President 
or the "powers an<l duties of the said office" dernl ve upon the Vice 
President in the event of Presidential inabilitv. The second is who 
has the authority to determine what inability Is, when it commences, 
and when it terminates. Senate Joint Resolution 1 resolves both 
questions. 
The first section would affirm the historical practice by which a 
Vice President has become President upon the death of the President, 
further extending the practice to the contingencies of resignation or 
removal from office. ·It separates the provisions relating to inability 
from tho~e relating to death, resignation, or removal, thereby elimi-
nating any ambiguity in the language of the present provision in 
article II, section t, ·clause 5. 
Sections 3, 4, and -5 embrace the procedures for determining the 
commencement and termination of Presidential inability. 
Section 3 lends constitutional authority to the practice that has 
heretofore been carried out by informal ugreemen ts between the 
President and the person next in the line of succession. It makes clear 
that the President may declare in writing his disability and that upon 
such ::i.n occurrence the Vice President becomes Acting President . 
~ 
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By establishing the title of Acting President the proposal makes 
clen.r that it is not the "office" but the "powers and duties of the 
office" that devolve on the Vice President and further clarifies the 
status of the Vice President during the period when he is dischar(J'in(J' 
the powers and duties of a disabled President. 0 0 
Section 4 is the first step, of two, that embraces the most difficult 
problem of inability-the factual determination of whether or not 
inability exists. Under this section, if a President does not declare 
that an inability exists, the Vice President, if satisfied that the Presi-
dent is dis!!.bled shall, with the written approval of a majority of the 
heads of the executive departments, assume the discharge of the 
powers and duties of the Office as Acting President upon the transmis-
sion of such declaration to the Congress. 
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to secure 
continuity in cases of inability must depend upon public opinion with 
a possession of a sense of "constitutional morality." Without such 
a feeling of responsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against 
usurpM.tlon. No mechanical or procedural solution will provide a 
complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases in which most of 
the parties are rogues and in which no popular sense of constitutional 
propriety exists. It seems necessary that an attitude be adopted that 
presumes we shall alwavs be dealing with "reasonable men" at the 
highest governmental level. The combination of the judgment of the 
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members appears to 
furnish the most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental 
eeks and balances between the executive, legislative, and ·judicial 
anches. It would enable prompt action by the persons closest to the 
resident, both politically and physically, and presumably most 
familiar with his condition. It is assumed that such decision would 
be w.ude 011ly afte1· udequuLe \;Of1:iulLa.Liou w-iLli medical a.-..pa:rts "ho 
were intricatelv familifir with the President's physical and mental 
con di ti on. • 
There are many distinguished advocates for a. specially constituted 
group in the nature of n. factfin<ling body to determine presidential 
inability rather than the Cabinet. However, such a group would face 
many dilemmas. If the President is so incapacitated that he cannot 
declare his own inability the factual determination of inability would 
be relatively simple. No need would exist for a special factfinding 
body. N" or is a factfinding body necessary if the President can and 
does <leclare his own inability. If, however, the President and those 
P.round him diner as to whether he does su.ff er from an inability which 
he is unwillin(J' to admit, then n. critical dispute exists. But this dis-
pute should n"'ot be determined by a special commission composed of 
pers0ns outside the executive branch. Such a commission runs a good 
chance of comin"' out with a split decision. What would be the effect, 
for example, if ~i commission of seven voted 4 to 3 that the Presi-
dent was fit and able to perform his Office? What power could he 
exert durincr the rest of his term when, by common knowledge, a 
chunge of o~e yote in the commission proceedings could yet deny him 
the right to exercise the powers of his Office? If the vote were the 
other way and the Yice President were installed as Acting President, 
what powers could he exert when everyone would know that one vote 
the other wu \" could cause his surrunu1T removal from the exercise 
of Prc.oidenti;l powers? If the man acting as President were placed 
; 
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in this a,.,,-kwnrd, completely untenable and impotent pos1t10n, the 
effect on dome-;tic affairs would be bad enough; the effect on the in-
ternational position of the United States might well be catastrophic. 
Ho,,·ever, in the interest of providing fie:-..ibility for the future, the 
amendment v.-ould authorize the Congress to designate a different body 
if this were deemed desirable in light of subsequent experience. 
Section 5 of the proposed amendment would permit the President 
to resume the powers and duties of the office upon his transmission 
to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives of his written declaration that no inability existed. How-
ever, should the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers 
of the executive departments feel that the President is unable, then 
they could prevent the President from resuming the powers and duties 
of the office by transmitting their written declaration so stating to the 
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Represent-
atives within 2 clays. Once the declaration of the President stating 
no inabilitv exists has been transmitted to the President of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, then the issue is 
squarely joined. At this point the pr~pos~l recommends that the 
Congress shall make the final determmat10n on the e:-..istence of 
inability. If the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of both 
Houses that the President is unable, then the Vice President continues 
as Acting President. However, should the Congress fail in any man-
ner to cast a vote of two-thirds or more i11 both Houses supporting the 
position that the President was unable to perform the powers and 
duties of his office, then the President would resume the powers and 
duties of the office. The recommendation for a vote of two-thirds 
is in conformity with the provision of article I, section 3, clause 6, of 
the Constitution relating to impeachments. 
This proposal achieves the goal of an immediate originn.l trnnsf er 
in Executive authority and the resumption of it in consonance both 
with the origiuul intent of the [rnmers of the Constitutio1:i itnd wiLh 
the balance of powers among the three branches of our Government 
which is the permanent strength of the Constitution. 
Vacancies 
Section 2 is intended to virtuallv assure us that the N n.tion will 
always possess a Vice President. "rt would require n. President to 
nominate a person \vho meets the existing constitutional qualifications 
to be Vice President whenever a vacancy occurred in that office. 
The nominee would take office as Vice President once he had been 
confirme<l by a mu.jority vote in both Huu::;es of the Congress. 
In considering this section of the proposal, it w11s obsernd that the 
office of the Vice President has become one of the most imoortant 
positions in our country. The days are long past when it was. largely 
honorary and of little importance, as has been previously pointed out. 
For more than u decade the Vice President has borne specific and 
important responsibilities in the execm.i,-e branch of Government. 
He has come to share and participate in the exe uti,·e functioning of 
our Government, so that in the event of tragedy, there would be 11P 
break in the informed exercise of executive authority. Ne,-er has 
this been more adequately exemplified than by the uninterrupted 
assumption of the Presidency by Lyndon B .. Johnson. · 
. ·' 
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It i;:; witltfJut contest that the procedure for the selection of a Vice 
President must contemplate the assurance of a person 'vho is com-
pat iblr wit Ii the President. The importance of this compatibility 
is rece>;;nized in the mo<lern pructice of both major politic1ll parties 
in according the presidential can<li<late a voice in choosing his running 
mute subject to convention approval. This proposal would permit 
the Presidcr1t to choose his Vice President subject to congressional 
nppron1l. In this way the country would be assured of a Vice Presi-
dent of the s;une politicn.l party ns the President, someone who would 
presumably i';ork in harmony with the basic policies of the President. 
CONCLUSION 
This amendment seeks to remove a vexatious constitutional prob-
lem from the re.1lm of national concern. It seeks to concisely clarify 
the ambiguities of the present provision in the Constitution. In so 
doillg. it rec<;gniY.es the vast importance of the office invoked, and the 
necessity to maintain continuity of the Executive power of the United 
States. 
The c:ommittee approved this proposal after its subcommittee heard 
testimony aud received written statements from many distinguished 
student:> on the subject. Last year the subcommittee also had the 
benefit of collsi<lerable study reflected in congressional doclllllen ts 
previuusly published on this subject. In the light of all this material 
and c\·idence, and for the fact that 7G Senators have sponsored Senate 
iint Resolution 1, the committee believes that a serious constitutional 
p exists with regard to Presi<lential inability and vacancies in the 
ffice of the Vice President, and that the proposal which is now 
presented is the best solution to the problem. 
REC0:-1:\IENDA TION 
The committee, after considering the several proposals now pending 
licforc it relating to the matter of Presidential inability, reports favor-
ablv (1!1 Senate .Joint Resolution 1 and recommends its submission to 
the' lezislatures of the several States of the United States so that it 
may i-;ecorne a part of the Constitution of the United States. 
CO:ID!ITTEE .-\:llE:C-·:D:IIENTS TO SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 1 SHOWING 
0:.11;,;sroxs, NEW :IIATTER AND RETAINED WORDING 
The committee amendments to the Senate joint resolution are shown 
as follows: ProYisions of the resolution as introduced which are 
omitted are enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, 
pro \·is ions iu which no change is proposed are shown in roman. 
"Article-
SEc. 1. In case of the removal of the President from 
uffice or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall 
l 1~co111e Prcsi<lent. 
:)Ee. 2. \Yhcnever there is 11 rncancv in the office of the 
\"ice hc:0idcnt 1 the Prcsi<lent shall nomlnftte a Vice President 
\: 
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who shall take office upon confirmn.tion by a majority vote 
of both Houses of Con;:i:ress. 
SEc. ~{. [If the Prcsi~lent <leclares in writing] lFhenever the 
President transmits to the Pres1'dent of the Senate and the 
Speaker oj the Hoitse of Representatives ·his 11.m'tten declaration 
that he is unable t8 discharge the powers and duties of his 
Office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the 
Vice President as Acting President. 
SEc. 4. [If the Presrdent does not so declare, and the] 
lVhenever the Vice President, ['Yith the written concurrence 
of] and t1 majority of the [heads] principal officers of the 
executive departments or such other body as Concrress may 
by law provide, transmit [s] to the [Congress ills]"" President 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the HCYUse of Representatives 
their written declaration that the President is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice Presi-
dent shall immediately assume the powers and duties of 
the office as Acting President. 
SEc. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the [Con-
gress] President of the Senate and the Speaker of the HO'use of 
Representatives his written declaration that no inability 
exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office 
unless the Vice President, \vith the written concurrence of a 
majority of the [heads] principal officers of the executive 
departments or such other body as Congress may by law 
provide, transmits within two days to the Congress his 
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge 
the powers n.nd duties of his office. Thereupon Congress 
[will] shall imm~diately proceed to decide the issue. If the 
Uoncrress determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses 
•1 •;::>Jl ~ ., J ••• 11 ' , •. 1 ,, , 
LWt.~ Lile rres1uenL is uuau1e Lu u1s1:uurge cue powei'~ auu 
duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to 
discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise the 
President shall resume the powers and duties of his office. 
. ·' 
• 
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF 
SEi\ATOR EVERETT :\IcKIXLEY DIRKSE:\" 
\\uen the Congress considers amendments to the Constitution, it 
deal:; not with the problems of today, or yesterday, or tomorrow, but 
in terms of tue grand sweep of our Nation's history and future. The 
Constitution is the basic chu.rter of our Government. It, is appro-
priate to keep its function separate from the various laws we derive 
from it, laws that are designed to meet specific problems as they may 
arise. The Constitution must meet the test of time. It can do this 
only if it provides the means by which the Congress may meet the 
neec.b of the moment, not the solution to specific problems. 
The questions of Presidential succession and Presidential inabilitv 
are not new to the Senate. It has been v.-restling with them for many 
years. Time and again it has tried its hand at contri \"i.ng an amend-
ment to the Constitution to deal with the problems. But each time 
when the Senute almost reaches a conclusion as to language for the 
amendment it becomes aware that its labors h:.1.ve been so narrowly 
irerted to the problems arising out of particular eYents that it hu-s 
iled to think and write in the broad fundamental concepts which are 
eressarv to a constitutional amendment. And then, because it 
realizes the clangers of a job half clone, it does nothing ut ull. 
Co11g:re:;s cannot go along that way any further. It must deal with 
Llie pruulern::. 0f I'i-t~si<leu tial successi8n ~!:!.d Presid.enfr:i 1 innbil i tv hv a 
constitutional amendment. It is necessary that the pertine1{t p-ro-
Yision of the Constitution dealing with i;acancy or inability, article 
II, section 1, that reads as follows: 
In case of the Rcmoni.l of the Pre::;i<lent from Office, or of 
his Death, Re:;ignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers 
and Dutie:; of the said Office, the ;)ame shall de·rnlve on the 
\"ice President, and the Con::rress may by law pro\-ide for the 
Case of Remo·n1l, Death, Hesig:nation or Inability, both of 
the Pre:-;ident and the Vice President. dec:laring \vhat 0£5.cer 
shall then act a::; Pre:;ident. and such Officer sh'RU act fl.ccorcl-
ing;l~-, until the Disability be remon<l, or a President shall 
he elected. 
he ;i.mcndecl to darifr whether the dernlution is of the Office of the 
Pre~iclent (ir only o( his po\vers and duties. Presumably it is the 
former in the ease of death or resicmation and the latter in c:1se of 
inalJilitY. Be that us it rnaY, it l;as been the uncertainty of con-
struction of thi:; bn;;uage that in the past has prevented Y'ice Presi-
dents from assuming autuority during foe periods of c1i:;ability of 
VtHiiHb Presidents. l\ext, it is essential that the Constitution prO\-ide 
n rnc:rns uf dc:din~ with the other matters ew:omp:1ssecl in ::3enate 
,Toit~'. Rl-.~fllnrion l. But the arnendrnent should not <led with cletaik 
Tltr>_,. ran be l1aa<llcd by statute ancl rif,:htly should lJe. 
17 
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This solution wa::; well bid out before this committee last Year nnd 2 
n'1u·::; a<::.·o hv the then Deputy Attorney General of the United States, 
\Ir. K;ttzcr1hach. His entire ::;t;i,tement in the 196'.3 hearings, in-
corpornted ag1tin in the 1964 he1uings, slioulJ be read by enryone who 
i~ considering this problem. Let me only emphu::;ize his concluding 
thou~hts: 
Apart from the \visdom of loading the Constitution down 
hy \\Titing detailed procedural and substantive provisions 
into it has been ques tionecl by many scholars and statesmen. 
The framers of the Constitution saw the wisdom of using 
broad and expanding concepts and principles that could be 
ndjusted to keep pace with current needs. The changes are 
that supplemental legislation would be required in any event. 
In addition, crucial and urgent new situations may arise 
in the changing future--not covered by Senate Joint Reso-
lution '.28 1-where it may be of importance that Congress, 
wi.th the President's approval, should be able to act promptlv 
without being required to resort to still another amend-
ment to the Constitution. Senate Joint Resolution 35 1 
make:; this possible; Senate Joint Resolution 28 1 cloes not. 
~ince it i::; difficult to fore::;ee all of the pos::;ible circum-
stances in which the Presidential inability problem could 
arise, we are oppo:;ed to any constitutional amendment 
which attempts to solve all these que:;tions by a series of 
complex procedures. YYe think that the best solution to 
the basic problems that remain \vould be a sin1ple consti-
tutional amendment, such as Senate Joint Re::;olution 35, 1 
which treats the con tingencY of inabilitv diff erentlv from 
situations such as death, removal, or resignation: ·which 
states that the Yice President in case of Presidential in-
nbilit>- succeeds only to the powers and ciutie:s uf Lue Office 
ns Acting President and not to the Office itself, and which 
deebres that the commencement and termination of nny 
inabilit:.- may be determined by such methods as Congress 
by law shall provide. ~uch an amendment would supply 
the flexibility which we think is indispensable and, at the 
same time, put to rest what legal problems may exist under 
the present provisions of the Constitution as supplemented 
by prnctice and understanding. 
:::en:Hc .foint Resolution 35, referred to by :.Ir. Katzenbach, now 
the c\..ttorne': General, ,tml modified in accordance ·.·.ith his suggestions 
reads as follows: ' ~ 
.Article--
111 c:tse of the rerr.ovnl of the President from office or of 
his cle,1th or resignution, the said office shall dernh-e on the 
\-ice Pre:;ident. in c:tse of the inubilitv of the President to 
<lisdwrgc the pmver:; and duties of th
0
e s«id office, the s:1icl 
powers and dutie::; shall <lernh-e on the \"ice President as 
c\..ctinz President until the inability be remcl\·ed. The Con-
g-re:;::; 'i11ay by bw pro,·ide for the C1l::ie of rcn10,·al, death, 
re:::i~ndion (Ir iwtbility, both of the Prc:;ident :cud Yice 
1 ~':'>~Ii Cvn;.:. 
I 
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l'rc,.;idcnl. dcclnrin'.2: wh:1L officer shall tlien be Pre::;ident, 
or in C<l:'C of in~ibllitY, <\Ct as Pre::;ident, ancl ~uch officer 
,.;\wll be <ir act 11:-: Pr~·.~idcnt acC<)rcling:ly, until a Prc,;ident 
shall be elected or. in c1ise of inabilitv, until the ina.bilitv 
sha.11 be c;ulier rern~ved. The commericernent and terrniw~­
tion of rrnv irrnbilitY m<tY be determined bv such method as 
Congreso; shall by l~w p1:0Yicle. -
19 
I, therefore. propose tlrnt we a.dopt us a constitutional amendment 
tlii:o proposal -which not only bears the imprimatur of the two <listin-
~ui,;hecl men who were then :\Iembers of the Senate, Senator Kefauver 
ancl Senator !\:ca.ting, but \\·hich wa.s so persua.sively supportecl by the 
Atturne,· General. He has confirmed to me that he still holds those 
,-ie\Ys. "And in his testimonv this vear he said onlv that he \Voulcl 
llCJt iusist on the preference t:e had expressed in the past. 
But such a constitutional amendment would be only the beginning. 
\Ye must then prepare specific legislation to establis!.i the mechanics 
an<l the detaib of Pre:oiclential succession and inabilitv. It coulcl he 
i11 much the sume bng-uage <ls that proposed by tlie Senator from 
Indiana for :c constitutio:ial amendment. 
This course of action has one ad\·antag:e above all others. It 
removes the fear that we may embed in the Constitution procedures 
which may not turn out to be workable. If they are in a statute we 
can change them. If they become u part of the Constitution, it 
would t<tkc allother constitutional amendment to chancre them . 
• 
Indeed the events of the pnst few dnys have created a'=' presumption 
n<l perhaps a C<Jnclusin~ presumption that a constitutional amend-
ment in the form reported will be ill a<l.-ised. fo te,;timony before 
the Committee on the .Tudiciur~- of the other body, the Attorney 
Ge11er:il ha,; ~-i,·i;>.n f1.1rthi:r indi<'.ntion of doubts he holds about the 
acle<1t1;tc\· of tiw Lrn'.?:ua~te of Senate .Joint Resolution 1. Is section 3 
per1i1iltu1g: the Prc;iclent to dechlre his inability if he transmit;; a 
declarntion in ·,niting tcJ the Scn11te and the House to be used when 
tlic Presiclen t is h:n·in~ a toot ft pulled·: Is it to he use<l when be is 
out nf the country on a .-isit to ~Ie::-.ico or to a ::\ATO meeting, or 
periiap,.; when lte is in the air at any time? If so, then we hu ve 
irnpo,;etl in t!te Constitution :t ve1'>· cumbersome procedure for him 
tu t1l!;:e ba<"k liis pcrn·ers <llHl Juties. \Ye have provided the same 
meclwnic,.; for an inabilit~· of a few minutes, or a few hours, as we 
lian• for long periocl,.; of illness. 
Tlien, to(). as hus been suggested by those who ha,-e studied Senate 
.ToinL Resohttion 1 in the form repc·ned hy the committee, there n.re 
mun.- thinC?:s \\·hich <He not con~red by the detailed lan'.!unze of this 
a:1!ei1dme11t which perh:i.ps shc1uld be c~were<l if we are going'into such 
detuil it1:;te:1d of ndnpting broad constitutiorrnl hnguu~e wliich can be 
applied li~- statHte to sit1tations as they may arise. If one of the pur-
JW;::es nl' tlte :unenclment is to provide to the greatest extent possible 
fur the llllin~ of the OHice ,if \"ice President. h<lVe we clone so? n·hat 
h:i p1w1i::; if t lie President is d i,.;1t bled for m·any mon tbs a :id t be Yice 
Fresiden t :;:::si:m es hi:; pcrn·ero; an cl d ll ties as Acting Pre;.;iden t '? C:rn 
lie :1p:ioint :l \"ice Pre~i,_lcnt. or must th;1t Ofli.ce rem:tin empty? 
Sure!\· tlH·re is ;ts 111L:<'~l d1a11ce that sume ill lll<LY hef.tll the rnnrt.11 
\'\1111 l.3 j.<·tifl~ l'rr~side11t due tu the clis,1bility ot' the i'resiJent <lS there 
I 
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would he if he succeeded to the Presidency upon the death of the 
President. By moving into this area \vith a constitutional amend-
ment contflining such specifics dealing with the one case we may have 
foreclosed ourselves from dealing by statute ,.,-ith other parts of the 
proLlem. On the other hand the broader language of Senate Joint 
Resolution ;),j, 88th Congress, would permit us to deal with this whole 
problem by statute. 
An<l, let us never forget, that it is often argued that been.use situa-
tions of great >ariety and complexity may arise at any time in the 
conduct of our foreign relations and in the administration of the laws 
which we pass, we ~hould not too tightly or too rigidly control the 
exercise of discretion by those who must deal with the problems. But 
by writing such specifics into the Constitution as are proposed by 
Senate Joint Resolution 1 as reported, \Ve are even more tightly and 
more rigidly binding ourselves in dealing with the details of problems I 
of Presidential succession and inability. I 
We should certainlv heed the wisdom of the Attornev General when ~ 
he testified on the merits of the various proposals last year and the year 
before. And ,,-e should give thought to the implications of all the 
assumptions the Attorney General felt constrained to make when he 
testified this year. Let us see \vhat he said: 
First, J assume that in using the phrase "majority vote of 
both Houses of Congress" in section 2, and "two-thirds vote 
of both Houses" in section 5, what is meant is a majority and 
two-thirds Yote, respectively, of those Members in each House 
present and Yo ting, a quorum being present. This interpre-
tation would be consistent with longstanding precedent (see, 
e.g., iJii~su11ri Pac. R?J. Co. -..-. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919)). 
Second, I assume that the procedure established by section 
5 for rcstorinz the President to the powers and duties of his 
office is applicable only to instances where the .!:'resident Las 
been <leclare<l disabled without his consent, as provided in 
section 4; and that, where the President lrns voluntarilv 
declared himself unn.ble to act, in n.ccorcl:.mce with the proce-
dure established bv section 3. he could restore himself innne-
din.tely to the po\\;ers and dt~ties of his office hy declaring in 
writing that his inability has ended. The subcommittee mav 
,,-id1 to co1:sider \vhether language to insure this interpreta-
tion should be added to section 3. 
Third, I as:0ume that eYen where disability was established 
originally pursuant to section 4, the President could resume 
the powers and duties of his Office immediately with the 
concurreHce of the Acting Pre::iident, and would not be 
obliged t1J await the expiration of the 2-day period 
mentinne<l in section 5. 
Fourth, I a::;sume that transmission to the Congress of the 
written (~eclarations referred to in section 5 would, if Congress 
were not then in session, operute to conYene the Congress in 
special se;;;;iou so that the mutter could be immediately 
resohed. In this regard, section ;) might be construed as 
irnpli(•dly requiring the Acting President to conYene a special 
scs:::iu11 in order to ruise an issue n.s to the Pre::;ident's inabilitv 
pursuant to section 5. " 
I 
.1 
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Further in this connection. I a;;sume tlrnt the language used 
i11 5ection 5 to the effect that Congress "will immediatelv 
decide" the issue means that if a decision were not reached 
bv the Congress immediately, the powers and duties of the 
Office would renrt to the President. This construction is 
rnfficiently doubtful, howeyer, and the term "immediately" 
is sufficientlv n.gue, that tile subcommittee may wish to 
consider adcling certainty by including more precise language 
in section :j or hy taking action looking toward the making 
of a.ppropriate provision in the rules of the House and Senate. 
In my testimony during the hearings of 1963, I expressed 
the view that the specific procedures for determining the 
commencement and termination of the President's inability 
should not be written into the Constitution, but instead 
should be left to Congress so that the Constitution would 
not be encumbered by detail. 
21 
The fact that we give heed and thought to these suggestions does 
not mean that we do nothing about the problem of presidential 
succession n.ud disability. Indeed, we must do something. Let us 
do it with the sweep of history in our mind and pen rather than the 
shackles of specifics. 
EVERETT ::\IcfuxLEY DIRKSE~. 
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Agrrcments cle\ised by the Prl'siden t and his Yice Pre':iiden t in pa:;t 
ad111ini::>trations to cope with nn inability crisi:; are not satisfactory 
wl11tio11::;. Recent historv has also made us ven· much awt:.re of the 
ncPd for filling the Office· of Yice Pre:;iclen t when a "'VU8anc1; arises. 
It i::; abundantly clear tlrnt, rather than continue these informal 
agreements, the only sound approach is the adoption of a con::;titu-
t io 11al arnenclrn ent. 
The hearings, which have been held on this important ::;ubject in 
recent. yeurs and in which this Senator has had the opportunity to 
p11rticipate, have led me t0 prefer a different approach than the 
present one. As in other legislative matters, the finished product 
requires the refinement of indi\i<luul prefereP..ces. In the spirit of 
thi:-1 simple reality, I shall support the proposed amendment. It is 
my earnest. hope that the Congress and the State legislatures will 
approve und ratify it promptly. There is, howe\'er, one amendment 
which I would urge, as discussed at a later point. 
There are two major reasons for my acceptance cf the proposed 
amendment. 
The first is the urgent need for a solution. Differences of opinion 
in Congress have <leprfred us of a solution for for too long. It is 
time that these constitutional shortcomings be met. 
Secondly, the proposed lan~uage approaches the product which 
would have resulted under the proposal which I had urged, so tb.at 
thi.~ amendment is acceptable. 
N evertheles:-;;; it, is in order to stn.te the \Jases of my earlier µrel'er-
ence anll the preference of three Attorneys General. 
The proposed amendment would <li::;tinguish the inability situation 
from the three other contingencies of permanent nature; death, resig-
nation, uncl removal frum office, and would recognize that, in the first 
instunee, the Yice President becomes Acting President only. 
At this point, we encoun tcr the first major difference of opinion. 
Some would nth·ocate spelling out the procedure for determining 
innhility within the language of the proposed amendment. 1 dis-
agree ''ith the method of locking into the Constitution those pro-
cedure,; deemed appropriate today but which, in the li~ht of greater 
knowledge and experience may he found wanting tomorrow. 
Tlie preferred eourse would be for the amendment to authorize the 
Coti.'2:ress to est:!blish an appropriate procedure by bw. This practice 
parallels the situation of Presidential succe::;sion, \Vherein the power is 
delineated by the Constitution but the detail is left for Liter deter-
minution. 
l would abo add one fundamental limitation to the process. 
I refer to the doctrine of sep<trution of powers. The m;tintenancc 
of the three distinct brnnches of Go,·ernment, eoequ:tl in character, 
lrn.'i long hee11 <lcceptecl as one _of tile most important s.1fe~uar<ls for 
the prc;;etT•ttior1 of the H.epublic. 
l 
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Tlic exeeuti\·e brnurh should cleti>rmine the presence of and termina-
tion vf the i1rnhility of the Pre:0ident. It i:0 my view tliitt u method 
which would involrn neither the judicial nor the leo·islatin' Lrn.nch of 
the Gcfferrnnent would be the better course. "' 
Thi> dcterrninn,tion of Presidenti,11 inahilitv and its termination is 
oh,·ioush- ft factu«l matter. Ko policv i:0 "inrnlw<l. TLe issue is 
simply \\:hether a specific indi,·ichwl with certain physicn.l, mental, or 
emotional impairments possesses the ability to continue as the Chief 
Executi\·e or whether hi:; infirmitv is so serious and :;e,·ere as to render 
him incupuble of executing the cli1ties of his Office. 
Injecting Congress into the factual question of inability does create 
a secondary impen.chment procedure, although limited, in which the 
conduct of the Pre:0iclent would not be the test. 
The impeachment trial of President .Andrew Johnson affords a 
clear illustration of the dangers presented when Congress performs u 
j udiciul function. The intrigue and interplay within the Congress 
during the impeachment trial serves as a warni.ng of dear and present 
dangers which exist when Congress is called upon to consider where to 
place the mantle of the presidential powers. 
An additional compelling argument for restricting this authority 
to the executive branch is that this determination must be made \vith 
a minimum of delay. Although this objection has been alle\iated in 
the present language, the executiv~ bruf!-ch is clearly best equipped to 
respond promptly as well as effectively m the face of such a crisis . 
• 
Obviously, such a decision must rest on the relevant and reliable 
ts regardin~ the President's physical or mental faculties. It must 
di»orced from any thoughts of political advantage, personal 
prejudice, or other extraneous factors. Those possessing such firsthand 
infornution about the Chief Execnt.ive, or most accessible to it on a 
pcrscn~l basi::i, are founu wilhiu the e.\.ecutive 1Jruuch aml uoL ebe-
where. 
We must be mindful that the President is chosen by the people 
of the entire ?\ation. It is their wish :rnd their riczht thnt he sen·e 
as President for the term for which he was chosen. EHrT sen~ible and 
sympathetic construction favoring his continued performance of 
presidential duties should be accorded him. Indeed, were error to 
be committed, it should be in Ln·or of his continuation in office or, 
were it interrupted by a di:3ability, by hi:0 resumption of the office at 
the earliest possible moment upon recoyery. The members of the 
executi\·e branch are best situated to protect that interest. 
\Ylt,~t briefly has heen developed is the basis of my \iew tlrn.t 
Congress should not be injected into the clecisionmaking proces:; in 
C<lSe;; (Jf presiclenti:d inability or recoYery. 
Consiclerahle reference hits been made in the discussion of Senate 
Joint Resolution 1 to the 7G cosp(Jnsors of the proposed resolution. 
Cusponsl)rship of a pmp(Jsal does not rne:m acceptunce of det11il and 
the exc<ct. text. I am certnin th11t Ct)Spunsors do not consider them-
sdves hnund li)- a proposal ns introducecl. Cosponsorship does not 
in die ate a desire to proceed \\-i thout !ten rings, delihPra ti on. <lllli amend-
ments in committee us well :1s on the floor of the Senate. Refine-
ments 111;1dc 1i-_· the committee on this rne,1sure illustr,tte tlwt \\·hether 
:i prnp(1::;,ll Jins a si11g:le sponsor or 99 cosp<•nsors, it must be ex.tmined 
in !~eLiil before it is co11siderccl by the '.:ien:tte v:itli a ,-ie\\- r0 elwnge 
t"""'"ln>enl ,,,. ,uh,lilntion. 
. ·' 
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The refinements that luwe been made on the original lano-ua()'e of 
Senate Joint Resolution 1 v.-ill chi.rify the detailed procedu~e t;-; be 
followed in a case of disability. 
The role of Congress is n:U'r·ow. It is us an apperrl open to the 
President from the decision of the Vice President and the members 
of the Cabinet. It \Vill be brought into the matter only in those 
limited circumstances where the Vice President, wi.th a majority of 
the principal officers of the executive departments, and the President 
disagree on the question of inability. It is important to note that 
Congress will not have the power to initiate a challenge of the Presi-
dent's ability. 
The procedure by which Congress shall act is properly left to later 
determination within rules of each branch thereof. A point of possible 
conflict is resolved in the understanding that Congress shall act as 
separate bodies and within their respective rules. 
The language that "* * * Congress shall immediately proceed to 
decide the issue" leaves to Congress the determination of \Vhat, in 
li()'ht of the circumstances then existing, must be examined in decidin()' 
the issue. Thus, the matter will be examined on the evi.dence avail~ 
able. It is desirable that the matter be examined with a sympathetic 
eye toward the President who, after all, is the choice of the electorate. 
It is apparent that Senate Joint Resolution 1 does have aspects 
which allevi.ate the dangers attendant to a crisis in presidential 
inability. Nevertheless, it is felt by this member of the committee 
that caution and restraint will be demanded should this inability 
measure be called into application. 
A time does arrive, however, when we must fill the vacuum. The 
points which I have emphasized and previ.ously insisted upon are 
important; but havi.ng a solution at this point is more than important, 
it is urgent. For thi~ reason, I support Senate Joint Resolution 1 
and urge its passage. I hope that it will be given expeditious approval 
h 1 t.. L 1 1 l ,•r- ,• 1 .1 • 1 1 r v}' tne Otue"l uO(tJ il.ilU t:any l"ll.LlliCil.LlUil Oy Lile reqwreu llUWOer 01 
States. 
PROPOSED AMEND~IENT 
Section 5 gi,·es the majority of the Cabinet and the Vice President 
only 2 days in which to challenge the President's declaration that his 
inabilitv has terminated. 
This 1s not enough time considering the gravi.ty of the situation and 
the circumstances which might exist. · 
In the discharge of their duties, members of the Cabinet often travel 
wi<lelv. There are also long periods of time in which thev ma\· not 
have ·had an opportunity to observe and vi.sit with the Presl.dent. so as 
to judze whether he has recovered sufficiently to resume hi.B duties. 
Such periods of inaccessibility might even be longer, in the event of the 
President's illness. 
The '.2-clay period should be extended to properly allow for these 
factors. I urge amendment of this point to pro>ide additional time. 
Ro:-.rAx L. HRUSKA. 
0 
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PRESIDENTIAL I~ ABILITY AND V .ACANCIES IN THE 
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDEXT 
M.u:cH 24, 1965.-Referred-to the House C:i.lendar sncl ordered to be printed 
1fr. :McCULLOCH, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted 
the following 
REPORT 
[To accompany H.J. Res. l] 
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the joint 
resolution (H.J. Res. 1) proposing an amendment to the Constitution 
of the United Stn.tes relatmg to succession to the Presidency and 
Vice-Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to dis-
charge the powers and duties of bis office, having considered the same, 
report fo:rnr,1.bly thereon with an amendment e.nd recommend that 
the joint resolution do pass. 
The nmendment is as follows:· · 
Strike all after the enacting_ clause and insert in lieu thereof the 
following: 
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution 
of the united States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of 
the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several 
States nit.bin seven ye.:i.rs from the date of its submission by the Congress: 
"Article -
"~EcTJON 1. In case of the removal of the Pre;;ident from office or of his death 
or re~:i:;n::ition, the Yice President shall become President. 
"SF.c. 2. '";"henevcr there is a \"acruJcy in the office of the Vice President, the 
Prcsic!cn t sh::ill no!nir.ate a Yice President v.·ho shall take office upon confirmation 
by ::i majority vote of both Houses of Congress. · 
"Si:c. 3. '\Vbenever the Presid~ot transmits to the President pro tempore of 
the Sen:i.te anci the Speaker of the House of Representatives his v.Titten declara-
tion tlJ.:J.t he is uo:i.ble to dischar;e the power;;; and duties of his office, and until 
he trar:~mits a written decl:i.ration to the contrary, such powers and duties slui.ll 
be discharged by the Vice President as Actiilg Pre:;ident. 
"Si:c. 4. WheneYcr the Vice President :rnd a majority of the principal officers 
of the e~:ccutive departments, or such other bo•Jy as Congress may by law pro-
\·ide, trJ.nsmit to the President pro tcmpore of the Senate and the $peaker of 
the House of P.cpresent:i.tiYes their writtt.:!n drclaration that the President is 
un~ble to di~charge the po..,·ers and cluties of hi3 office, the Vice Pre:;ident shall 
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.. 
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"There:ifter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Reprcsentath"es his written declara-
tion that no inability exists, he shnll resume the powers and duties of his office 
unle~s the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive 
departments, or such other body as Congre:ss may by law proYide, transmit within 
two days to the Pn:;iident pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
Hou:;e of Representatives their written decl:lrntion that the President is unable 
to disch!ll'ge the po~vers aod duties of his office. Thereupon Congress ~hall decide 
the issue, immediately assembling for that purpose it not in seosion. I! the Con-
wrss, within ten days after the receipt of the written declaration of the Vice 
Prcsidt:nt and a majority of the principal officers of the e:o1:ecutive departments, 
or such other body as Congress may by law provide, detennioes by two-thirds 
vote of both Hou.ses that the President is unable to dischar:;;e the powers and 
duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to di:;cnarge the same as 
Acting Presirleut; otherwise the President shall resume the powers and duties 
of bis office." 
PURPOSE OF THE.AMENDMENT 
The principal purpose of the amendment is to distinguish between 
inability voluntaril;Y declared by the President himself and ino.bility 
declared without his consent. In the former case, the President can 
resume his duties by making a simple declaration that the inability has 
ceased; in the latter, the measure pro\·ides procedures for promptly 
determining the presence or absence of inability '""hen that issue is 
present. 
The amendment makes no chancres in sections 1 and 2 of the consti-
tutional amendment proposed by 'Rouse Joint Resolution 1 as intro-
duced; it does make changes ip. sections 3 and 4 and it eliminates 
section 5 by merging the substance of that section with that of 
section 4. 
The changes made by the amendment in section 3 clarify- the 
procedw·e o.nd clarify the consequences when the President hrmself 
declares his inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office. 
There are two: First, the amendment indicates the officio.ls to whom 
the President's written declaration of inability shn.ll be transmitted, 
namely the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives. The committee deemed it desiro.ble 
to add this specification which wns absent from the joint resolution as 
introduced. Second, the amendment makes clear that, in co.se of 
such voluntary self-disqualification by the President, the President's 
subsequent transmittal to the same officials of a written declaration 
to the contrary, i.e., a 'vritten declaration that no inability e.-ci.sts, 
terminates the Vice President's exercise of the Presidential powers 
and duties, and that the President shall thereupon resume them. 
In short, it is the intent of the committee that >oluntary self-dis-
qualification by the President shall be terminated hv the President's 
own declaration that no inability exists, without further ado. To 
·permit the Vice Presid.ent ai:id the Cabinet. to cbRllenge such _!ill 
assertion of recovery might discourn~e a President from voluntarily 
relinquishing his powers in cnse of illness. The right of challenge 
would be resen·ed for cases in "'hich the Vice President and Cabinet, 
without the President's consent, had found him unRble to discharge 
his powers nncl duties. 
Sections 4 and 5 of the amendment proposed by House Joint Reso-
lution 1, n.s introduced, dealt resl'ectively with the de>olution upon 
the Vice President, as Actin~ President, of the President's powers and 
•• 
• 
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY 3 
dnties pnrsunnt to n dednrntion of his innbility mnde by the Vice 
Presi<lent nnd other officials, nnd mth the procedure upon subsequent 
declarn lion by the President thnt no inllbility exists. 
The amendment places the substnnce of former section 5 into section 
4, in order to emphasize the commiLtee's intent thnt the procedure 
prav'i<lt>d by former section 5 relates only to cnses in which Presidential 
mnbility hn.s Leen <lechred by others thun the President. Two i<lenti-
cnl chnnges n.re made in former sections 4 and 5. First, the term 
" rincioRl officers of the executive de 11rtments" is substituted for the 
term ' en so e executive e 11r o ma e it c earer t n.t o 
a ID et rnn - s oul art1c1 a em e ec s10n e.s ow e er 
re:::1~.ent1a ma i v _· c:: The su stitu ec nngunge ollows more 
closely a.rttc e II, section 2, of the Constitution, which provides that 
t.he President mu.y reqci,re the opinion in light "of the principal officers 
in ench of the executive departments * • *." The intent of the com-
mittee is that the Presidential appointees\yho direct th 10 execut1' 
ep::i.nmen name in 5 v artment 
n s n , wou part1 -pa e, w1 . e 'ice res1 en , m aeter-
mmmg ma'6ility. · In case of the death, resignation, nbseoce, or sick-
ness of the beRd of any executive department, the acting head of the 
depa.rtment would be authorized to participate in a pr~sidentia.l 
innLility determination. : 
The second change made in former sections 4 nnd 5 is to sJ>_ecify 
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House 
of Rcpresentntives ns the congressionnl officials to whom declaration 
concerning Presidential inability shall be transmitted, as is done in 
section 3. 
TLe language of former section 5 of Hou.;e Joint Resolution 1 is 
furthe1· amended to make clear that if Congress is not in session a.t 
the time of receipt by the President pro tempore of the Senate a.nd 
the Spe:i.ker of the House of Representatives of a written declaration 
by the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the 
executive departments contradicting n. Presidential declaration tha.t 
no inability exists, Congress shall immediately assemble for the pur-
pose of deciding: the i55ue. Fionlly, the langun.ge of former section 5 
is further nmeoded by providing thnt in such event the President shall 
resu:ne the powers and duties of his office unless the Congress within 
10 d:::.ys after receipt o{ such declarntion of Presidential inability de-
determines by two-thirds vote of bot.h Houses that the President is in 
fact unable to discharge the powers n.nd duties of bis office. 
The corrunittee deems it essential in the interest of stability of 
go\·ernment to limit to t.he smn.llest possible period the time during 
which the >itnl issue of the executive power can remain in doubt_ 
Under the bill, following n Presidential declaration that the disability 
preYiomly declared by others no longer exists, a challenge to such 
dcd.iration must be ma.de within 2 days of its receipt by the heads of 
the Houses of Congress and must be finully determined within the 
follomn.~, 10 days. 9tber-ITT.se the Presi~ent, having_d~clared himself 
nble, Will re.sume bis powers. an~ ~uties. An u~lun1ted pO\ver in 
Con::,-rcss might uffor~ nn irre;;1s~ible temptation to temporize 
with respect to restoring the President's powers. In this highly 
char:;c<l area there is no room for cquh-ocntion or delay. 
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ST.\TE:\IEXT 
For ils report herein the committee adopts in substn.ntin.l measure 
the report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to nccompnny 
Senate Joint Re.solution 1, namely, Senate Report ~o. 66, 8!}th Con-
gress, 1st session: 
The constitutional provisions 
The Constitution of the United Stn.tes, in article II, section 1, 
clause 5, contains provisions relating to the continuity of the Executive 
power s.t times of deR.th, resignation, innbility, or removal of a Presi-
dent. No replacement prov-ision is made in the Constitution where a 
vncimcy occurs in the office of the Vice President. _.Uticle II, section 
1, clause 5, reads as _follows: 
In Case of the Remova.i of the President. from Office, or 
at bis Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the · 
PO\vers nod Duties of the said Office, the SA.me shall devolve 
on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide 
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation, or Inability r 
both of the President and Vice President; decl11ring what 
Officer shill then a.ct as President, nnd such Officer shall net 
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President 
shall be elected. . 
This is the language of the Constitution as it was adopted by the 
Constitutiona.l Convention upon recommendation of the Committee 
on Style. When this portion of the Constitution was submitted to 
that Committee it read as follows: · 
In cn.se of his (the President's)· removal as aforesaid, 
dee.th, absence, resignation, or inability to discharge the 
powers of duties of his office, the Vice President shall exer-
cise those powers and duties until another President be 
chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed. 
The Legislature may decbre by law what officer of the 
United States shall act as President, in case of the des.th, 
resicna.tion, or disability of the President and Vice President; 
anl' such officer shall act accordingly, until such disability 
be remo>ed, or a President shall be elected. 
\Vhile the Committee on Style was given no authority to change 
the substance of prior determinations of the Convention, it is clear 
that this portion of the draft which that Committee ultimately 
submitted \Vas a. considerable alteration of the proposal which the 
Committee bud received. 
The inability clause and the Tyler precedent . 
. The records of the Constitutional Convention do not contain :my 
explicit interpreto.tion of the provisions as they relate to inability. 
As a m:.i.tter of foct, the records of the Convention conto.in only one 
appn.rent reference to the aspects of this clo.use which deal with the 
question of clis::i.bility. It was 1\fr. John Dickinson, of Del::i.wn.re, who, 
on August '27, 1787, nsked: 
Wbnt is the extent of the term "disability" o.nd who is to be 
the judge of it? (Farrand, "Records of the Constitutional 
Con,·ention of 1787," vol. 2, p. 427.) 
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The question is not nnswered so fu1· as the records of the Con'\'ention 
disclose. 
It '\\n.s not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution wns called 
into question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingencies. 
In that yenr President William Henry Ha.rrison died, 1md Yice Presi-
dent John T·der faced the determina.tion as to whether, under this 
proYis!on of the Constitution, he must ser~e ns ActinO' Presicent or 
whether he becnme the President of the 'United States. '\tice President 
Tyler ga. ,.e answer by taking the on th n.s President of the United States. 
While this e~oked some protest nt the time, noticeably that of Sens.tor 
Willi.11n Allen, of Ohio, the Vice President (Tyler) was b.ter recognized 
by both Houses of Congress as President of the United States (Con-
gressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol.· 10, pp. 3-5, May 31-
Jnne 1, 1841). 
This precedent of John Tyler has since been confirmed on seven 
occasions when Yice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency of 
the United States by virtue of the death of the incumbent President. 
Vice Presidents Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roo.se\o·elt, 
Coolidge, Truman, and Lyndon Johnson nll became President in this 
manner. 
The acts of these Vice Presidents, and the acquiescence in, or 
confirmation of, their acts by Congress have serred to establish a 
precedent that, in one of the contingencies under article II, section 1, 
cln.use 5, that of death, the Vice President becomes President of the 
United States. . 
· The clause \vhich I?rovicles for succession in cnse of death also 
applies to succession m case of resignation, removal from office. or 
inability. In all four contingencies, the Constitution states: "the 
same shall devolve on the Vice President." • 
Thus it is said that whatever deYolves upon the Yice President 
upon death of the President, likewise devokes upon him by reason of 
the resignntion, inability, or removal from office of the President. 
(Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability," North .American Re·dew, 
vol. 133, p. 442 (1919).) 
The Tyler precedent, therefore, has serred to cause doubt on the 
abilitv of an incapacitated President to resume the functions of his 
office· upon recovery. Professor Dwight, who later beeame president 
oi Yale Uninrsity, found further basis for this argument in the fe.ct 
that the Constitution, while causing either the office, or the power and 
dntie,;; of the office, to "devolve" upon the Vice President, is silent on 
the return of the office or its functions to the President upon reco,·ery. 
\lbere both the President and Vice President are incapable of serring, 
t.be Constitution grn.nts Con~ess the power to declare what officer 
sbP..11 act 21s President "until tne disabilitv is removed." 
These consiclerntions apparently moved persons such as ,;Danii:J 
"IT' ebster, \Vho was Secretn.ry of State when Tyler took office as PreSJ.-
dent, to <lecbre that the powers of the ofilce a.re inseparable from the 
office itself and that a recovered President could not displace a "\''ice 
Pn·sident "Who had assumed the prerognti.-es of the Presidency. This 
internretntion gains support by implication from the language of 
artide I, section 3, cll:!.use 5, of the Constitution which pro>i<les that: 
The Senn t e sb!!.ll clrnse their other Officers, nr.d also a 
President pro tempore, in the nbsence of the Vice President, 
or when he sb!lll exercise the office of President of the United 
Stutes. [Italic supplied.] · 
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The doubt engendered by precedent wn.s so strong that on two 
occasions in the history of the United Stutes it hu.s contributed materi-
nlly to the failure of Vice Presidents to assume the office of President at 
a time when a President wus disabled. The first of these occasions 
arose in 1881 when President Garfield fell victim of nn n.ssa.ssin's 
bulle.t. President Garfield lingered for some SO days dwin~ which he 
performed but one official net, the signing of an e:ll.-tradit1on paper. 
There is little doubt but that there were pressing issues before the 
e:xecuti>e department 11.t that time \Vbich requll-ed the n.ttention of a 
Chief Executive. Commissions were to be issued to officers of the 
United Stn.tes. The foreign relntions of this Nation required n.ttention. 
There was evidenc~ of mail frnuds involving officialS of the Federal 
Go,ernment. Yet only such business ns could be disposed of by the 
heads of Go,·ernment deJ?artments, without Presidential supervision, 
was handled. Vice President Arthur did not act. Respected legal 
<?Pinion of the dny was divided upon the ability of the President to 
resume the duties of his office should he recover. (See opinions of 
Lyman Trumbull, Judge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler, and Prof. 
Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North .American Review," 
vol. 133, pp. 417-446 (1881).) 
The division of legal authority on this que:;tion n.pparently extended 
to the Cabinet, for newspapers of that dayJ ·not.ably the New York 
Hern.Id, the New York Tribune, and the N e\v York Times contain 
accountS stating that the Cabinet considered the question of the 
advisability of the Vice President n.cting during the period of the 
President's incapncity. Four of the seven Cabinet members were 
said to be of the opinion thn.t there coul~ be no temporary deyolution 
of Pre::;idcntial power on the Vice President. This group reportedly 
includeJ the then Attorney General of the United States, 1-fr. Ws.YJ?.e 
1fac Veagh. All of Garfield's Cabinet \vere of the Yiew that it would 
be desirable. for the Vice President to a.ct but since they could not 
agree upon the ability of the President to resume his office upon 
recovery, and because the President's condition pre'\"ented them from 
presenting the issue to him directly the matter was dropped. 
It was not until President Woodrow Wilson suffered a severe stroke 
in 1919 that the matter became one of pressing urgency again. This. 
damage to President Wilson's health came at a time ''hen the struggle 
concerning the position of the United Stntes in the League of Nations 
\\S.s at its height. Major matters of foreign policy such a.s the Shan- -
tung Settlement were unresolved. The British -~bassador spent 
4 months in Washington without being received by the President. 
T'rnnty-eight acts of Congress became law without the President's 
!:ignature (Lindsay Rogers, "Presidential Inability, the Review," .. 
~·fay s, rn20; reprinted in 1958 hearings before Senate Subcommittee 
on Constitutional Amendments, pp. 232-235). The President's 
,nfe and a group of \Vhite House associates ncted as a screening 
bonr<l on decisions which could be submitted to the President 'vithout 
irupuirment of his health. (See Edith Bolling Wilson, "~1y ?\Iemoirs," 
pp. 2SS-290; Hoover, "Forty-two Years in the \\llite House," pp. 
105-106; Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 437-438.) 
A.s in lSSl, the Cabinet considered the n.clnsability of asking the 
Vice President to act as Pre.sident. This time, there wn.s considerable 
opposition to the adoption of such procedure on the part of assistants 
to the Pre.sident. It has been reported by a Presidential secretary 
v. 
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of tbnt day that he reproached the Secretary of State for suggesting 
such I\ possibility (Joseph P. Tumulty, "Woodro\v Wilson as 1 Know 
Him," pp. 443-444). Upon the President's ultimate reconry, the 
President ca.used the <lispla.cement of the Secretary of Stn.te for 
rensous of allege<l disloyalty to the President (Tumulty, "W'oodrow 
"-ilson ns I Know Him," pp. 444-445). 
On three occnsions durinu the Eisenho,ver ndm.inistrn.tion, incidents· 
involving the physic::i.l health of the President ser>ed to focus attention 
on the inability clause. · 
President Eisenhower becnme concerned about the gap in the. 
Constitution relati>e to Presidential inability, n.nd he attempted to 
reduce the haznrds by means of an informs.I agreement with Vice 
President Ni....:on. The agreement provided: ' 
1. In the event of inability the President would, if J>Ossible, 
so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President wowd serve 
ns Actin~ President, exercisin~ the powers and duties of the 
office until the inability had enoed. . 
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the· 
President from so communicating with the Vice President, the 
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him a.ppro-
priu.te under the circumstances, would decide upon the devolu-
tion of the powers and duties of the office and would serve as 
Acting Presi<lent until the inability had ended. 
3. The President, in either event, would determine when the 
inability bo.d ended and at that time would resume the full 
exerci:;e of the powers and duties of the office. . 
P1·esident Kennedy entered into a similar ugreement with Vice. 
President Johnson as <lid President Johnson with Speaker John· 
11cCorrunck and Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Such informal 
agreements cn.nnot be consiclered an adequate solution to the problem 
been.use: (A) Their operation ''ould cliff er according to the relation~ 
ship between the particular holders of the offices; (B) a. private 
n;;reement cannot gi>e the Vice President clear authority to dis-
churge pO\vers conferred on the President by the Constitution, 
treaties, or statutes; (C) no provision is made for the situation in 
~·bich a dispute exists over whet.her or not the President is disabled. 
Former Attorneys General Brownell and Ro~ers as well as Attorney 
General Kennedy agree tha.t the only definit.i>e method t-0 settle the 
problem is by means of a. constitutional amendment. · . -
THE ~EED FOR CH.'\NGE 
The historical review of the interpretation of article II, section l; 
clause 5, sug;;ests the difficulties which it hns already presented. 
The lungnn...,.e of the clause is unclear, its application uncertain. The' 
cl;rn::;e coupfes the contingencies of a. permanent nature such as des.th, 
reEignn.tion, or removnl from office, with inability, a contingency 
whi<'h may be temporary. It does not clell.rly commit the determi-
n11tion of inability to any individual or group, nor does it define 
innLility so that the existence of such n. status may be open and 
notorious. It leaves uncertain the capacity in which the Vice Presi_. 
<lent acts during n. period of inn.bility of the President. It fails to 
<lcfine the period during which the Vice President serves.· It doe$ 
not specify that a recovered President mo.y regain the prerogatives 
(:. 
8 PRESIDENTL.\L L'>ABILITY 
of his office if he hos relinquished them. It foils to provide any 
mechanism for determining whether n. Pre$i<lent hns in fact recovered 
from his inubility, nor does it indicate how n. President, who sourht to 
recover his prerogatives while still di.sabled, might be preYented from 
doing so. 
The resolution of these issues is imperu.tive if continuity of E::ecu-
tive power is to be presernd with a minimum of turbulence nt times 
when a. President is disabled. Continuity of Executive authority is 
more important today thau e\·er before. TLe concern which hns been 
manifested on previous or.ca.sions when n. President WilS disabled, is 
increased when the disability problem is weighed in the light of the 
increased importance of the Office of the Presidency to the United 
States and to the world. 
This increased concern hns in turn manifested o.n inteu.si.fied exnmi-
nation of the adequacy of the provisions relating to the orderly tra.n:;(er 
of the functions of the Presidency. Such an examination is not 
renssurin~. The constitutional provision has not been utilized been.use 
its procectures hnve not been clear. After 175 yenrs o( experience 
with the Constitution the inability clause remains an untested pro 
vision of uncertain a.pplicntion. 
:METHOD OF CH...\;:-:GE 
In previous inst~nces ~n history when this question has a.risen, one 
of the mnjor cons1dern.t1ons bas been ''bether Congress could con-
stitutionally proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether 
an enablin~ constitutional nmendment would be necessary. As early 
as 1920, wnen the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Rep-
resentatives, 66th Congress, 2d session, considered the problem, 
Representn.tives Madden, Rogers, and Mc.Arthur took the position 
that the matter of disability could be dealt with by stn.tute without 
an amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess 
wn.s of the opinion that Congress wn.s not authorized to a.ct under the 
Constitution, and that un amendment would first hnve to be adopted 
(hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Rep-
resentatives, February 26 and ~larch 1, 1920). Through the years, 
this controversy has increased in intensity among Congressmen and 
constitutional scholn.rs who have considered the Presidential inability 
problem. . -
Those who feel that Congress does not hn>e the authority to resolve 
the matter by statute claim that the Consti.tution does not support a. 
reusonable inference that Congress is empm>ered to legislate. They 
point out that n.rticle II, section 1, clause 5, of the Constitution author-
ized Congress to provide by statute for the case \\here both the Presi-
dent and Vice President are incapable of sernng. By implication 
Congress does not hn.>e the authority to le&i_slate with regard to the 
situation which concerns only n. disabled rresident, with the Vice 
President succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this is 
the proper coustruction, becnuse the first stiltute dealin;; with Presi-
<len ti.a.I succession under article II, section 1, clnuse 6, "·hich was 
enacted by contemporaries of the framers of the Constitution, did 
not purport to establish succession in instances where the President 
alone was disabled (act of ?-.farch 1, 1792, 1 Stat. 239). 
• 
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Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether the "necessary 
and proper" authority of article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the 
Congress the power to legislate in this situation. The Constitution 
does not vest any department or office with the power to determine 
inability, or to decide the term during which the Vice President shell 
act, or to determine whether nnd o.t what time the President may later 
regain his prerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to argue 
tbnt article I, section 8, els.use 18, gives the Congress the authority 
to m11ke n.ll la.\VS which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out 
such powers. 
In recent ye:i.rs, there seems to have been a. strong shift of opinion 
in favor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment is neces-
sary, and that a. mere statute would not be adequate to solve the 
problem. The lo.st three Attorneys General who have testified on the 
matter, Herbert Brownell, William P. Rogers, and Acting Attorne7 
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, have agreed an amendment IS 
necessary. In nddition to the American Bar Association and the 
American Association of L.e.,,v Schools, the following organizations 
hn.ve Rgreed n.n amendment is necessary: the State bar associations 
of Arizona., Arkansn.s, California., Colorado, Connecticut Hawaii, 
Indiana., Iowa, Knnsas, Louisiana., Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island, 
Texns, Virginia., Vermont; and the bar associations of Denver, Colo.; 
the :qist.rict of Columbia; Dade Cou?ty, Fla.; city of New York; 
Passn.1c County, N.J.; Greensboro, N.C.; York County, Pa.; and 
:Milwaukee, Wis. 
The most persuasive argument in favor of amending the Constitution 
is that so many legal questions have been raised about the authority 
of Congress to act on this subject without. :i.n amendment that any 
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge at 
t.be most critical time-that is, either 'vhen a President had become 
disabled, or when a President sought to recover his office. Under 
these circumstances, there is an urgent need to a.dopt an amendment 
which "'ould distinctly enumerate the proceedings for determination 
of the commencement and termination of dis:i.bility. 
Filling of vacancies in the office of the President 
\\7bile the records of the Constitutional Convention disclosed 
little insight on the frnmers' interpretation of the inability provisions 
of the Constitution, they do reveal that wide disagreement prevn.iled 
concerning whether or not a Vice President was needed. II he was 
needed, what were to be bis official duties, if any. 
The creation of the office of Vice President came in the closing 
davs of the Cc,nstitutional Convention. Although such a position 
was con>'i<lered very early in the Convention, later proposals envisaged 
the President of the Senate, the Chief Justice, and even a council of 
adyisers, ns persons who would direct the executive branch should a 
lupse of ExecutiYe a.uthority come to pass. · 
On September 4, 1787, :i Committee of Eleven, selected to deh'berate 
those portions of the Constitution which had been postponed, recom-
mended that un (lffice of Yice President be created and that he be 
e1ectcd with the President by an electoral college. On September 7, 
1787, the Com· en tion discussed the Vice-Presidency an<l the duties to 
be performed by the uccupant of the Office. Although much de-
liberation ensued regarding the official functions of the office, little 
H. Rept. 203, S9-l-2 
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thought.seems to -h~ve be·e~ .gi;~n 'io .. the successio~ of th.e Vice Presi-
dent to the office of President in"ca.se of the death of the President .. 
A committee, desiQ.'!lated to revise the style of and arrang.e the 
articles agreed to by the House, returned to Convention on September 
12, 1787, a <lTaft which for nil practical purposes was to pecome the 
Constitution ·of th..:i United States. It contemplated two official 
duties for the Yi'ce President: (1) to preside over the Senate, in which 
cap?-city _he would. vote .when the Senate was "equally divided" and 
open the certificates listing the >Otes of the presidential electors, and 
(2) to discharge the. powers. and duties of the President in case of his 
death, resignation, removal, or inability. · . . 
. 'Whil~. the Constitution does not address itseU in all cases to specifics 
regarding the Vice·President. as was the case for the President, the 
importance of the office in .view of the Convention is made apparent 
by article II, section 1, clatise·3. ·.This clause, the original provisio~ 
for the election.of the President.and the Vice President, made it clear 
that it. wii,s designed to insure that the Vice President \Vas a perso~ 
equal in stature to. the .President. : . . . . .. 
. The intent Of the.Convention, howe\"er, was totally frustrated when 
the electors began to distinguiSh he tween the two votes which article 
II, section l_, clause 3 had bestowed upon them. This inherent defect 
wns made painfully apparent .in the famolis Jefferson-Burr election 
contest.of 1800, ·and in 1804 the 12th amendment modified the college 
vot.ing to pre\•ent a reoccurrence of similar circumstances. : ... 
There is little doubt the 12th amendment remoYed a serious defect 
from. ~he Qo:nstitUtion:,. . · Howeve_r, i.ts passa~, ~oupled with U:1e 
growing political pract.ice of nominatm~ Vice Presidents to appease 
disappointed factions of the parties, Began a. decline that was in 
ensuing yetU"S to mold the Vice-Presidency into an office of inferiority 
and disparagement. ·. . . .. · · . . · . . ..... 
Fortunately, this century saw a. gradual resurgence of the importance 
of the Vice-Presidency .. He has become a regular member of the 
Cabinet, ·chairman .of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, 
Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Op-
portunities, a member of the National Security Council, and a personal 
envoy: for the President. He has in the eyes of Government re~ained 
much of the "equal stature" which the framers of the Constitution 
contemplated he should entertain. 
THE URGENCY OF AMEND!.tENT 
.. 
The death of P1esident Kennedy and the acces.sion of President 
Johnson in 1963 pointed up once again the abyss which exists in the 
executive branch 'vhen there is no incumbent Vice President. Sixteen 
times the United States of America has been without a Vice President, 
totaling 37 years during our history. 
As has been pointed out, the Constitutional Convention in its 
'risdom fore.saw the need to have a qualified and able occupant of the 
Vice Pre:sident's office should the President die. They did not, 
ho~ever, provide the mechanics whereby a Vice-Presidential vacancy 
could be filled. 
The considerations which enter into a determination of whether 
provisions .for filling the office of Vice President when it becomes 
meant should be made by simple legislation or require a constitutional 
-· 
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auiendment are simifar to those which enter into the same kind of 
determination about President.ialinability provisions. "In bot.h ca.Ses,: 
there is some opinion that Congress ha.s authority to act. However,. 
t.he nrguments that o.n amendment is necessary are strong and sup-
ported by many indi>idua13. '\Ve must not gamble \\;th tbe·consti-
tutional legitimacy of our Nation's executi>e branch. TVhen" a. 
President or a Vice President of the United State:S°~sumes bis office.: 
the entire Nation and the world must know without doubt that he 
does so as a matter of right. Only a constitutional amendment can 
sur.ply the necessary air of legitimacy. · ·· ·: ··· · -··· · · · : ·. 
fhe R.rgument that Congress can designate a. Vice President by law:.· 
is A.t best a ''enk one. Th~ power of Congress in this regard is meas-·· 
ured principally by article II, sectio~ 1; clause. 6,° which states that:-:..;.··. 
the Conaress may by la\v provid~ for ·th~'Case.of Rem~val. - ·' .• 
Death, ftesignation~ or Inability, both of the President and. 
Yice President, declaring what officer shall then act as Presi.,. ., .. _ 
dent, and such officer. shall act. accordingly, . until. the.:· .··. :.> 
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. ... : ... : .:·,. ·~. 
This is not in ~pecific terms a power to· declare:what officer shall: be ; 
Vice P1·esident. It is a power to declare upon what officer thei "dutiE?S··'-
and pO\vers of the office of President shall devolve 'vhen there is . 
neither President nor Vice President to a.ct. ·• · ',·::.;~1 ~ 
To stand by ready !or the power5 and duties oC the Pre:>"identi&l 
office to devolve upon him at the time of death or inability :of the.'· 
President, is the principe.l constitutional function of the Vice Presider.it:'~ 
It is clear that Congress can designate the officer who is to perform 
that function· when the office of Vice President. is "\"'acant .. Indeed·; 
it has done so in each of the Presidential Succession. Acts. Should" 
there be any more objection to designating· that officer Yice President : 
than there is to designating a.s President the Vice President upon .. : 
whom devolve the powers and duties of· a deceased President;. for'·· 
which designation there is no specific constitutional authorization? . · 
The answer to that quest.ion is "Yes."-. The Constitution has gi>en .. 
the Yic~ President n.n?tJ:er ~uty and sets for.th specific .instructions e.S '. 
to who 1S to perform 1t m his absence. Article I, section 2, clause 4, ·. 
pro·ddes that the Vice President shall be the President of the Senate 
and clause 5 _provides that the Senate shall choose its other officers. 
including s. "President. pro Tempore, in the Absence of the Vice Presi-·: 
dent or when he shall exercise the Office of the President of the United 
States." It is very difficult to argue that a person. designated Vice 
President by Congress, or selected in any way other than by the pro-
cedw·es outlined in amendments 12 and 22, can be the President of the 
Senate. 
One of the principal reasons for filling the office of Vice President 
when it bec:omes vu.cant is to permit the person next in line t.o become· 
familiar with the problems he will face should he be called upon to act 
as President, e.g., to sen-eon the National Security Council, head the 
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, partici-
pate in Cabinet meetings nnd take part m other top-le>el discussions 
which lend to nn.tional policymal-ing decisions. Those who consider 
a lnw o;11fficient to pro\ide for filling a. Vice Presidential Yacancy point 
out tliu.t the Constitution says nothing about such duties and t.here is 
therefore nothing to prevent Congress from assigning these duties to 
••• 1 ... 
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the officer it designates as ne:tt in liue in whatever Presidential suc-
ct?,;sing law it enacts. Regardless of what office he held a.t the time of 
hi~ designation n.s Vice President, however, he would have a difficult 
time carrying out the duties of both offices a.t the same time. 
'Vb.en, to all these weaknesses, one adds the !a.ct that no matter 
what 111.ws Congress may write describing the duties of the officer it 
designates to act a.s Vice President, the extent to which the President 
tiikes him into his confidence or shares with him the delibers.tions lead-
ing to executive decisions is to be determined larO'ely by the President 
rather than by statute, practical necessity would' seem to require not 
only that the procedure for determining who fills the Yice Presidency 
when it becomes vacant be established by constitutional amendment 
but that the President be given a.n active role in the procedure what-
ever it be. 
· Finally, as in the·case of inability, the most I?ersuasi~e argument in 
favor of amending the Constitution is the division of authority con-
cerning the authority of Con!lress to 11.ct on this subject. With this 
division in existence it wou1J' seem that any statute on the subject 
would be open to. criticism and challenge at a. time when absolute. 
legitimacy was needed. . , . 
ANALYSIS. 
Inability . . . 
The proposal now being submitted is cast in the form of a. con-
stitutional amendment for the reasons 'vhich have been outlined 
earlier. 
Article II, section 1, clause 5, of the Constitution is unclear on two 
important points. The first is whether the "office" of the President 
or the "powers and duties of the said office" devolve upon the Vice 
President in the event of Presidential inability. ·The second is who 
has the authority to determine what inability IS, when it commences, 
and when it terminates. Senate Joint Resolution 1 resolves both 
questions. 
The first section would affirm the historical practice bv which a. 
Vice President has become President upon the death of the l'resident, 
further extending the practice to the contingencies of resignation or 
removal from office. It separates the provisions relatina to inability 
from those relating to death, resignation, or remoYnl, thereby elim-
inating any ambiguity in the language of the present pron.sion in 
article II, section 1, clause 5. · · 
Sections 3 and 4 embrace the procedures for determining the com- · 
mencement and termination of Presidential inability. 
Section 3 lends constitutional authority to the practice that has 
heretofore been carried out by informal agreements between the 
President and the person next in the line of succession. It makes clear 
that the President may declare in writing his disability and that upon 
such an occurrence the Vice President becomes .Acting President. 
By establishing the title of Acting President the proposal makes clear 
that it is not the "office" but the "powers and duties of the office" 
thn.t devoh-e on the Vice President and further clarifies the status of 
the Vice President during the period when he is discharging the 
powers and duties of a disabled President. 
The amendment to section 3 makes certain that in cases in which 
a President himself declares his inability, the period of his disability 
would be terminated by a simple Presidential notice to both Houses 
-
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of Congress. To permit the Vice President and Cabinet to challenge 
such an assertion of recovery might discourage a President Crom \"Ol-
un t:Lrily relinquishing hi~ powers in case of illness. The ri(7ht of chal-
lenge would be reser'>ed for cases in which the Vice PX:sident and 
the Cabinet, ~;thout the President's consent, bad found him unable· 
to discharge his powers and duties. . .. 
Section 4 of the proposed constitutional amendment deals with the ' 
most difficult problem of inability-the factual determination of 
whether or not inability exists. It provides that whene>er the Yice 
President and a. majority of the principal officers of the executh·e. 
departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, ' 
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker 
of the House of Representati•es their .mitten declaration that the· 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, 
the Vice President shall immediately a.Ssume the powers and duties 
of the office as Acting President. 
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to secure 
continuit;r in cases of inability must depend upon public opinion with 
a possess10n of a. sense of "constitutional morality." Without such 
a f~eling of r~ponsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against .· 
usurpation. No mechanical or procedural solution will provide a 
complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases in which most of 
the parties are rogues and in which no popular sense of constitutional 
propriety exists. It seems necessary that an attitude be adopted that 
presumes we shall alwn.ys be dealing 'vith "reasonable men" at the 
highest governmental level. The combination of the judgment of the 
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members appears to 
furnish the most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental 
checks and balances between the e."'tecutive, Iegislati>e, and judicial 
branches. It would enable prompt action by the persons closest to the 
President, both politically and physically, and presumably most 
familiar with his condition. It is assumed that such decision "ould 
be ro!!.de only after adequate consultation with medical experts wb,o 
were intricately familiar with the President's physical and mental 
condition. 
There are many distinguished advocates for a. specially constituted 
group in the nature of e. factfindina body to determine presidenti4} 
ir:s.bility rather than the Cabinet. ftowever, such a. group would face 
mauy dilemmas. II the President is so incapacitated that he cannot 
declb.re his own inability the factual determination of inability would 
be relo.ti>ely simple. No need would exist for a. ~ecial fact-finding 
body. Nor is a factfindin~ body necessary if the President can and 
does declli.re his O\V1l inability. If, howe>er, the President n.nd those 
:~round him differ as to whether he does suffer from an inability which 
he is unwilling to admit, then a critical d.isfute e.."'tists. But this dis-
pute should not be determined by a specie. commission composed of 
persons outside the executive branch. Such a commission runs a good 
chn.nce of coming out with a srlit decision. What ,.-oulcl be the etfect, 
for example, if a commission o seven ..-oted four to three that the Presi-
dent was .fit and able to perform his office? Wbat power could be 
exert during the rest of his term \>hen, by common knowledge, a 
chan:zc of one vote in the commission proceedings could yet <leny him 
the r!'aht to exercise the powers Of his office? If the Yote were the 
other ~ay and the Vice President were installed as Acting President, 
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whnt powers could he e..xert when everyone would know that one vote 
the other wny could ca.use his summnry removnl from the exercise 
of Presidential powers? If the man acting as President-\vere placed 
in this nwkwnrd, completely untenable !lnd impotent position, the 
effect on domestic affnirs would be bad enough; the ~ffect on the in-. 
terna.tionu.l position of the United States might \Vell be catastrophic.:· 
However, in the interest of providing flexibility for the future, the 
amendment would authorize the Congress to designate a different body 
if this were deemed desirable in li~ht of subsequent experience. 
The second para.graph of section 4 of the proposed amendment 
would permit the President to resume the powers and duties of the•· 
office upon his trn.nsmis3ion to the President of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of R~rescntath·es of his m-itten· declaration 
that no inability existed. However, should the Vice President and 
a majority of the principal officers of the executi•e-depsrtments feel 
that the President is unable, then they could preYent the President · 
from resnmincr the powei"S and duties of the office by transmitting 
their written declaration so stating to the President of the Senate and 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives within 2 days;'' Once 
the declaration of the President stating no inability exists has been'· 
transmitted to the President of the Senate· and the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, then the issue is squarely jomed .. ·At this 
point the proposal recommends that the Congress shall make ·the· 
final determination on the existence of inability. If within 10 days:.i 
the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses that the 
President is unable, then the Vice President continues as Acting 
President. However, should the Congl"ess fail hi any manner to cast· 
a. .vote of two-thirds or more in both Houses supporting the position .·. 
that the President was unable to perform the powers and duties of 
his office, then the President would resume after the expiration of 
10 clays the powers and duties of the office. The recommendation 
for a rnte of two-thirds is in conformity with the provision of article I, 
section 3, du.use 6, of the Constitution relating to impeachments. 
The committee contempla~s that Yates taken pursuant to the pro-
nsions of the proposed constitutionnl amendment will be conducted 
in e.ccorda.nce with the rules of the House and Senate, respectively, 
and that record votes may be ta.ken when in conformity with such rules. 
This proposal achieves the goal of an immediate original transfer 
in Executive authority and the resumption of it in consonance both 
with the original intent of the framers of the Constitution and with 
the balance of powers among the three branches of our Government --
which is the permanent strength of the Constitution. 
Vacancies 
Section 2 is intended to virtually assure us that the Nation will 
always pos3ess a. Vice President. It "Would require a. President to 
nominnte a person \vho meets the existing constitutional qualifications 
to be Vice President \vhenever a vn.cancy occurred in that office. 
The nominee would take office n.s Vice President once he has been 
confirmed by a mn.jority vote in both Houses of the Congress. 
In considering this section of the proposal, it was obserred that the 
office of the Vice President has become one of the most important 
positions in our country. The days are long pnst when it was largely 
honorary and of little importance, as has been previously pointed out. 
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For more· t.ha.n o. decade the Vice President hns borne specific and 
import.ant responsibilities in the cxecuti•e branch of Government. 
He hns come to sb!lre and pRrticipn.te in the executive functioning of 
our Government, so thst in the ennt of tr.ngedy there would be no 
break in the informed exercise of executive authoritv. Never has 
this been more a<lequn.tely exemplified than by the· uninterrupted 
assumption·of the Presidency by Lyndon B. Johnson. . 
It is without contest that the procedure for the selection of a Vice 
President must contemplate the nssurnnce of a person 'vho is com-
patible with the President. The importance of this compatability 
is recognized in the modern practice of both major political parties 
in according the presidential CR.ndidn.te a major voice in choosing his 
running mate subject fo convention appro\"'al. This proposal 'vould 
permit the President to choose his Vice President subject to congres-
sional approvaL In· this. way the country would be assured of a Vice 
President of the same political party as the President, someone who 
would presumably work in harmony with the basic policies of the 
President. . . · ·· ' ·. 
The committee recommends .adoption of the joint resolution as 
fl.mended. · 
. ·, . . •. ·:· . 
COMMITI'EE AME.~DMEN'TS TO HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTIO~ 1 SHOWING 
OMISSIONS, NEW MATTER, AND RETAINED WORDl?'lG 
The com~ittee am:end~ents to the House joint resolution a.re 
shown as follows: Provisions of the resolution a.s introduced which 
arc omitted are enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in 
italic, provisions in which no change is proposed are shown in roman. 
Article-
SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from 
office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall 
become President. 
SEc. 2. Whenever there is a. vacancy in the office of the 
Vice President, the President shall nominate a. Vice President 
who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote 
of both Houses of Congress. 
SEc 3. [If the President declares in writing] TVhenez:er the 
President transmits to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatius his uTitten · 
dularation that he is unable to discharge the powers and 
d11ties of his office, a.nd until he transmits a wriJ;ten declaration 
to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by 
the Vice President as Acting President. 
SEc. 4. [If the President does not so declare, and the Vice 
President with the written concurrence of a. majority of the 
bc:1ds of the executive departments or such other body as 
Co.:igress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his] 
W7,wez:er the Vice President and a majority of the principal. 
officers of the c:ucutfre departments, or such other body as 
Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President Pro 
T£mpore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Rep-
resrntatiL·es their written declaration tho.t the President is 
-
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nnA.ble to discho.rge the powers and duties of his office, the 
Vice Pr<.'sident shall immediately assume the powen; ·and 
duties of the office as Acting President. 
[SEc. 5.] Thereafter, when[ever] the President transmits 
to the [Congress] PresUle-it Pro Tempore of the Senate and 
th.e Speaker of the House oj Representatives his written declara-
tion tho.t no ina.hility exists, he shall resume the powers and 
duties of bis office unless the Vice President, [with the 
written·concurrence of a majority of the heads of the execu-
tive departments or such other body as Congress may_b:v law 
· provide, transmits within two days to the Congress bis] and 
a ma1on"ty of the principal officers o.f the eucuiit e departments, · 
or s-uch other body a.\ Congress may by law pro1 ide, transmit 
within two days tn the Pres'i<lent Pro Tempore of the Seno.te and 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives tkeir written 
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall 
[unmedia.tely] decide the issue, immediately assembling for , ... 
that pttrpose if 1LOt in session. If the Congress, within ten .. 
days after the. receipt of the written declaration of th.e Vice ' 
President and a majority of the principal officers of the eucu-
ti-ce departments, or such other body as Congress may by law 
pro-r:ide, determines by two-thirds vote of "Doth Houses that ·. ; 
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the 
snme as Acting President; otherwise the President sbnll 
resume the powers and duties of his office; 
. . . 
• 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE 
EDWARD HUTCHINSON 
House Joint Resolution 1, ns reported, would rntify the Tyler 
precedent of succession to the office of President by the Vice President 
npon the death of the President; it would provide for filling a. vacancy 
in the office of Vice President; and it would incorporate into the 
Constitution a <letn.iled procedure for the trn.nsfer of Executive power 
from the President to "the Vice President in times of the President's 
inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office. 
THE TYLER PRECEDENT 
No reasonn.ble question any longer exists about the constitutional 
succession to the office of President by the Vice President upon the 
deilth of the President. Vice President Tyler's claim to the office 
as well as its powers and duties, upon the death of President W. H. 
Enrrison in 1841, has without exception been asserted ori every 
subsequent like occasion. The country would not now accept any 
different construction of the constitutional provision, nor would any 
difierent construction be warranted. There is no disagreement over 
section 1 of House Joint Resolution 1. It makes clear that whenever 
a YRcn.ncy in the office of President occurs, whether by removal, death 
or resignation, the Vice President will assu.nie the office as well as its 
pO\Yers an<l duties. 
FILLI!\'G A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL V.\.C.\.::iCY 
S2ction 2 of House Joint Resolution 1 would empower and direct 
the Pre5ident to nominate a Vice President when that office is vacant, 
ancl the citizen so nominated would take office when confirmed by a 
m!ljority >ote of both Houses of Congress. . · 
\\hile it is generally assumed each House would act separately, 
the language employed requires a majority vote of both Houses, not 
each House, to confirm. If, sometime in the future, pres.sure is brought -
to beur for congressional con.firmn.tion in joint convention·, as some 
proponents of this meR.sure now ad-vocate, the language of section 
2 may be construed to require only n. majority of both Houses com-
bine<l, in thti.t way diluting the vote of Senators. In my opinion, 
this pos5ibility would be lessened if the language directed the mn.jority 
·rnte in each House instead of a. majority vote of both Houses . 
. .\ltl.iough the section is silent on the point, it is expected that the 
majority Yote required, so long as each House acts separately, is a 
m:--.jority of the ,·otes cast in en.ch House, a quorum being present. 
There is no requirement for n. record >ote, but one-fifth of those 
prl'sent c0uld require it. A secret ballot could not be ordered over 
their objections. 
I'mcc<lure for confirmation of nominations by the President by 
both Houses is unique in our experience. All other appointments nre 
17 
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submitted only to the Senate, for advice and consent. A good case 
could be made for submission of this nominution to the Senate alone. 
After all, the sole constitutional duty of the Vice President remains 
that of President of the Senate; and \vitbin the purnew of the Con-
stitution, the President, by nominating a Vice President, is choo::;ing 
their Presiding_ Officer. Senate approval of his nominee, as in the 
case of other Presidential appointments, certainly would huve been 
thought sufficient in earlier periods of our history, and may be sufficient 
today. 
The case for Senate action alone also can be buttressed by an 
analogy. In those cases where a Vice Pre::;ident is not elected, because 
of a failure of a majority of the electoral .-ote, the Constitution 
directs the Senate to elect one from the candidates who received the 
two highest numbers. 
Finally, in the case for Senate confirmation alone, it may be observed 
that our constitutional proce::;ses for the selection of our Presidents 
and Vice Presidents are Federal in nature. Presidential electors, 
chosen in each State in such manner as the legislature may direct, 
meet in their respective States and there cast the votes to which their 
State is entitled_ The Senate, too, is a body Federal in nature. Ea.ch 
State has an equal vote in the Senate. The Senate represents the 
States in our legislative branch. It would be wholly consistent with 
the preservation of the Federal structure if the Senate were vested 
with power either to elect a Vice President to fill a vacancy, or to 
advise and consent to the nomination of the President for that purpose. 
Thus far in our history there has been a. vacancv in the office of Vice 
President during a part of 16 different terms.- One vacancy was 
ca.used by resignation of the Vice President. Seven died in office and 
the other eight succeeded to the Presidency upon the death of the 
President. 
On those occasions when the Vice President's office becomes vacant 
through removal, death, or resignation, it is possible that some division 
in Congress might occur over confirmation of a President's nomination 
of a successor. But on those occasions when a >acancy is due to a. 
Vice President's succession to the Presidency, and the new President, 
so recently a Vice President himself, is called upon to nominate 
another, the temper of the country and of the Congress is likely to 
be such as to make congressional confirmation of the appointment 
pro form.a. Under such circumstances, how meaningful really is the 
function of congressional confirmation? The new President might 
as well be empowered to appoint a new Vice President outright. 
Consider the terrible pressures that will immediately come to bear 
on n. newly elevated President to choose a. Vice President. No time 
1s speciJied \'rithin which the nomination must be made, but it would 
be a mistake to believe the new President could relieve the pressure 
by putting the matter off. As soon as he enters the presidential stage, 
the new President will see prospective Vice Presidents and their sup-
porters in the wings. In addition to all of the other cures, duties, 
ruid responsibilities thrust upon him, he will also have to deal with 
those who aspire to the second highest office of the la.ncl-t he largest 
plum within his hands. 
A better solution to the problem of succession to the office of Vice 
President would be to provide thri.t the bolder of some other office in 
"' 
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the administration should nutomntically succeed to the Vice-
Prcsideucy. 
It is ha.rd enough for the country to go through the sad e"'i>erience 
of a change of administration at the time of the death of n. President, 
''hen the succession i.s automatic. That is the situation now and as 
it bus been. Since 1792 there has always Leen a. known successor to 
the office of President when there was no Vice President. But upon 
the ratification of this proposed n.mendment, there will be an air of 
uncertainty, at least for the time during which it takes a new President 
to nominate and obtain confirmation of his choice-and this uncer-
tainty will be e:\.-perienced H.t a time when the country can least bear it. 
PRESIDE:-iTIAL HV .. BILITY 
House Joint Resolution 1 would incorporate into the Constitution 
a detailed procedure for the transfer of Executive power from the 
President to the Vice President in times of the President's inability to 
discharge the po,vers and duties of his office. Such transfer can occur 
mth the President's consent or over his protest. The la~wiage of the 
resolution offers no hint that the determination of inability shall be 
based on medical or psychiatric evidence. Instead, the determination 
will be a political one; and here lies a. danger in the proposal. · . 
Words written into the Constitution in the past are now found to 
have vested powers to extents and in ways not intended by their 
authors. We should be extremely careful, lest we unwittingly pro-
>ide tools of power we \Vould ourselves oppose. 
Do the pronsions of section 4 of this resolution in effect create a. 
new way in which a President might be rem"oved from office? Might 
it be possible for a Vice President, sometime in the future, to form a 
cab:il with ::i. majority of the President's Cabinet nnd size power from 
him? Are we, by incorporating these words into the Constitution, 
provi<ling the machinery by which the stability of the office of Presi-
<lcn t might be undermined? All it tn.kes, under section 4, is for the 
Vice President and a. majo1ity of the Cabinet to file their written 
declaration of the President's inability with the President pro tempore 
of the Sene.te and the Speaker of the House, and the \"ice President 
becomes Acting President. Then the President, dislo<lged by this 
maneuver from his a\vesome powers, is put in the position of having 
to win back his position by persuading Congress of his fitness. Here 
ag::i.in the decision will be a. political one. There is no suggestion that 
medical or psychiatric evidence even be considered. .And, if an 
unpopular President should foil to find support among at least a 
third of the Sen;ltors und Representath-es m Congress, he would 
<:ontinue in name only, shorn of his powers nnd duties. He could 
apparently make repeated attempts to regain the powers of his office 
until his term e.:<:pires. W' ould these circumstance lend stability to 
the country or un<le.rmine it? 
On the other band, suppose an unpopular President is upheld by the 
Congress ,,;th more than one-third, but less thn.n a ma3ority of the 
:'.\1embers sustaining his contention of ability to serre. Is it not 
po~sible the sauie cabal might try ago.in? The President would 
break it up, iI possible, by changes in his Cu.binet, providing he could 
\•:in the advice and consent of the Senate for his new appointees, but 
under such circumstancP.s he might not obtain confirmation of his 
-
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Cnbinet chnnges. Would these circumi;tances tend to lend sto.bility 
to the Government or undermine it? 
Other nssumptions mi~ht be made to illustrate further how the 
machinery we no\v offer tne country might sometime be used by meo. 
ambitions for power. 
We should keep in mind thnt we are fashioning tools i\ hich could 
be used to unsettle the stnbilitV" of our Government while we mean to 
promote it. w 
Section 4 is certainly not intended to provide the tools for power to 
enl men. Its drafters had in mind an nltogetber different situation. 
They suppose an ill Prcsidenthphisically unnble to .$i•e his consent for 
the assumption of power by t e \ice President. "Coder these circum-
stances some alternative to his consent must be <lensed if the Govern-
ment is to carry -on. Thereafter, when the President bas reco•ered 
sufficiently to resume bis duties, or thinks he has, the drafters wnnted 
to be sure of machinery whereby he could reco>er his powers from a. 
Vice President and Cabinet who might disagree il;th his own assess· 
ment of recovery. · 
Supporters of this proposal call the power of public opinion to their 
defense and sav a. Vice President nnd Cabinet would not dare seize 
power from a President physically and mentally able, nor withhold 
power from him once recovered.:- But public opinion can be molded, 
and some Presidents in our history haYe been most unpopular in 
office, and probably there will be some in the future. · 
There is no definition of inability or disability in the proposed 
amendment, nor is there any provision for the definition of this term. 
If there has existed an uncerto.inty of con~essional power to define 
it under existing constitutional provisions, it is clear Congress will be 
without power to define an inability n{ter House Joint Resolution 1 
is incorporated into the Constitution. 
The proposal ·will leave to the President in section 3, and to the 
Yice President and Cabinet majority in section 4, complete power to 
treat anv condition or circumstance thev choose as a disability. It is 
enn concei ,.u.ble, though I hope not likely, that some President might 
declare himself mrnble, and stnte no reason therefor (since no reason is 
required by the language) in order to a.void responsibility for some 
unpopular act, dernh-ing the powers of his office upon the Vice 
President for the t.ime beinu to accomplish that purpose. After 
ratificn.tion of House Joint ltesolution 1, the Congress definitely 
Cfrnnot define by liiw \vhnt constitutes Presidentiu.l clis11bility. I think 
a good cns·e can be made to vest that power of definition in Congress. 
Here would be nuother check and balance in our system, built in to 
guard against nbuse of power. 
It rras suggested in the hearings that the Pre:5ident might declare 
bis inabilitv because of absence from the countrV'. It seems unlikely 
thn.t he would do so because he would \'1\.nt to go abroad with full 
powers of bis office, as Presidents have done in the past. But members 
should know that in the minds of some, the language of this proposi;i.l 
"\\ill permit n. future President to rclie,·e himself of the burdens of his 
office, at will, bv a declaration of inability due to ab;;ence. 
The provisions of House Joint Resolution l leave many questions 
unresoh--ed. For example, it does not nddress itself to the problem of 
what happens if an -~cting Prcsidc11t suff:.:.rs an inability. It ondooks 
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the possibility of n Presidential inability :lt a time \\'hen there is no 
Vice Pre;:;ident., which might occur soon ufter n new President succeeded 
to office R.lld before be nominated fL new Vice President. How could 
the machinery of sect.ion 4 work then? Under the lnngu1\ge of that 
s~ction, it would o.ppear essential tlrnt there be n. Vice President to 
trigger t.he machinery of thnt section. 
In my opinion it would be better to 'vork out the answers to these 
problems R.nd others before submitting this p&oposed amendment for 
rntificat.ion. There is no res.I urgency. We no'v hnve a Vice President, 
aud an executive understanding between him nnd the President on the 
mo.tter of Presidential disability. We should not rush this proposal 
on its way until it is as perfect as we co.n make it. These other 
problems will rems.in unsoh"ed o.nd those who are concerned about a 
certainty of succession and ability mil continue to press for further 
amendments. 
It \'rul be trngic if we have unWittingly deprh·ed Con~e5s of power 
to move into any breach in the structure here being f n.suioned. 
Respectfully submitted. . . . · . 
· EDWARD HUTcHi~so:::i. 
·( 
DISSENTING VIEWS OF REPRESENT.A.l'IVE CHARLES :McC. 
~1A THIAS, JR. 
I dissent from the views of the majority of the committee with 
respect to the grant of power to the President to nominate his heir. I 
oppose such power as oeino- in conflict with the basic principles of the 
Republic nod the philosopbv of the Constitution which tends to dis-
perse, rnther than to centralize, power. 
The Presidency has always been considered an elective office, but it 
m.ll not be purely elective ii this amendment is adopted. 
The Constitutional Convention, as we know it tbrouah :\fadison's 
Journal, woul~ s~ely have reje~ted an app?ip.ted Vic~ cpresident. on 
grounds of pnnc1ple a.lone. Modem cond1t1ons, while compelling,. 
do not dictate that we a.bandone principle when we provide a modern 
method of successiOn. 
The Constitution seeks means to interpose legal safe&11ards between 
the weakness, the temptations, and the eVil of men nnd tne opportunity 
to injure the state. We do the same in private life when we ask an 
honest debtor to execute a mortgage or an honorable man to state his 
promise or covenant in writing. 
By permitting the President to name a. Vice President, House Joint 
Resolution 1 operates on the opposite /rinciple, assuming that a. 
President ,n.n always be enlightened an disinterested in naming a. 
Vice President. While this optimism reflects well on the 20th Cen-
tury's opinion of itself in contrast to the pragmatic 18th century 
estimate of human frailty, it may not be a prudent basis for constitu-
tional law. 
Congressional confi.rmnt.ion of a. nee-presidential nominee would be 
only a mild check and, in my judgment, would be a mere formality 
in a period of national emotional stress. !\fost of us who were hera 
in the last dn.rk da.ys of November 1963 would confirm that almost 
an-v such request mn.de by President Johnson \Vould have been favor-
ably received by the Congress in our desire to support and stabilize his 
n<lministration. 
Gh-i.ng the President exclusive power to nominate a Vice President 
has been justified by a false analogy to the broad discretion allowed 
modern presidential nominees to express a preference for their running 
mates. But a presidentin.l nominee and an incumbent President are 
verv different men-even if they inha.bit the same :mortal frame-and 
the)· may be mo,·ed by very different motives. A President secure 
in the "White House will ba•e undergone a metamorphosis from his 
earlier self, insecurely and temporarily occupying the presidential 
suite at the Blackstone or the 1fark Hopkins during the climax of a 
national conYention. 
If the presidential nominee really is allowed a personal choice of 
ruuninrr mates, be \\ill seek a candidate to complement his own candi-
dacy :nd to strengthen the ticket. He will want an nttractive, 
>igorous, and patently able n.ssociate. The electability of the vice-
22 
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presid<>ntinl cau<lido.te is a Corm of accountability for the head of the 
tic.kct. By 'my of e."to.mple, recnll the ~robable motins of Senator 
John F. Kennedy in choosing Lyndon B. Johnson for his running 
m:lte and consider whether the sa.me moth·es would have been decisive 
with President John F. Kenuedy. 
Furthermore, the analogy used to justify this amendment would 
crystllllize contem2orary political custom int.o organic lu.w. Current 
prnctice o.t nationtil. political conventions and conventions themselves 
a.re the crcR.tures of custom only. Customs C.'\D and should change as 
socinl, political a.nd technological changes nffect our way of living .. 
The Constitution cannot and should not be so fle..xible. 
The public todn.y is all too ready to impugn t.he motives of a 
President dea.lina with his Vice President. It is hinted that & Presi-d~nt is cons!a.ntfy .t~mpt~d to relegate the Yice Presiden~ to !" sub~r­
dms.t.e role m {>Olitlca:l life. If such mot1'\'"es are credible m daily 
('l'o~ernmentnl relations, how much more would they be present in the ~election of nn heir and successor .. 
Couple this consideration to the provisions of House Joint Resolu-
tion l mt.h respect to Presidential inability and the considerations 
that might move a President to nominate o. respectable, but pallid, 
Vice President. If the heir apparent is to go.in certain powers of 
deposition as well as natural succession, a President may indeed hesi-
tate in seeking s. vigorous and aggressive Vice President.. Such & 
ds.nO'er would not have escaped e..xam.ination by the framers of the Con~titution and should be considered by those who propose to 
a.mend it. 
CHARLES Mee.. MA.THlls, Jr. 
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1.st Session 
REFORT 
No. 554 
PHESJDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE 
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT 
Jt;XE 20, 1065.-0rdered to be prll!ted 
~fr. CELLER, from the committee of conference, submitted the 
following 
CONFERENCE REPORT 
[fo accompany S.J. Re:i. l} 
Tl1e commit tee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the t\vo 
Hon:-:es on the amendment of tbe House to the joint resolution (S.J. 
Res. 1) proposiug an amendment to the Comtitution of the United 
St<ltc.s reluting to successirm to the Presidency nnd Vice-Presidency 
and to <::1scs where the President is unable to di5chnrge the powers 
and <l11t~es of his office, h:n·ing met, after full and free conference, 
U:l\"e :1~rcccl to recommend and do recommend to their respective 
H O\!::cs n.s follow.:;: 
Tb'.t the Senate recede from its disagreement to the u.mend.ment of 
the Hou:;e and ngree to the sume with Rn n.mendment as follows: 
In lieu of the nutter proposed to be inserted by the Honse amend-
ment i;;sert the following: 
AR'f'ICLE -
SrcTIO?I" 1. In case oft/;e removal of the Pres1"dentfrom office or of Ms 
clf'ltf,. or N:&1.anation. tlie Fice President shall become President. 
SEc. 2. Tf"/;cnt~·u th.ac is a racancy in the office of the \."'ice President, 
tl,e I're~·iJent shall nolt!inr:!te a Fice President wlto shall tal.:e office upon 
co1Jirrnation &ya 11;ujorit~· rnie of both Houses of Congress. 
Src. 3. lT"l1t11t !'fi° the l'rfsidtnf tra~ismits to tl,e Pre.~·idutt pro tempore 
of t,'lf Srnate and t/,1:. Spwi.-cr of the House o; H€pres:entatfres his u.ritten 
dtclaration that /,e is unaUe to (Hsc/,arge the ]Jou;ers C!nd duties of his 
njiicc. unrl v;itil Id trollsmits to tl>em a written declarc.tion to the contrary, 
.'11c), r,;wus und rhtic., s!1all le discharged &'I/ tl,e F{ce Prcs;°c/ent as Acting 
p,.[\.;,h11t. 
SE~·. 4. TFliu:1 ;·a tl1e 1:-:ice Prc;sidrnt and a mr:jority of either the prin-
c:j,(!/ ''.f,7.cu;s nf tl, i' e;,.·,'t:ul;rc depurlments or of surf.. othu body as Congress 
.I 
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may by law prouiM, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration 
that the President is unable t.o disch.arge the powers and duties of his 
office, the Vice President shall immediately ossv.me the p01Cers and duties 
of the office a.s Acting President. 
Thereafter, when the President tran::.mits to the President pro temf.ore 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his wntten 
declaration that no inability ensts, he shall resnme the 'I!ou;ers and duties 
of his o.ifice unless the Vice PresUent and a majority of elther the principal 
officers of the executive department or of s11ch other body as Congress may 
by law provide, transmit 'Within four days to the President pro tempore of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Represent.atives their written 
declamtion that the President is unable to ai.scharge the powers and duties 
of his o.ifice. Thereupon Co11gress shall decide the i.ss11e, assembling 
within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the 
Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written 
declaration, or, if Congress i.s not in session, within tu;enty-one days 
after Congress is required to assemble, determines by tu;o-thirds vote oj 
both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the 
same as Acting President; otherwise, the Presuunt shall resnme the 
powers and duties of his ojjice. 
And the House agree to the same. 
EM.'i..::>nJEL CELLER, 
BYRON G. ROGERS, 
J.'i..l\!ES c. COR'.\IAN, 
WILLIAM M. 11cCu-x.Loca:, 
RICHARD H. POFF, 
Jo.1anagers on the Part of the House. 
BrncH E. BA TH, Jr., 
JA~ES 0. EASTLAXD, 
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., 
Ei."ERETT :i\1. DIRE:SEX, 
Ro'.\IAN L. HRUSK..'i.., 
Managers on th,e Part of the Senate. 
. ... 
I\ 
STATEMENT OF THE :\-!ANAGERS ON THE 
PART OF THE HOUSE . 
--
The m:rnagers on the part of the House at the conference on the 
dis1tgreeing votes of the t\rn Houses on the amendment of the House 
to the bill (S.J. Res. 1) proposing o.n amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and 
Vice-Presidency o.nd to ca·ses where the President is unable to dischnr~e 
the powers and duties of his office, submit the following sto.tement m 
explanation of the effect of the action o.greed upon by the conferees 
and recommended in the accompanyina conference report: 
The House po.ssed House Joint ResoYution 1 and then substituted 
the pro>-isions it hs.d adopted by striking out all after the enn.cting 
cbuse and insertinq all of its pronsions in Senate Joint Resolution.I. 
The Senate insisteo. upon its version and requested a. conference; the 
House then o.areed to the conference. The conference report recom-
mends that the Senate recede from its disagreement to the House 
amendment and agree to the same with an amendment, the n.mend-
ment being to insert in lieu of the matter inserted by the House 
nmendment the matter agreed to by the conferees and that the 
House agree thereto. 
In substance, the conference report contains subst.o.ntinlly the 
langunge of the House !!.me::id.mcnt ';',"itb. & !ew exceptio!ls. 
Sections 1 and 2 of the proposed constitutional amendment were not. 
in disugreement. Howe,er, in sections 3 n.ncl 4, the SenA.te provided 
that the trn.nsmittal of the notification of a President's inability be to 
the President of the Senute nnd the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentati,·es. The House >ersion pronded tliat the trimsmittnl be to 
the President pro t.empore of the Senate and the Speaker of the Honse 
of Representnti>es. The conference report provides tho.t the trans-
mittal be to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker 
of the Honse of Representatives. 
In section 3, the Senate provided that after receipt of the President's 
written cleclarn.tion of his ino.bility th::i.t such po,vers and <lnties wonld 
then be discha.rged by the Vice President as Acting Presiclent. The 
Honse Yersion proYided the so.me pronsion except it adclecl the clnuse 
"uncl 1mtil he transmits a \rritten clecbrntion to the contrnry". The 
confere;1ce report adopts the House langnage with one minor chnnge 
for p;1rposes c•f clarification by adding the phrn.se "to them". me:rnin~ 
the Pre:;ident pro tempore of the Sennte and the SpeR.ker of the House. 
The first paragraph of section 4, ontside of adopting the langna!?e 
of the House designating the recipient of the letter of transmittal be 
the Pre:;itlent pro tcmpore of the Senate ::i.nd the Speaker of the House 
of RPprcsentatives, minor change in language was m:i.de for purpu~es 
of rhriflc:>.tion. 
In the Seun.te Ycrsion there wus fl specific section; namely, section 5, 
<lealing ,,·ith the procedure thn.t when the Presiclent sent to the Con-
gress his written <lecln.r::i.tion tliut he wus no longer clisablecl be could 
3 
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rc.;11111c the i;wwers :111<l duties of his office unless the Vice President 
nnd a mnjunty of the principal officers of the executh·e depnrtments, 
or such other body ns the Congre::;s might by law pro·dde, transmit 
within 7 <lnys to the <lesi~nnte<l officers of the Congress their "°Titten 
dcl'hration that the President is unable to <lisclrn.r~e the powers nnd 
<l 11 ties of his tiffice. Thereupon, the Congress woulct irnmedintely pro-
cet-d to decide the issue. It further proYided thn.t if the Congress 
clelennines bv two-thirds vote of both Houses thnt the President is 
una hie to dis~hfl.rge the powers nnd duties of bis office, the Vice Presi-
<lcut would continue to discharge the same us Acting President; other-
wise, the President would resume the powers nnd duties of his office. 
The House \ersion combined sections 4 and 5 into one section, now 
Eection 4. Under the· House Yersion, the Vice President had 2 days 
in "·hich to decide whether or not to send n letter stating that he and 
n llllijority of the officers of the execufrve departments, or such other 
body as Congress mny by lnw pro,;de, thnt the President is unable to 
disclrnrge the powers nnd duties of his office. The conference report 
pro,ide:'- that the period of time for the transmittal of the letter must 
Le within 4 dnys. 
Tue Seuute provision did not pro,;de for the conYening of the Con-
gre:::s to decide this issue if it was not in session; the Honse pro'rided 
that the Con~rress must convene for this specific purpose of deciding 
the issue "·it.bin 48 hours nfter the receipt of the 'nitten .declnration 
that the President is still disnbled. · The conference report adopts 
the hn~nuge of the House. 
The Senate provision pbced no time limitation on the Congress for 
clc:Lem1ining whether or not the President. wus still disabled. The 
Ho11sc ";"Crsion provided that detc!"r!1ino.ticn by the Cm:!~ess must be 
m!lde within 10 d!!.y:> nfter the receipt of the written aeclurution of 
the \"ice President :ind n majority of the principal officers of the 
excrntive dcpartrn2nts, or such other body :.1.s Con~Tes:; m:Ly by ls.w 
pro,·ide. The conference report adopts the principle of limiting the 
period of time \\ithin ";hich the Congress must determine the issue, 
and while the Honse originnl version 'ms 10 days nnd the Senate 
\Cr:'-ion an unlimited period of tirne, the report requires n. fins.I deter-
mination inthin 21 dA.ys. The 21-dny period, if the Congress is in 
se::sion, nins from the du.te of receipt of the letter. It further pro-rides 
that if the Congress is not in session the 21-day period runs from the 
time tbnt the Congress con-rnnes . 
... \ Yote of less thu.n t\\o-thir<ls by either House \\Ould immedi:.1.tely 
nuthorize the President to nssume the powers and duties of his office. 
E:'IIAXUEL CELLER, 
BYRON G. ROGERS, 
JA:IIES C. COR:\!A);, 
" ... ILLIA:\! ~-f. ::\·fcCULLOCH, 
RICHARD H. POFF, 
Managers on the Part of the House. 
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OXORESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { 
PRESIDE;:\TIAL INABILITY Al"\1"D VACANCIES 
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT 
Ju~E 30, 1965.-0rd~red to be printed . 
REPORT 
No. 564 
IN THE 
:\Ir. C:t:LLER, from the co:nmittee or conference, submitted the 
following 
CONFERENCE REPORT 
[To accompany S.J. Res_ 1] 
The committee of conference on the <lis11greein~ votes of the tw·o 
Hou,;e:; on the nmendment of the House to the joint resolution (S.J. 
Res. 1) proposing nn n.mendment to the Constitution of the United 
~1 ·;; rebtrng to succession to the Pre:;idency nud "Vice-Pre:;idency 
case::; where the President is unn.b!e to discharge the powers 
ties of bis office, ha Ying met, after full nnd free conference, 
l11n·e agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respecti\-e 
H ou:0e:; ns follov .. ·s: 
I
, That the Senu.te recede fro:n its disagreement to the n.mendment of 
the Hc11!-,e n.nd n.gree to the same with nn amendment as follows: 
Iii lieu of the mutter prnposed to be inserted by the House amend-
! me!'lt in:::ert the follo\',;ng: 
.l 
Tl·ai t-':ef,illnu:inr article. is proposul as an amer.dmer.t to tl.e Cr,11stilu-
tion. nf thf Cnit.ed E"lates, wl.ich shall be rnlid to all fr.fer.ts and pi.;rpo.~·es 
as !!art 1J th' Con ~titutio11 wf.e n ratified by tf.e lef islali:res of three-jot rt/. s 
'.J.f the ~uual St,1tes u:itlin seren years frcm ti:e date of its sulmfr5icn 
by t1:c C.1n~ ress: l "SECT 10.Y 1. In '"·" of th1 :::::,.::Lo; th1 Pu.,id 1nt.fTom ojfiCI OT of hU. 
' 1lwth or 1·esiJ11alir>n, the 'Vice Pre1;ident shall become President. 1 "S£c. 2. 117,er~ecer there is a rccancy in the office of the Vice President, 
~ the Pre~i1lerd shall 11ominale a 1'ice President v:ho shall take office upon 
• con.fin1<1tirJn by a mc.jori·t!I ro~e of both Hoi;.<es of C'c-ngress. 
··l "SEr. 3. lrJ;.enuer the l'rc,ident trans7flits to the Pre1;ident pro fempore 
1 r,_f tl~e Su1aft and the S11enf..:cr of the House n.f Representatfres his uritten j rlrclurr.tion f/,nt lie i.~ 1rnnble tu discharge the pou·crs and duties of his 
~ 1ifjict' .. n1:r.1 !llllil he frn11smits lo tl:r:m a v.;riften declaraf1"on to the contran1, 
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2 I'HESIDE::\TI:\L IXADILITY 
suc!L po1cers and duties slu1ll be di.;c!Larged by the Vice Pre.si<lenl a.<: .·1ctina 
I'n~sident. · · · . · · · 
"S£c. I,. l Vhenuer lht Vice President a ncl a majority of either the vrfo-
dpal officus of the ereculice departments nr of wch other body a.s C'<mgress 
111n;1 by law proi:ide, lran..,mit tu the President pro lt:mpnre of thr Senate 
and the Speaker of the HousP. of Representatices their ·u:n"tten declaration 
that the Pre.;.;ident is unable to cliscliar~t. the pou.:ers aml du.tie.<s of f.i11 
office, the Vice Proident shall immediately assume the powers and dvtie.'l 
<d the ofjice as ...::1ctin9 President. · . 
"Thereafter, v;hen the President transmits to the Pre.:rfrlent pro tempore 
of the Senate and the Speaker o/ the House of Represl!ntatir:es his wriUen 
clcclarr..tion that no inability erisl~, he shall resume the powers and dv.ti~ 
of his office 11nless the ·vice President and a majority of either the principal 
. officers of the e.recutii:e department or of such other body as Congress may· 
by law ziror:ide, transmit 1uithinf01tr days to the Presi.dent prn tempore of 
the Senate and the Spwker of the House of Representatives their written. 
cleclara6on that the President is unable lo <lischarge tl.e prrwers and dutie.s 
of his office. Thereul'on Cong,.ess shall decide the issu.e, assembling 
1.1.;ilhin forty-eight hours for that zrurpos! if not in session. · If the Con-
gress, within. t11;entu-one days after receipt of tlie Zaller written <feclaration, 
or, if Congress is not in session, u:ith.in twenty-one clays after C'ongre.ss 
is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds rote of both. Houses 
that the President is unable to discharge the pou;ers and duties of ki-s 
office, the Fice President shall continue to discharge the same as Aeling 
President; otheru.,ise, the President shall resume tli.e powers and duties 
of his office." · 
And the House ngree to the same. 
E:-.tAX GEL CELLER, 
BYROx G. RoGEr..s, 
J.Dn:s C. ComL-\.X, 
\YILLI.UI ::\f. ::'.\fcCuLLOCH, 
R1cru .. no H. PoFF, . 
},Janagers on the Part of the House. 
BmcR E. B.>.. YH, Jr., 
JA:'-IES 0. EASTL.!SD, 
SA~I J. ERYIX, .Jr., 
EYETIETT ).L DIRKSEX, 
Ro::-.r.>..x L. HP.t:5KA, 
},f anagers on the Part of the Sen ale. 
/ 
I 
~~~~~i~ti}•t·~~ll 
. ·' 
STATE:\!E:\T OF THE :\JANAGERS ON THE 
PART OF THE HOUSE 
The managers on the pnrt of the House at the conferenee on the 
clisii.grreing \"Otes of the two Houses on the nmendment of the House 
to the bill (S.J. Res. 1) proposing an nmendment to the Constitution 
of the United Stntes relating to succession to the Presidency i\nd 
-- Yice-Pre.,;idency nnd to c11.:;eo; where.the Pre:;inent i-; unn.ble to clischnr~e 
the po\vers nnd <lnties of his office, submit the following statement 10 
exphnH.tion of the effect of the nction ngree<l upon by the conferee:> 
nnd recommended in the nccomp:rnying conference report: -
The .!-Iou:;e p:i.sse<l House Joint Re:;olution 1 nnd then substituted 
the pro\·isions it hnd ncloptecl by striking out nil after the enacting 
chu:se :incl inserting nil of its pro,·isions in Senate Joint Resolution 1. 
The Senate insi:;teCl upon its ,·ersion an<l requested n conference; the 
·Hou:::e then 11.greed to the conference. The conference report recom-
mends thnt t"he. Se111\le recede from its cfuugreement to the House 
nmendment and :i.~ree to the sirn1e with an nmendment, the nmend-
ment being to ins-ert in lieu of the matter inserted by the House 
nmeuclment the matter ngreed to by the conferees 1rncl tb-1.t the 
Ho1t-:>e ugree thereto . 
• 
n sub.:.to.nce, the conference report contains snb'ltantially the 
~'ll•t;e of the H01.1se nmenc1ment wit-h fl. few exceptions. 
cetio11:s 1 nn<l 2 of the propo:;ecl con:;tiiutiounl nmenclment were not 
in cfo-,1greement. Ho'.YeYer, in ~ections 3 :i.nd 4, the Sen;1te pro,·ided 
thiLt- the transrnittul of the notific:1tion of a President's inability Le to 
the Pre,;iclcnt of the Senate nnd the Speaker of the Home of Repre-
sentati,·es. The House Yersion provided thnt the trnt!~mittal be to 
the Pre"iiclent pro ternpore of the Sennte nnd the Speaker of the Hou~e 
of Rt:pre:sentati\·es. The conference report pro,·ides thftt the tr1ms-
mitt1il be to the President pro ternpore of the Senate an<l the Spenkcr 
of the House of RcpresentatiYes. · 
In ~ection 3, the Sen11.te proYided thut nfter receipt of the President's 
\\Tit ten decLm1tio:i of hi:; inability tlui.t such powers and cluties \Vould 
the:-i be <liseharged by the Vice President ns Acting Pre::iclent. The 
Hume Yersion proYitled the s11.rne proYision except it n.clcled the clnuse 
"1111<l until he trnnsmits n. written clechrntion to the contran·". The 
conference report adopts the House langunge ·with one minor chunge 
for purposes of chrific:ition by adcling the plu·use "to them", me:miug 
tlie Prc:-iclent pro tcmpo:·e of the Senute an<l the Speaker of the House. 
Tlie fir.:;t p;1.rngr:1.ph of section 4, outside of adopting the b.ngunge 
of the Hou~e de:>ignnting the recipient of the letter of trun~mittul be 
tl1e Presi(lent pro tempore of the Sennte nn<l the Spell.ker of the House 
of Rerre::ienl11ti,·es, minor c-h:.rnge in bngunge wns macle for purposes 
of cbrific:-1tion. 
In tLe Senate ver:;ion there \\·usu specific section; uamely, section 5, 
de;ilin~ ,,·itb the proceclure thnt wl1en the President sent to the Con-
gress lii:s wiitten clecl1u-ntion tlwt he wo.s no longer disabled he could 
rc:0ume tlie pO\\-crs ancl duties of his office unless the Vice President. 
3 
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n1l\I a mnjority of the principnl officers of the e:-i:ecuth·e clepnrtrnents, 
or such other body ns the Cougress might by lnw provide, transmit 
within 7 <l11ys to the desi9n1\tccl officers of the Congress their written · 
cler:1u·ntion thnt the President is un11ble t.o cliscb11r~e the powers and 
duties of his office. ·TI1ereupon, the Congress woulct immediately pro-
ceed to decide the issue. It. further provided that if the Congress 
determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses thnt the President is 
unnhle to <lisdrnrge the powers und duties of his office, the Vice Prcsi-
<l~ut would co~ti.nue to disclrnrge the sH.me as Ac tin~ P:esiden~; other- . 
wise, the Pres1<lent would resume the powers and auties of his.office;:_:· .. 
The House >ersion combined sections 4 nnd 5 into one section, now .;.:. 
section 4. Under the House >ersion, the Vice President had 2 days -~: · 
in which to decide whether or not to send a letter stating that he and . .:.,:·· 
· R majority of the officers of the executive depnrtments, or such othei: --~­
bodv us Congress roo.y by 111w provide, thnt the President is unable to .. :· 
discb:\rge the powers and duties of his office. ·The conference report· · · 
pro,~de~ that the period of time for the transmittal of the .letter mus.t · 
be w1thm 4 clRys. · · ··· · .. ,:, ... , . 
The Senate provision did not proYide for the convening of the Con~· . • 
gress to decide this issue if it was not in session; the House provided · 
tl11\t the Congre.ss must convene for this specific purpose of deciding 
the issue within 48 hours nfter. the receipt of the written declnration 
th1\t the President is still disabled.. The conference report adopts 
the l11ngunge of the House. . · , ·. , .. 
The Sennte provision plt\ce<l no time Emitation 011 the Congre:>s for 
<letenninin~ wheti1er or not the President wns still clisnbled. The 
Hou~e Yers'ion provided thnt <letermiu:i.tion by the Con&'re:;s must be 
made within 10 dH.ys nfter the receipt of the wTitten d.ecl.\ration of 
tl1e Vice Pre::;i<lent a:id n. majority of the pri.ncip11l officers of the 
c:-:c·ctttive departments, or such other bo<ly ns Con£Tess mny by bw 
pro,·itle. The conference report ndopts the princip1e of limitin~ the 
pe1iod of foue within which the Congress must determine the issue, 
and while the Hou:;e originRl Yersion was 10 cll\ys and the Sennte 
ver~ion n.n unlimited period of time, the report requires n final deter-
min.1tion within 21 cl!\ys. The 21-dfl.y period, if the Congress is in 
se"'sion, runs from the <l1\te of receipt of the letter. It further pro\·ides 
th11t if the Congress is not in se..;;sion the 21-<lay period nms from the 
ti111e that the Cullgres::; con,·enes. ::. 
. :\ ,·ote of le::;s than t\Yo-thirds hy either House would immediately 
n11tl1urize the Prcsiclent to :tS5ume the powers and duties of his office; 
E::-,rA!\UEL CELLER, 
BYRO~ G. ROGERS, 
JA::\IES c. COR::\Ll..X, 
r·. 
\YILLIA.'.11 ?vI. ?vfcCuLLOCH; 
RICHARD H. POFF, 
111anagers on the Part of the House. ·. 
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THE WHITE HOl"SE 
W .... SHINGTO)'.; 
July 13, 1985 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I 
will be briefly and temporarily incapable of 
discharging the Constitutional powers and duties of 
the Office of the President of the United States. 
After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney 
General, I am mindful of the provisions of Section 3 
oi the 25th Amendment to the Constitution and of the 
uncertainties of its application to such brief and -
temporary periods of incapacity. I do not believe 
that the drafters of this Amendment intended its 
application to situations such as the instant one • 
Nevertheless, consistent with my long-standing 
arrangement with Vice President George Bush, and 
not intending to set a precedent binding anyone 
privileged to hold this Office in the future, I have 
determined and it is my intention and direction that 
Vice President George Bush shall discharge those 
powers and duties in my stead commencing with the 
administration of anesthesia to me in this instance. 
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I 
determine that I am able to resume the discharge of 
the Constitutional powers and duties of this Office. 
May God bless this Nation and us all, 
S~rely, 
~~~~~ 
The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. 
Speaker 
United States House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
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THE WHITE HOL.SE 
July 13, 1985 
Dear Mr. President: 
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I 
will be briefly and temporarily incapable of 
discharging the Constitutional powers and duties of 
the Office of the President of the United States. 
After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney 
General, I am mindful of the provisions of Section 3 
of the 25th Amendment to the Constitution and of the 
uncertainties of its application to such brief and -
temporary periods of incapacity. I do not believe 
that the drafters of this Amendment intended its 
application to situations such as the instant one. 
Nevertheless, consistent with my long-standing 
arrangement with Vice President George Bush, and 
not intending to set a precedent binding anyone 
privileged to hold this Office in the future, I have 
determined and it is my intention and direction that 
Vice President George Bush shall discharge those 
powers and duties in my stead commencing with the 
administration of anesthesia to me in this instance. 
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I 
determine that 1 am able to resume the discharge of 
the Constitutional powers and duties of this Office. 
Mav God bless this Nation and us all, 
Sin~ely, 
~<~~ 
The Honorable Strom Thurmond 
Preside~t Pro Tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
• 
THE WHITE HOCSE 
WASHl;\;GTOS 
July 13, 1985 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
Follo~ing up on my letter to you of this 
date, please be advised I am able to resume 
the discharge of the Constitutional po~ers 
anc duties of the Office of the President of 
the Cnited States. I have infor~ed the Vice 
?resident of ~y deter~ination ar.d ~y 
res~=ption cf those po~ers and duties. 
c:.;,...ce[(ei · 
--··. ~~ 
The Eonorable Ihomas P. O'~eil~. Jr. 
Speaker 
Cnited States House a: Represe~tatives 
~ashington, D.C. 20515 
THE WHITE HOt:SE 
WASHISGTOS 
July 13, 1985 
Dear Hr. President: 
Follo~ing up on my letter to you of this 
date, please be advised I am able to resume 
the discharge of the Constitutional po~ers 
and duties of the Office of the Presider.t of 
the United States. I have infor~ed the Vice 
President of my determination and my 
resu=ption of those po~ers and duties. 
c:: • . " "C\~~ 
T!-:e Eor.crc.ble Strcr:: ';hur:::ond 
President ?ro Ter::pore 
United States Senate 
~ashington, D.C. 20510 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
July 11, 1986 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE 
FROM: 
SUBJECT: 
~\aD­
D IANNN A G . HOLLAND CJ.J U 
July 13, 1985, Letter from the President 
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate 
With regard to the above referenced letter, the reference to a 
long-standing arrangement between the President and the Vice 
President is not an agreement that was ever put in writing; 
however, Fred Fielding (Counsel to the President) told me that 
the President and the Vice President reaffirmed a discussion 
that they had after the assassination attempt with regard to 
the transfer of power. This reaffirmation was done in·Mr. 
Fielding's presence shortly before the July 13 event. He 
further indicated that the concern with regard to invoking 
Section 3 in 1985 was that the President wanted to ensure that 
future Presidents would not be bound by the precedent of in-
voking Section 3 for such a short period of time. The 
explanation was included in the July 13 letter in order to 
explain the President's position that he did not want the 
situation to set a precedent which could possibly include, for 
example, having a tooth removed. 
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NOT USED 
THE \\"HITE HOl'SE 
WASHI?-:GTOX 
January 5, 1987 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I will 
be briefly and temporarily incapable of discharging the 
Constitutional powers and duties of the Office of the 
President of the United States. 
As I have indicated in the past in similar circumstances, 
I am mindful of the provisions of Section 3 of the 25th 
Amendment to the Constitution and of the uncertainties 
of its application to such brief and temporary periods of 
incapacity. I do not believe that the drafters of this 
Amendment intended its application to situations such as 
the instant one. 
Nevertheless, consistent with my long-standing arrangement 
with Vice President George Bush, and not intending to set 
a precedent binding anyone privileged to hold this Office 
in the future, I have determined and it is my intention and 
direction that Vice President George Bush shall discharge 
those powers and duties in my stead commencing with the 
administration ofLanesthesia to me in this instance. 
I shall advise you ~eirice President when I determine 
that I am able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional 
powers and duties of this Office. 
!\lay God bless this Nation and us all. 
The Honorable 
Speaker of the 
House of Representatives 
Washington, D. C. 20515 
Sincerely, 
• 
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NOT USED 
THE WHITE HOL'SE 
WASHll"GTON 
January 5, 1987 
Dear I'vir. President: 
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I will 
be briefly and temporarily incapable of discharging the 
Constitutional powers and duties of the Office of the 
President of the United States. 
As I have indicated in the past in similar circumstances, 
I am mindful of the provisions of Section 3 of the 25th 
Amendment to the Constitution and of the uncertainties 
of its application to such brief and temporary periods of 
incapacity. I do not believe that the drafters of this 
Amendment intended its application to situations such as 
the instant one. 
Nevertheless, consistent with my long-standing arrangement 
with Vice President George Bush, and not intending to set 
a precedent binding anyone privileged to hold this Office 
in the future, I have determined and it is my intention and 
direction that Vice President George Bush shall discharge 
those powers and duties in my stead commencing with the 
administ:i.4 ation of anesthesia to me in this instance. 
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I determine 
that I am able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional 
powers and duties of this Office. 
May God bless this Nation and us all. 
Sincerely, 
The Honorable Strom Thurmond 
President pro tempore 
of the Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
w 
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THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
January 5, 1987 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
Following up on my letter to you of this 
date, please be advised I am able to resume 
the discharge of the Constitutional powers 
and duties of the Office of the President 
of the United States. I have informed the 
Vice President of my determination and my 
resumption of those powers and duties. 
The Honorable 
Speaker of the 
Sincerely, 
House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
( 
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NOT USED 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
January 5, 1987 
Dear Mr. President: 
Following up on my letter to you of this 
date, please be advised I am able to resume 
the discharge of the Constitutional powers 
and duties of the Office of the President 
of the United States. I have informed the 
Vice President of my determination and my 
resumption of those powers and duties. 
Sincerely, 
The Honorable Strom Thurmond 
President pro tempore 
of the Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
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NOT USED 
THE WHITE HOL.SE 
WASHl!'<GTON 
July 31, 1987 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
Following up on my lette: )0 you of this 
date, please ·b,e advised y~~ able to resume 
the discharge of the Constitutional powers 
and duties of the Office of the President 
of the United States. / I have informed the 
Vice President of my, determination and my 
resumption of those ~~ers and duties. 
·., 
Sin'<:~erely, 
The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the 
"~ 
House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
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NOT USED 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
July 31, 1987 
Dear Mr. Pr~ent: 
Following up on "my letter to you of this 
date, please be a~sed I am able to resume 
the discharge of the Constitutional powers 
and duties of the Ofn~/ of the President 
of the United States./ !"-have informed the 
Vice President of det~mination and my 
resumotion of tho e power~ and duties. 
~ ~ 
\. 
Sincerely., 
\. 
The Honorable John C. Stennis 
President pro tempore 
of the Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
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WASHINGTON 
NOT USED 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
"-, 
Following 'op on my letter to ou of July 31, 
1987, please ·be advised I able to resume 
the discharge 'of. the Constitutional powers 
and duties of the'-Office of the President 
of the United States-.. ,, I have informed the 
Vice President of my 'Ci~termination and my 
resumption of those powers and duties. 
I Sinc:;~ly, 
The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the 
House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
w 
(f) 
:::> 
0 
I 
w 
I-
I 
~ 
w 
I 
I-
THE WHITE HOl.SE 
WASHINGTON 
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Dear Mr~ .sident: 
Following up n my letter to you of July 31, 
1987, please b advised I am able to resume 
the discharge ot the Constitutional powers 
and duties of the Office of the President 
of the United Stat have informed the 
Vice President of m determination and my 
resumption of t,hos wers and duties. 
I 
// Si \y, 
The Honorable John C. Stennis 
President pro tempore 
of the Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
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THE WHITE HOl:SE 
WASHIJ'<GTON 
July 31, 1987 
Dear Mr. President: 
I am about~undergo surgery during which t' e I will 
be briefly an temporarily incapable of disc rging the 
Constitutional owers and duties of the Of ce of the 
President of the '\United States. 
As I have indicat~n the past in s~mfu:r circumstances, 
I am mindful of the =, ovisions of S,,e'ction 3 of the 25th 
Am~ndment. to. the Con tituti?n a~d of the uncert~nties 
of 1ts apphcation to sue . brief )Ind temporary periods of 
incapacity. I do not believe that the drafters of this 
Amendment intended its ap)µication to situations such as 
the instant one. // ·,\ 
Nevertheless, consistent with rlty long-standing arrangement 
with Vice President ~orge Bush, and not intending to set 
a precedent binding/ anyone privileged to hold this Office 
in the future, I have determined and it is my intention and 
direction that Vice President George Bush shall discharge 
those powers a?ld duties in my stead \Commencing with the 
administratioyof general anesthesia to .. me in this instance. 
I , 
I shall a~· 'e you and the Vice President when I determine 
that I am ble to resume the discharge of the Constitutional 
powers d duties of this Office. \ 
\ 
May God bless this Nation and us all. \ 
\ 
Sincerely, 
The Honorable John C. Stennis 
President pro tempore 
of the Senate 
Washington, D. C. 20510 
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NOT USED 
THE \\'HITE HOl"SE 
WASHl,GTO}.; 
July 31, 1987 
De~. Speaker: \ /' 
I am about,, to undergo surgery during whiyr( time I will 
be briefly ard temporarily incapable of discharging the 
Constitutional powers and duties of the j)'ffice of the 
President of the United States. / 
As I have indic~d in the past in ¢milar circumstances, 
I am mindful of th~ provisions of Section 3 of the 25th 
Amendment to the Constitution artd of the uncertainties 
of its application to such brief .Amd temporary periods of 
incapacity. I do not b€1ieve that the drafters of this 
Amendment intended its \{lpplication to situations such as 
the instant one. \/ 
I \ 
Nevertheless, consisten~ ·with my long-standing arrangement 
with Vice President George Bush, and not intending to set 
a precedent binding anyone pnvileged to hold this Office 
in the future, I hav.e determined and it is my intention and 
direction that Vice ,President George Bush shall discharge 
those powers and 'duties in my stead commencing with the · 
administration of/general anesthesia to me in this instance. 
I shall advise :fou and the Vice Pre~ident when I determine 
that I am abie to resume the discharge , of the Constitutional 
powers and !duties of this Office. 
I 
May God j>less this Nation and us all. 
!' 
The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the 
House of Representatives 
Washington, D. C. 20515 
Sincerely, 
' 
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